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Security is becoming a major concern in this information era. The development
in wireless communications, networking technology, personal computing devices,
and software engineering has led to numerous emerging applications whose secu-
rity requirements are beyond the framework of conventional cryptography. The
primary motivation of this dissertation research is to develop new approaches to
the security problems in secure communication systems, without unduly increasing
the complexity and cost of the entire system.
Signal processing techniques have been widely applied in communication sys-
tems. In this dissertation, we investigate the potential, the mechanism, and the
performance of incorporating signal processing techniques into various layers along
the chain of secure information processing. For example, for application-layer data
confidentiality, we have proposed atomic encryption operations for multimedia data
that can preserve standard compliance and are friendly to communications and del-
egate processing. For multimedia authentication, we have discovered the potential
key disclosure problem for popular image hashing schemes, and proposed mitiga-
tion solutions. In physical-layer wireless communications, we have discovered the
threat of signal garbling attack from compromised relay nodes in the emerging
cooperative communication paradigm, and proposed a countermeasure to trace
and pinpoint the adversarial relay. For the design and deployment of secure sen-
sor communications, we have proposed two sensor location adjustment algorithms
for mobility-assisted sensor deployment that can jointly optimize sensing cover-
age and secure communication connectivity. Furthermore, for general scenarios of
group key management, we have proposed a time-efficient key management scheme
that can improve the scalability of contributory key management from O(log n) to
O(log(log n)) using scheduling and optimization techniques.
This dissertation demonstrates that signal processing techniques, along with
optimization, scheduling, and beneficial techniques from other related fields of
study, can be successfully integrated into security solutions in practical communi-
cation systems. The fusion of different technical disciplines can take place at every
layer of a secure communication system to strengthen communication security and
improve performance-security tradeoff.
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Security is becoming a major concern in this information era. The development
in wireless communications, networking technology, personal computing devices,
and software engineering has led to numerous emerging applications whose com-
plex security requirements are beyond the framework of end-to-end cryptography.
The complexity lies in the fact that emerging electronic devices often contain mul-
tiple functional layers and components, each performing different functionality
while interacting with each other. On the system level, applications that use such
electronic devices nowadays could involve a large number of users, who are often
required to perform tasks in a coordinated way with heterogeneous communication
capability. The primary motivation of this dissertation research is to discover new
approaches to the security problems in emerging communication technologies and
multimedia applications, without unduly increasing the complexity and cost of the
entire system.
The issue of information security arises in different forms and may cause dam-
1
ages of different severity. For example, piracy in digital video, audio and software
incurs huge damage to the economy. A 2001 study shows that the estimated annual
revenue losses due to piracy by the Recording Industry Association of America,
the Motion Picture Association of America, and the software industry are 3 billion,
4.2 billion, and 11 billion US dollars, respectively. The impact of identity theft
on the economy is even larger. A comprehensive study by the US Federal Trade
Commission found that there were nearly 10 million victims of identity theft in
2002, and identity theft cost businesses and individuals nearly 50 billion dollars in
that year alone [19].
In addition to economic damages, security problems in the emerging commu-
nication and multimedia systems may also lead to the compromise of personal
privacy, and corporate or state proprietary information. Such information can be
exploited by adversaries for malicious purposes. For example, electronic patient
record has the potential to allow health care provider and patients to interact more
efficiently. However, such records may also be illegally sold to insurance compa-
nies, police departments, employers, drug companies. Such concerns have been
recently raised by academic experts toward the patient record system “Connecting
for Health”, which was deployed by the National Health Service of the United King-
dom [5]. An astonishing security breach in electronic records recently occurred at
the United States Department of Veteran Affairs, which could leak private informa-
tion of up to 26.5 million veterans and active-duty service-members 1. In addition,
security issues also exist during information transmission. For instance, many com-
munications system rely on wireless radio transmission, which is very flexible in
terms of deployment, but can be easily eavesdropped and interfered. Applications
1http://www.firstgov.gov/veteransinfo.shtml
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using radio communications, such as ad-hoc network and sensor network, may also
be deployed in hostile environment. For these applications, a comprehensive secu-
rity framework is required to ensure information confidentiality and authenticity,
detect system intrusion, and trace security breaches.
1.2 Background
In this section, we introduce general background related to security in communi-
cation systems and multimedia applications. We focus on various aspects where
existing security solutions cannot meet the requirements of the emerging applica-
tions, and provide general philosophies on how to resolve such issues.
In the past, the security in communication systems have been addressed mainly
by cryptography. To achieve various security goals, cryptographic primitives, such
as encryption tools, authentication tools, and cryptographic random number gen-
erators are designed [76][115]. The role of encryption tool is to protect the confiden-
tiality of data, by either encrypting the data one block at a time (i.e. block-cipher),
or performing bit-by-bit encryption (i.e. stream cipher)[115]. For authenticating
the content of a message, hash functions can be used. A hash function is a one-
way function producing a fixed-length binary sequence from a variable-length input
message [76]. Based on the cryptographic primitives, cryptographic protocols can
be developed to specify how to use the cryptographic primitives in order to achieve
a security objective [52]. Usually a cryptographic protocol specifies a sequence of
actions to be taken by the protocol participants, as well as certain conditions to be
satisfied for the protocol to be successfully carried out. One such example is the
key management protocol. Since most (symmetric-key) cryptographic primitives
require a secret key as input, the information sender and receiver usually need to
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agree upon the same secret key before such cryptographic operations as encryption
and decryption can be performed. The key management protocol achieves this goal
by either using a trusted third party, called the key distribution center, or using
public-key cryptographic primitive such as the Diffie-Hellman algorithm [52].
Traditionally, communication system and upper layer multimedia applications
are separately considered in system design. With the advances in communications
and networking, and multimedia signal processing, more integrated approaches
have been proposed for multimedia communications. For instance, unequal error
protection techniques for transmitting multimedia over error prone channels have
been proposed to exploit the different importance in various layers of media repre-
sentation [121]. For multicasting multimedia content over heterogeneous network,
efficient media transcoding schemes have been proposed to adapt the bit-rate of
media content according to available bandwidth, processing power, or display res-
olution [138]. At the same time, more communication system designs take into
account the nature of data being transmitted and the applications that utilize
the communication channel. For example, different streams of data, such as voice,
video, image, or text are assigned different priorities in the communication system.
For delay-sensitive applications, such as interactive voice, more network resources
will be reserved to achieve better quality of service. In such an integrated multi-
media communication system, incorporating a security component is a challenging
task. If we encrypt the multimedia content using a contemporary cipher directly,
the encryption will remove the bit stream syntax contained in the compressed me-
dia. However, doing so may hinder the capability of rate adaptation in network
transmission, or applying unequal error protection when the media is transported
through error prone channels [72]. This is because most of the bit-rate adaptation
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schemes and unequal error protection schemes rely on the syntax and structure
in the coded media content to identify which part of the media stream is more
important. Verifying the authenticity of the media content is equally challenging
as encryption. Since the media content can go through rate adaptation or be cor-
rupted by transmission noise/packet loss, the bit-by-bit representation of media
content may be changed. Ideally, such graceful quality degradation does not indi-
cate malicious modification of the content, and the received content should still be
considered authentic in principle. Unfortunately, these goals cannot be achieved
by directly applying cryptographic hash to media authentication. In this disserta-
tion, we will introduce techniques to address these challenges in secure multimedia
communications.
One special class of security problems is how to trace an adversary or compro-
mised user within a group of users. We introduce an abstraction of the traitor
tracing in the cooperative communication scenario as follows. Let us consider a
group of nodes that can communicate with each other. One node s sends a message
M to a destination node d, through a number of relay nodes r1, r2, ..., rn. Each of
these relay nodes obtains a message from sender s containing (almost) the same
content, and may or may not forward this message to d. There are one or multiple
adversaries within the group of relay nodes. These adversaries can modify the
message M to M ′ and send M ′ to the destination d. Upon receiving a message
M , d may want to find out the following information: (1) from which relay the
message M was sent, and (2) whether the message has been tampered. When
combining the answer to both questions, we can detect the tampering and relate
it to the compromised relay node(s). This is especially useful in tracing informa-
tion tampering in relay communications, such as in wireless ad hoc networks. In
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such networks, the wireless communication channel and the malicious nature of
attacks can make the task of traitor tracing very challenging. The message s sent
to each relay node ri could contain the same content plus the relay node’s unique
ID. However, if the relay node(s) is adversarial, it (they) will have every incentive
to remove such ID information to avoid being identified. Another example is that
the received message at d is a superposition of relay messages from multiple relay
nodes through wireless channel. The relay signals are combined by physical laws
related to microwave signal propagation. In this situation, it is very hard for the
destination node to distinguish which part of the received message is contributed
by which relay node. It is clear that solving such a traitor tracing problem not
only requires cryptographic tools, but also involves signal processing to take into
account the nature of signal transmission over the physical communication channel.
In an electronic system that involves communication, signal processing, and
system security, there are tradeoffs among security, performance and functionality.
Since the security subsystem is a part of the overall system, it will interact with
other components in the system. The functionality and performance of all system
components may be mutually constrained and affected. The security-performance
or security-functionality tradeoffs are very important because, as secure commu-
nication systems become more complex, the interaction and interdependency be-
tween the security subsystem and other system components are also becoming
more intricate. Sometimes adding a security component may lead to incompat-
ibility with other system components or substantial performance loss. In order
to achieve security and improve the performance in the overall system, one can
seek to optimize the security protocol when the security sub-system is stand-alone
and such optimization will not drastically affect other system components. Other-
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wise, one should seek to optimize the tradeoff between the security component and
other performance aspects in the system design, which can lead to a more balanced
system performance. One example in security-performance tradeoff is the tradeoff
between key manage protocol and other system performance aspects. Such a trade-
off has an especially significant impact to the overall system performance in group
communications. First, the complexity and cost of the key management should
have good scalability with respect to the communication group size. Second, the
key management scheme should also take into consideration the memory and com-
putation resources available at each individual node, such as in sensor networks
or other networked embedded systems. Third, the key management scheme often
interacts with other system performance criterions. Given a practical system, how
to jointly optimize the performance of key management together with other system
performance aspects is an important issue open for investigation.
1.3 Organization and Contribution
This dissertation focuses on identifying, modelling, and solving the security prob-
lems in a single layer or across several layers of a secure communication system.
The main challenge in solving such security problems is that, the issues in appli-
cation security are often coupled with system constraints, and directly applying
existing cryptographic tools cannot solve such emerging security problems without
violating the constraints. The contributions of this dissertation can be summa-
rized in three aspects. Given an application and its security requirements, we first
model and formulate the security problems and system constraints into a common
framework. Based on such a framework, we propose new security solutions and
evaluate its strength using existing cryptographic tools and signal processing al-
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gorithms. When performance versus security tradeoffs are involved, we introduce
quantitative metrics that capture the tradeoff within the system formulation, and
improve the tradeoff using signal processing and optimization techniques.
The nature of this research is to view security issues in secure communication
systems from cross-layer, inter-disciplinary perspectives and jointly consider system
security, system constraint, and system performance. To that end, not only signal
processing theory and algorithms, but also optimization techniques, scientific com-
puting algorithms, and other related knowledge from different disciplines can be
employed in solving security problems and optimizing security versus performance
tradeoff. In this dissertation, we show such design principle through a number
of examples in different layers of secure communication systems. In Chapter 2,
we focus on application-layer communication security and introduce a joint signal
processing and cryptographic approach to multimedia encryption. We also discuss
the security and robustness tradeoff in image hashing by adapting the concept of
unicity distance pioneered by Shannon [101]. In Chapter 3, using signal process-
ing techniques for physical-layer wireless communications, we discuss how to trace
malicious attacks from adversarial relays in cooperative wireless communications,
which is an emerging communication paradigm for ad hoc networks. In Chapter 4,
we look into the joint optimization of key establishment and sensing coverage for
secure sensor network design and deployment, and propose a coordinated sensor
deployment framework that can improve the sensing and secure communication
tradeoff. For general scenarios of group key management, in Chapter 5, we inves-
tigate how to optimize the time efficiency of rekeying operations in contributory
key management, using dynamic scheduling and cost amortization. Through these
typical scenarios, we demonstrate the potential and benefits of introducing sig-
8
nal processing in formulating and solving security problems in different layers of
a secure communication system. Finally, conclusions and future perspectives are





Signal processing has played a significant role in developing coding and communi-
cation technologies for digital multimedia, paving ways to many opportunities for
people around the world to acquire, utilize, and share multimedia content [93]. To
allow for wider availability of multimedia information and successful commercial-
ization of many multimedia related services, assuring that multimedia information
is used only by authorized users for authorized purposes has become essential. This
chapter focuses on jointly utilizing signal processing and cryptography to protect
the confidentiality and achieving access control of multimedia information, as well
as authenticating the media content received through communication channels.
In a typical use of multimedia illustrated in Fig. 2.1, the owner of the multi-
media content wants to distribute the content through networks or archive it for
future use. With the sophistication of heterogeneous networks and the growing
amount of information being generated, it is becoming less efficient for the con-
tent owners to manage the distribution or archiving process all by themselves.
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Figure 2.1: Typical usage of multimedia content
As a result, third-party service providers, equipped with specialized servers, huge
disk space, and abundant bandwidth resources, will serve as delegates for con-
tent owners to perform content distribution, archiving, search and retrieval. On
one hand, the delegate service providers often need to process the received media
data, such as adapting the rate of the media data according to the available band-
width. On the other hand, the owner may not want to reveal the media content
to these delegates because of security and privacy concerns. One such example is
the privacy-preserving data retrieval using untrusted server [40].
A common way to achieve content confidentiality is to encrypt the entire mul-
timedia data using a cipher, such as DES, AES, or RSA [76][115]. However, many
types of processing, such as rate adaptation for multimedia transmission in het-
erogeneous networks [58] and DC-image extraction for multimedia content search-
ing [137], cannot be applied directly in the bitstream encrypted by these generic
encryption tools or their simple variations. This implies that the delegates are still
have to hold the decryption keys to decrypt the content, process the data, and
then re-encrypt the content. Since revealing decryption keys to potentially un-
trustworthy delegates is often not in line with the security requirements of many
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applications, generic encryption alone is inadequate in the delegate service sce-
nario.
Another unique security issue with multimedia delivery is the authentication
of received media content. Since the media content may undergo changes during
network communication, using a traditional cryptographic hash for authentica-
tion may “reject” media contents that has undergone format changes, resolution
reduction, or bit/packet errors, which are not intentional tampers to the media
content [117][37]. For this reason, an ideal hash should authenticate based on the
media content, not the exact bit-by-bit representation. At the same time, the hash
should also use a secret key as input and contain randomization that cannot be
easily forged or attacked by other means. In addition to image authentication,
robust image hashing can also be used in non-oblivious watermarking for image
and video [24][14]. Instead of using the original image, the hash can provide partial
information of the image content to be used in the watermark detection phase. In
video fingerprinting, video frame hashes have been used for temporal registration
purpose [41]. For content-based multimedia retrieval, image hashes can be used
as a concise ID for each image. Thus fast and effective comparison of image con-
tent can be achieved by comparing the distance of hash vectors [62]. In all these
applications, the image hashing scheme needs to be resilient to a set of authen-
ticate modifications and sometimes minor intentional distortions to the original
image content. These modifications include rotation, scaling, noise corruption,
and common image filtering.
The first step towards addressing the aforementioned issues is to design flexible
multimedia encryption schemes that can handle delegate processing and achieve
access control by content and quality [65], as well as content-based multimedia au-
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thentication tools. In this chapter, we first focus on the design of encryption tools
for multimedia that can encrypt once and securely process in many ways using the
existing multimedia signal processing techniques. To achieve this goal, we jointly
consider signal processing and cryptography in our exploration of multimedia en-
cryption. In particular, we investigate the possible domains in which encryptions
can be applied, including the sample domain, the quantized transform domain, the
intermediate bitplanes, and the bitstream domain. We propose and analyze two
atomic encryption operations tailored for multimedia signals, namely, a general-
ized index mapping encryption tool with controlled overhead and an intra-bitplane
encryption tool compatible with fine granularity scalable coding. A video en-
cryption system, which incorporates the proposed operations and other relatively
straightforward extensions of generic encryption, is then studied. The resulting
system takes into consideration the structure and syntax of multimedia sources
and protects the content confidentiality during delegate processing. Then we in-
vestigate the security and robustness tradeoff exhibited in image hashing schemes,
by adapting the unicity distance concept pioneered by Shannon [101]. Through
two examples, we show that the security of typical image hashing schemes can be
quantitatively analyzed. Such security analysis framework can provide guidance
in the design of multimedia hashing schemes.
2.1 Background and Preliminaries
We examine in this section the possible domains in which encryption can be ap-
plied to multimedia, along with a review of prior work. Using a widely adopted
multimedia coding framework, we illustrate the candidate domains for applying
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Figure 2.2: Candidate domains to apply encryption to multimedia
2.1.1 Encryption Before and After Coding
According to Fig. 2.2, there are two straightforward places to apply generic encryp-
tion to multimedia. The first possibility is to encrypt multimedia samples before
any compression (i.e. Stage 1 in Fig. 2.2). The main problem with this approach
is that the encryption often significantly changes the statistical characteristics of
the original multimedia source, resulting in much reduced compressibility. It is
worth noting a novel approach has been recently proposed to efficiently compress
encrypted data [49]. By employing distributed source coding theory, this new
method achieves the same compression gain as compressing the unencrypted data
in the case of ideal Gaussian source. The compression gain, however, would be
reduced for more general source that is common in practice, and it cannot easily
support many other forms of delegate processing.
The second possibility is to apply generic encryption to the encoded bitstream
after compression (i.e., Stage 5 and 6 in Fig. 2.2) [94]. This approach introduces
little overhead, but may destroy the structures and syntax readily available in the
unencrypted bitstream. Such structures, often indicated by special header/marker
patterns, would enable many kinds of processing in delegate service providers and
intermediate network links, such as bandwidth adaptation, unequal error protec-
tion, and random access [136, 131, 121, 126].
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As headers and markers are special bit patterns in a compressed bitstream for a
variety of purposes [121], a simple way to realize syntax-aware encryption is only to
encrypt the content-carrying fields of the compressed multimedia bitstream, such
as the fields of motion vectors and DCT coefficients in MPEG video, and keep the
structure and headers/markers of the bitstream unchanged [125][140]. However,
this method can only preserve limited syntax from unencrypted media to facilitate
a fixed set of processing. Other advanced features in multimedia signal processing,
such as the fine granular scalable (FGS) coding [102, 95, 58], cannot be easily
preserved using this approach. Bitrate overhead also occurs in the range of 1%-8%
due to block padding and the added side information. Furthermore, each tailored
encryption technique may also require different handling by delegate processing
units. This is not always realistic, because the processing units are likely coming
from different vendors and the barrier to standardization seems insurmountable
due to market considerations [7].
After applying generic encryption, some parts of the encrypted media data
could become identical to certain headers/markers. This emulation problem can
bring potentially serious troubles to delegate service providers and intermediate
processing modules [126] when the multimedia data go through certain network
protocols, transcoding, and error recovery. One possible remedy to header emula-
tion is bit-stuffing [132], a technique that is widely adopted in the packetization
stage of network communications [111].
2.1.2 Encryption at Intermediate Stages of Coding
Recently, there have been interests in studying how to encrypt multimedia data
in such a way that the encrypted data can still be represented in a meaningful,
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standard-compliant format [86]. They are particularly useful for secure delegate
services and multimedia communications that prefer handling media streams com-
pliant to certain multimedia coding standard, such as JPEG or MPEG-1/2/4 stan-
dard [126][127]. The encryption is performed in the intermediate stages illustrated
in Fig. 2.2. For example, at Stage-2, the motion vectors in video can be encrypted
by applying DES to their codeword indices [126]. At Stage-3, DC and selected
AC coefficients in each block of a JPEG image or an MPEG video frame can be
shuffled within the block [112], or across blocks but within the same frequency
band [141]. At Stage-4, the entropy codeword can be spatially shuffled within
the compressed bitstream [127]; the Huffman codewords of coefficients and/or mo-
tion vectors can be encrypted by alternating between several Huffman codebooks
in a cryptographically secure fashion [130]. At Stage-5, only intra-coded frames
and blocks of an MPEG video are selected and encrypted using a classic DES
cipher [133] or its variations [94]. Some of these schemes are also known as selec-
tive encryption [127, 133, 130], i.e., they encrypt only portions of multimedia data
stream that carry rich content, in hope of alleviating the problem of high compu-
tational complexity and the potential bitrate overhead. However, we believe that
the computational complexity in encryption is not a major concern given the fast-
growing computation power and the efficient implementation of established generic
encryption tools. In contrast, the protection of content confidentiality under dif-
ferent processing scenarios, such as delegate services and communications, is of
paramount urgency. Unfortunately, few existing work has thoroughly considered
these scenarios.
In Section 2.2 and Section 2.3, we propose two general atomic encryption op-
erations using index mapping and constrained shuffling to achieve confidential-
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ity protection in delegate services and other processing scenarios. The rationale
is to ensure that the encrypted bitstream still complies with the state-of-the-art
multimedia coding techniques. We are particularly interested in how much price
in terms of security and compressibility these techniques have to pay to achieve
standard-compliant encryption, and we answer this question through analysis and
simulations.
2.1.3 Content-based Authentication using Image Hashing
Image hash is a content-based concise representation of an image. Just as the
traditional cryptographic hash, image hash can be used to verify the authenticity of
image content. To this end, the generation of the image hash must be randomized
according to a secret key, which is to ensure that an unauthorized user will not be
able to forge a hash without the key. What makes image hash different from the
cryptographic hash is that, an image usually allows different representations for
approximately the same content. For example, an image may be compressed to
lower bit-rate or corrupted by noise during transmission. After such distortions,
the bit-by-bit representation of the image has been changed while the content has
been preserved. In order to verify the authenticity of the image content under
such situations, an ideal image hashing scheme should be robust against moderate
distortions, such as rotation, scaling, filtering, compression, and additive noise, etc.
In the literature, a number of robust image hashing schemes have been proposed
in recent years [117][37][108][79]. In Section 2.6, we show that the robust image
hashing schemes should be used in a proper way, otherwise an adversary would
be able to exploit the robustness constraint in image hashing schemes, deduce the
hashing key, or forge a valid hash for a completely new image. We will present our
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analysis under the framework of unicity distance proposed by Shannon.
The concept of unicity distance was pioneered by Claude Shannon in investi-
gating encryption systems[101]. The basic idea is that, when a secret key is used to
encrypt multiple messages, the amount of uncertainty in the encryption key (or the
cipher text for a new message) reduces with the increased number of observed clear
text-cipher text pairs. When the number of observed cryptograms is large enough,
one can almost surely determine the secret key from the observations. The number
of observations (or some normalized form) is called the unicity distance. Thus the
unicity distance quantifies how many clear text-cipher text pairs are required to
almost surely determine the secret key.
Shannon demonstrated the concept of unicity distance using a two-letter sub-
stitution cipher in his paper[101]. The field of cryptography has been advanced
significantly since Shannon’s discovery. Most contemporary block ciphers nowa-
days require a minimum key length that is 64 bits or more. For a message block
of 128 bits or more, one would require an enormous number of clear text-cipher
text pairs to deduce the secret key. Therefore it is hard to demonstrate the unic-
ity distance in contemporary ciphers. However, for perceptual hashes that are
constrained by the robustness requirement, we found that demonstrating unicity
distance only requires a few dozen of observed image-hash pairs. These results are
presented in Section 2.6.
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2.2 Generalized Index Mapping with Controlled
Overhead
Unlike generic data encryption where the encryption output can take values over
the entire data space, joint signal processing and cryptographic encryption requires
that the encrypted output should satisfy additional constraints. These constraints
are essential to preserve the structure, syntax, and standard compliance that enable
delegate processing and leads to communication friendliness. A format-compliant
encryption scheme was proposed in [126] by assigning a fixed-length index to each
variable length codeword (VLC), encrypting the concatenated indices, and then
mapping the encrypted indices back to codeword domain to form an encrypted bit-
stream. This prior approach would work well with such codes as the Huffman codes
and the Golomb-Rice codes, which associate each symbol coming from a finite set
with a unique codeword of integer length, but it cannot be directly applied to VLCs
that allow fractional codeword length per symbol, such as the arithmetic codes.
In addition, this prior encryption work incurs a substantial amount of bitrate
overhead, and analytic study has not been provided regarding the overhead. In
this section, we construct and analyze an encryption tool that can overcome these
two problems.
2.2.1 Generalized Index Mapping
We extend the index encryption idea to apply encryption directly to symbols that
take values from a finite set before getting into VLC codeword domain. Exam-
ples include working with quantized coefficients and quantized prediction residues
(Stage #3 in Fig. 2.2), as well as run-length coding symbols (Stage #4 in Fig. 2.2).
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The encryption process to produce a ciphertext symbol X(enc) from a clear-text
symbol X is shown as follows:
X(enc) = Enc(X) , T−1[E(T (X))], (2.1)
where E(·) is a core encryption primitive such as AES or one-time pad [115], and
T (·) represents a codebook that establishes a bijective mapping between all possible
symbol values and indices represented by binary strings. The goal of this bijection
is to produce fixed-length indices that will be passed to subsequent encryption or
decryption. The decryption process has a similar structure:
X = Dec(X(enc)) , T−1[D(T (X(enc)))], (2.2)
where D(·) is a core decryption primitive corresponding to E(·).
As a simple example, we consider encrypting a string of symbols coming from
a finite set {A, B, C, D}. The symbol sequence to be encrypted is “ABBDC”. We
first assign a fixed-length index to each symbol:
A → [00], B → [01],
C → [10], D → [11].
We then convert the symbol sequence to an index sequence “00 01 01 11 10”,
and encrypt the index sequence using an appropriate encryption primitive such
as a stream cipher (the one-time pad) with a random bit-stream [0100 1011 1001
...]. Finally we convert the encrypted index sequence “01 01 11 00 00” back to
symbol sequence “BBDAA”. After encryption, any appropriate VLC coding can
be applied to the encrypted symbol sequence. It is worth noting that in such an
encryption one input symbol can be mapped to different encrypted cipher-text.
For instance, in the previous example the symbol B has appeared in the clear-text
sequence twice, the first time it was mapped to B and the second time to D.
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When processing a large sequence of symbols, the encryption method by index
mapping tends to make the encrypted symbols uniformly distributed, which is
good in terms of security [115]. However, the entropy of the encrypted symbols is
increased from the unencrypted ones. Since the compressibility of a sequence of
symbols using entropy coding depends on the entropy of the source symbols [23],
the index-mapping encryption would bring a bit-rate overhead in compression.
Next, we discuss how to quantify and control this overhead.
2.2.2 Analysis and Control of Overhead
In the following analysis, we investigate the impact of the index encryption on the
compressibility of the source symbols, which can be quantified by the changes in
average code length before and after encrypting a sequence of symbols.
Case-1
We consider compressing the source symbols using a default entropy codebook as
provided by many multimedia standards. The default codebook is obtained from a
set of representative training samples and is used most of the time for the simplicity
of implementation. We denote the probability mass function of the symbols prior
to encryption by {pi}, that of the symbols after encryption by {qi}, and the code
length designed for distribution {pi} by {li}. If encryption is performed on an
index drawn from the full range of symbol values, the distribution of ciphertext
symbols, q, will be uniform over the entire range. Alternatively, if we partition
the range of symbol values into mutually exclusive subsets {Sj} and restrict the
outcome of the encryption of a symbol x ∈ Sj to be within the subset Sj, i.e.,
Enc(x) ∈ Sj, the distribution q will be a piecewise uniform approximation of p, as
21
illustrated in Fig. 2.3.
Consider {qi} to be a piecewise uniform approximation of {pi}, i.e., for each sub-




i∈Sj qi = |Sj|q(Sj), where q(Sj) , qi for all i ∈ Sj, and | · | denotes the cardinality
of a set. Assuming that encryption changes the symbol distribution from {pi} to
the above {qi} and the same codebook of code length {li} is used both before and




(qi − pi)li = D(p||q) + D(q||r)−D(p||r), (2.3)
where D(·||·) represents the Kullback-Leibler divergence, and r represents a proba-
bility distribution of {ri , P (R = i) = 2−li/
∑
k 2
−lk}. The derivation is presented
in Appendix-A.
If we partition the symbol range S into more than one subset and restrict the
encryption output to be in the same subset as the input symbol, the complexity
of a brute-force attack for each symbol is reduced 1 from 2|S| to 2|Sj |, where Sj is
the subset to which the symbol belongs. On the other hand, the overhead is also
reduced because in the Kullback-Leibler divergence sense the distance from the
original distribution p to the piecewise uniform distribution q is closer than that to
a completely uniform distribution. Thus by controlling the set partitioning, we can
adjust the tradeoff between the security and the overhead. In addition, Eq. (2.3)
suggests that the optimality of the codelength {li} designed for probability distri-
bution {pi} affects the changes of the expected code length after encryption. If
the code is optimal for {pi}, i.e., li = − log pi, then D(p||r) = 0 and Eq. (2.3) is
reduced to δL = D(p||q) + D(q||p).
1This is equivalent to encrypting fewer bits of the indices. As to be discussed later in this










Figure 2.3: Index mapping within subsets gives piecewise constant approximation
of the distribution.
Case-2
We consider compressing the source symbols using adaptive or universal entropy
coding that adjusts itself to the source’s distribution. Arithmetic coding and
Lempel-Ziv coding are two such examples. Assuming that the adaptive entropy
coding can achieve the entropy bound for any source distribution, we exploit the
piece-wise constant property of {qi} and show in Appendix-A that the change of
the average codeword length is
δL = H{qi} −H{pi} = D(p||q), (2.4)
where H{xi} is the entropy of a discrete random variable following the distribution
{xi}. Similar to the first case, this result also indicates that if we partition the
symbol range S into more than one subset and restrict the encryption output to be
in the same subset as the input symbol, the distribution of encrypted source, {qi},
can better resemble that of the original source, {pi}, leading to reduced overhead
in compression.
The final result of the relative bitrate overhead (η) also depends on the ratio of













1 denotes the size of the encrypted part and ηe is the relative overhead
for the part being encrypted. Even if ηe is large as in the case of prior work [126],
the overall overhead can be constrained if only a relatively small part of the stream
is encrypted. With our proposed technique of set partitioning, the overall over-
head can be controlled both through reducing ηe and through maintaining a low
B1/B ratio by selectively encrypting only a portion of the stream (such as the
perceptually significant coefficients).
2.2.3 Set-Partitioning in Index Mapping
As we have seen, the set partitioning technique can control the bitrate overhead
introduced by the index mapping encryption, trading off the resistance against
brute-force attacks. The choice of partition also affects the security against esti-
mation attack. Since the encryption flattens the distribution within each subset,
no particular clue of the exact unencrypted source value can be inferred from its
encrypted value. The best estimate of an unencrypted value X in terms of the
mean square error has to resort to its conditional statistical distribution in the
subset Sj. It can be shown that, by observing X
(enc) ∈ Sj, the minimum mean
square error (MMSE) estimate X̂ for X is
X̂ = argmintE(|X − t|2|X(enc)) = E(X|Sj), (2.6)
and the corresponding mean square error is
E(|X̂ −X|2|Sj) = V ar(X|Sj). (2.7)
It has been known that many variables in efficient multimedia representation,
including the quantized transform coefficients and prediction residues, follow a
symmetric zero-mean distribution such as a Gaussian distribution or a Laplacian
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distribution. For these variables, if the subset partition is symmetric around zero,
as shown in the example of Fig. 2.3, the MMSE estimate of the original value given
the encrypted one will always be zero, regardless of the subset. This means that
the sign of the original value is not inferrable. Since the sign, or more generally,
the phase, is known to carry important information of a signal [84], an attacker
can hardly get any useful information from such MMSE estimation. However, if
the partition is not symmetric, for example, as in Fig. 2.4, the MMSE estimates
still preserve the sign and the approximate energy of the original value for each
subset. Such a choice of partition can leak a substantial amount of information to




Figure 2.4: Set partition with subsets asymmetric to zero
For several popular entropy coding techniques such as those in JPEG and
MPEG, the choice of set partition can be tailored to eliminate the overhead. For
example, the JPEG standard employs run-length coding, where the run of zero
coefficients are coded before the encoding of a non-zero coefficient. If we only
encrypt the values of non-zero coefficients and group all coefficient values with the
same code-length into the same subset, the code-length of the encrypted value will
be identical to that of the unencrypted one. No bitrate overhead will be introduced
in this particular case.
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2.2.4 Examples and Discussions
As an example, we encrypt the DC prediction residues of the JPEG representation
of the 512 × 512 Lena image using the index mapping approach. In JPEG, the
DC coefficient in each block collectively captures the coarse information of an
image and is differentially encoded to reduce the redundancy. For natural images,
DC differential residues are approximately Laplacianly distributed with very small
probability outside the range of [−63, 64]. We encode both the unencrypted and
the encrypted prediction residues with the default Huffman table in the JPEG
standard. Without encryption, the average code length for encoding DCs is 5.78
bits. In the first encryption experiment, we apply the proposed generalized index
encryption to the DC differential residues within [−63, 64] without set partitioning.
The index encryption is realized via XORing with a one-time pad, resulting in
an average code length of 8.60 bits, or an overhead of 2.82 bits. In the second
encryption experiment, we partition the symbol range of [−63, 64] into two subsets
[−31, 32] and [−63,−32] ∪ [33, 64], and restrict the input and output of index
encryption to be in the same subset. Fig. 2.5 shows the encryption result of the
Lenna image 2. With set partitioning, the overhead in average code length is
reduced from 2.82 bits to 1.53 bits.
2Encrypting DC alone is not secure enough as an attacker can still get the edge information
by setting the DCs to constant and observing the resulting image. We only encrypt DC in this
experiment for the purpose of demonstrating the proposed approach as one potential building
block. We will show in Section 2.5 that a complete encryption system should encrypt both DCs
and other information.
26
Figure 2.5: Encryption results using the Lenna image based on generalized index
mapping of DC differential residues: (left) original, (right) encrypted.
2.3 Constrained Shuffling
Random permutation or shuffling is a common cryptographic primitive operation.
The temporal characteristic of audio and video data as well as the spatial charac-
teristic of visual data make permutation a natural way to scramble the semantic
meaning of multimedia signals. Even before the arrival of digital technology, an
early work by Cox et al. builds an analog voice privacy system on a subband rep-
resentation framework and permutes time segments of subband signals across both
time and frequency [25]. More sophisticated coding techniques have been employed
by modern digital coding systems. Thus to control the bit-rate overhead and allow
for delegate processing, random permutation should be performed in a constrained
way and in appropriate domains. In this section, we use the encryption of scalable
video with fine granularity as an example to illustrate the proposed constrained
shuffling technique, which is known as the intra bitplane shuffling. This encryption
technique is compatible with fine granularity scalable coding and provides a tool
for access control of multimedia content at different quality levels.
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2.3.1 Intra Bitplane Shuffling (IBS)
Fine granularity scalability (FGS) is desirable in multimedia communications to
provide a near-continuous tradeoff between bitrate and quality. FGS is commonly
achieved by bitplane coding, as used in the embedded zero-tree wavelet (EZW)
coder [102] and the MPEG-4 FGS coder [95]. We shall use the MPEG-4 FGS
to illustrate the concept and the approach can be extended to other FGS coders.
As surveyed in [58], MPEG-4 FGS is a functionality provided by the MPEG-4
streaming video profile. A video is first encoded into two layers, namely, a base
layer that provides a basic quality level at a low bit rate and an enhancement layer
that provides successive refinement. The enhancement layer is encoded bitplane by
bitplane from the most significant bitplane to the least significant one to achieve
fine granularity scalability. Each bitplane within an image block is represented by
(Ri, EOPi) symbols, where Ri is the run of zeros before the i-th “1”, and EOPi is
an end-of-plane flag indicating whether the current “1” is the last bit with value 1
in the current bitplane. The run-EOP symbols are encoded using variable-length
codes and interleaved with sign bits.
To provide access control to the FGS encoded enhancement layers, the index-
based encryption discussed in Section 2.2 can be applied to each run-EOP symbol,
and the overhead can be analyzed using Eq. (2.3) or (2.4). We now present an alter-
native encryption by shuffling each bitplane according to a set of cryptographically
secure shuffle tables.
Fig. 2.6 illustrates the proposed intra-bitplane shuffling. We perform random
shuffling on each bitplane of n bits and the shuffled bitplane will then be encoded
using the run-EOP approach. For example, the first unencrypted bitplane 3 in
3We use “the first bitplane” to denote the MSB bitplane throughout this chapter.
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Fig. 2.6 “1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0” has n1 = 2 bits of value “1” out of a total of n = 10





= 45 different permutated patterns. In addition to
bit-plane shuffling, the sign bit si of each coefficient is randomly flipped according
to a pseudo-random bit bi from a one-time pad, i.e., the sign remains the same













Transform coefficients before coding and encryption
Encrypt sign bits (using a stream cipher) and bit-planes 
(using proposed intra bit-plane shuffling) 
Bitplane representation
Proposed encryption
Figure 2.6: Illustration of intra bitplane shuffling
2.3.2 Analysis of Overhead
An important property of shuffling is that the set of elements before and after
shuffling are identical. For intra-bitplane shuffling, this implies that the number
of “1”s is preserved. Thus the number of run-EOP symbols representing the en-
crypted bitplane is unchanged, ensuring no overhead coming from the increase in
the number of run-EOP symbols. We denote by Nd the number of occurrences






shuffles is equally likely for a specific n-bit bitplane with a total of n1 bits of











We therefore arrive at an expected histogram {E(Nd|n1)} versus d, which suggests
the likelihood of getting each possible run length.
Shuffling can also be done in a block larger than the block for run-EOP en-
coding. For example, we can shuffle a macroblock of n = 256 bits and perform
run-EOP encoding in a smaller block of nB = 64 bits. In this case, the expected













which will be reduced to Eq. (2.8) if n = nB. From the histogram before and after
encryption we can arrive at the expected overhead per symbol.
As a proof-of-concept, we experiment on the FGS encoded enhancement layer
of two video sequences in QCIF format (176 × 144 pixels per frame). One is 10
frames from the “Foreman” sequence, and the other is 100 frames the “Carphone”
sequence. We use intra-bitplane shuffling to encrypt each bitplane of the enhance-
ment bitstream, where shuffling is performed on a macroblock (n = 256) followed
by encoding block by block (nB = 64). The expected histograms {E(Nd|n1)} is
presented in Fig. 2.7, which also shows that the experimental results match the
above analytic results very well.
To compare different encryption approaches, we use the “Foreman” sequence
and encrypt the first three most significant bitplanes, which provides sufficient
visual scrambling on the enhancement layer. We have found that for the “Foreman”
sequence, the intra bitplane shuffling approach gives an overhead of 7.0%, while
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the overhead by the index-mapping approach in Section 2.2 is 14.3%. In general,
the bitrate overhead for each bitplane by the proposed shuffling approach depends
on the overhead of each run-length symbol and the number of symbols (n1), as
reflected in the plot of the overhead contributed by each bitplane in Fig. 2.8. The
arc shape is a result of an increase in symbol number from MSBs to LSBs and a
decrease in overhead per symbol. From Fig. 2.8 we can also see that some videos,
such as “Foreman”, have very few number of “1”s in the MSB. Therefore the
overhead from encrypting the MSB is very small. This also suggests that the MSB
alone does not contribute to the perceptual quality significantly in these sequences,
and more bitplanes should be protected.
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Figure 2.7: Expected histograms of zero-run lengths after intra-bitplane shuffling:
solid line indicates the analytic result, and circles indicate the experimental result;
the number of “1”s per macroblock (n1) is 28 bits, which is the average from the
2nd MSB bitplane of the “Foreman”.
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Intra Bit-plane Shuffling: Overhead vs BitPlane
Foreman
Carphone
Figure 2.8: Overhead of each bitplane by intra-bitplane shuffling algorithm.
2.3.3 The Security of IBS
The security of intra bitplane shuffling is affected by how shuffle tables are gen-
erated and used. Shuffle tables can be generated from a cryptographically strong
pseudorandom sequence using a classical linear-complexity algorithm [55]. Differ-
ent shuffle tables should be used for different bitplanes, which forces attackers to
resort to a brute-force search to simultaneously guess the permutation table used
in multiple bitplanes. Similarly, the shuffle tables should be updated frequently
without reuse. The amount of brute-force trials for finding the exact clear-text of














1 is the number of “1”s in the j-th bitplane of the i-th block, and Nblk
and Nbp represent the number of blocks and bitplanes, respectively. As an example,
we consider recovering exactly the second bit-plane in the “Foreman” sequence.
This bit-plane is important because adding it to the base-plus-MSB video improves
the PSNR from 29dB to 33.4dB. In the second bit-plane, the average number of
“1”s in each shuffled 8x8 block is about 7 in the “Foreman” sequence. Suppose
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each shuffled block has 7 bit of “1”s in a bit-plane with QCIF size, the number






is equivalent to guessing approximately 105 encrypted bits. In this situation, a
brute-force attacker would rather guess the cryptographic key used in generating
shuffling tables, which is 128 bits long.
Another security aspect is how many bit-planes should be encrypted in order to
provide sufficient protection. From our study using a number of video sequences, we
found that when the sign information and the first three bit-planes are unknown,
adding lower bit-planes to based layer video will degrade the quality of based
layer video both perceptually and in terms of PSNR. This is because without
the higher bit-planes and the sign information, the lower bit-planes behave like
random noise. A similar observation has also been introduced in the streaming
video literature [12]. Another observation from the FGS literature is that the first
three bit-planes, especially the second bit-plane, contribute most to the refinement
of the quality [58]. Hence we believe that encrypting the first three bit-planes along
with the sign information can provide sufficient protection for most multimedia
applications.
2.3.4 Other Forms of Constrained Shuffling
Since shuffling auditory signals temporally or visual signals spatially can easily
make the shuffled signal unintelligible, random shuffle among self-contained coding
units (such as the macro-blocks in compressed video), has been a popular tool
for multimedia encryption and appears in various forms [112, 94, 141, 127]. We
refer to this encryption method as coded block shuffling (CBS). A major drawback
for block shuffling alone lies in the fact that the information within a block is
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perfectly retained. An attacker can exploit the correlation across the blocks (such
as the continuity of edges and similarity of colors and textures) and reassemble the
shuffled blocks with a moderate number of trials 4. The reassembly effort can be
significantly smaller than the brute force search as many unlikely search directions
are pruned [85]. Therefore, block shuffling alone is often not a secure encryption
operation. We will incorporate block/macroblock shuffling as a complementary
building block to our two proposed operations and explore their combinations in
the design of an encryption system in Section 2.5.
2.4 Attack Modelling and Security Measurement
In this section, we introduce a notion of multimedia-oriented security to evaluate
the security against approximation recovery. To illustrate this concept, we shall
use the security of visual data as an example and propose two visual security scores.
The principles behind these security scores can be extended to auditory and other
types of multimedia.
2.4.1 Approximation Recovery
One simple and common way to evaluate the security is to count the number
of brute-force trials in order to break the encryption, which is proportional to
min{| clear-text space |, | key space |}, where | · | denotes cardinality. Aside from
the brute-force search, there are also notions of security that quantify the security
of a system in terms of the amount of resources needed to break it [9] [10]. How-
4This is usually true when the block is large enough. For small blocks, such as block of size
2x2, the correlation information between blocks is hard to exploit.
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ever, the traditional all-or-nothing situation in generic data security is not always
appropriate for measuring the security of multimedia encryption [112, 133, 141].
Beyond the exact recovery from ciphertext, it is also important to ensure partial
information that is perceptually intelligible is not leaked out from the ciphertext.
Many forms of multimedia data, such as image, video, audio and speech, contain
inherent spatial and/or temporal correlation. The encrypted multimedia content
may be approximately recovered based on the syntax, context, and the statisti-
cal information known as a priori [70]. This is possible even when the encrypted
part is provably secure according to some generic security notions. For example,
in MPEG-4 video encryption [127], when motion vector fields are encrypted and
cannot be accurately recovered, a default value 0 can be assigned to all motion
vector fields. This approximation sometimes results in a recovered frame with
fairly good quality for frames having a limited amount of motion. Additionally,
the statistical information, neighborhood patterns, and/or smoothness criterion
can help estimate an unknown area in an image [122] and automatically reorder
shuffled image blocks [85]. Although these estimations may not be exact, they can
reveal perceptually meaningful information once the estimated signal is rendered
or visualized.
As an example, we have shown in Fig. 2.5 the experimental result of encrypt-
ing the DC prediction residue of the Lena image. Although the directly rendered
version of the encrypted Lena image in Fig. 2.5 is highly obscured, an attacker
can obtain edge information by setting the DCs to a constant and observing the
resulting image shown in Fig. 2.9. We can see that the edge and contour of the
approximated Lena image is clearly comprehensible, which suggests that it is nec-
essary to encrypt other components in addition to DCs.
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Figure 2.9: Approximated Lenna image by setting all DC coefficients to 0.
Since the value of multimedia content is closely tied with its perceptual qual-
ity, such value composition should be reflected in access control and confidentiality
protection [66][67]. From the considerations presented above, we propose to eval-
uate the security of multimedia encryption using the following framework. After
encryption, the encrypted media is first undergone some approximation attacks.
We then use perceptual similarity scores to measure the amount of information
leakage about the original media data through the approximated media. The re-
sults can indicate the security of the encryption scheme against the approximation
attacks. Next, we discuss the methods and tradeoffs of measuring visual similarity
for encryption applications.
2.4.2 Visual Similarity Scores
Studies on human visual system have shown that the optical characteristic of eyes
can be represented by a low-pass filter [47], and that human eyes can extract coarse
visual information in images and videos in spite of a small amount of noise and
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geometric distortion. The important information extracted by human visual sys-
tem includes spatial-luminance information and edge and contour information [36].
Motivated by these studies, we design a luminance similarity score and an edge
similarity score to reflect the way that human perceives visual information. These
scores can quantitatively measure the perception-oriented distance between the
clear-text copy of multimedia and the attacker’s recovered copy from the encrypted
media. The proposed scores are inspired by the recent work on automated image
quality measurement [123][124] that incorporated human perceptual properties.
Luminance Similarity Score To capture the coarse luminance information,
we introduce a block-based luminance similarity score. We assume that two given
images are preprocessed to be aligned and scaled to the same size. These two
images are first divided into blocks in the same way, using 8 × 8 or 16 × 16 non-
overlapping blocks. Then the average luminance values of the i-th block from both
















where the parameters α and β control the sensitivity of the score. Since the images
under comparison may be corrupted by noise during transmission or be mis-aligned
by a few pixels, such noise and perturbation should be suppressed during similarity
estimation. The resistance to minor perturbation and noise can be achieved by
appropriately choosing the scaling factor α and the quantization parameter β . In
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our experiments, α and β are set to 0.1 and 3, respectively. A negative LSS value
indicates substantial dissimilarity in the luminance between the two images.
Edge Similarity Score The edge similarity score measures the degree of resem-
blance of the edge and contour information between two images. After the images
are partitioned into blocks in the same way as in the LSS evaluation, edge direction
classification is performed for each block by extracting the dominant edge direction
and quantizing it into one of the eight representative directions that are equally
spaced by 22.5 degrees, as shown in Fig. 2.10. We use indices 1 to 8 to represent
these eight directions, and use index 0 to represent a block without edge. Denoting
e1i and e2i as the edge direction indices for the i-th block in two images, respec-












0 if e1 = 0 or e2 = 0,
|cos(φ(e1)− φ(e2))| otherwise,






0 if e1 = e2 = 0;
1 otherwise.
The score ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates that the edge information of the
two images is highly dissimilar and 1 indicates a match between the edges in the
two images. A special case arises when the denominator in Eq. (2.10) is zero,
which happens when both input images are “blank” without any edge. We assign
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an ESS score of 0.5 to this special case. In our experiments, the input images
are partitioned into non-overlapping 8x8 blocks, and the Sobel operator is used for
edge detection [47]. The dominant edge direction of a block is determined by a
majority voting inside the block according to the number of pixels associated with




















Figure 2.10: Eight representative edge directions used in ESS score evaluation
2.4.3 Evaluation Framework for Multimedia-Oriented Se-
curity
When evaluating the image similarity, we first calculate the ESS and LSS scores
between the attacked/approximated image and the original image, and then com-
pare the scores with two pre-determined thresholds, ESSth and LSSth, respectively.
An encrypted image/video is said to pass the similarity test against a certain attack
if both the ESS and the LSS are lower than the thresholds. In our experiments,
we set ESSth to 0.5 and LSSth to 0.
The proposed similarity scores exhibit a tradeoff between capturing coarse se-
mantic information and texture details of images. The sensitivity of the two simi-
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larity scores to image details can be controlled by the size of the block partition.
When small blocks (e.g. 4 × 4) are used, a small amount of noise or geometric
distortion can result in scores that indicates dissimilarity for two similar images.
We refer to this type of mis-classification as a miss. From security point of view,
such a miss would lead to a security breach. When blocks with larger size (e.g.
32 × 32) are used, the scores tend to identify some images as similar when their
details are different. We refer to this type of mis-classification as a false alarm. As
preventing information leak is the main concern in many access control applica-
tions, usually there are relatively stringent requirements on keeping misses as low
as possible, while allowing to tolerate a moderate amount of false alarms. Given
these considerations, we suggest using 8× 8 or 16× 16 blocks in block partition.
The two similarity scores are intended to measure the amount of information
leakage through an attacked image. To this end, other types of perception-based
similarity scores, such as robust image hashing [108], can also be incorporated
to measure the image similarities, especially on the luminance similarity aspect.
These hashing methods measure image similarity through the similarity of hash
vectors using the normalized Hamming distance [78] and the receiver-operating-
characteristics (ROC) formulation [108].
The design philosophy of the LSS and ESS scores can be extended to other
types of multimedia, such as audio and speech. Similar to the design of audio
hash [78], we can first segment an auditory signal into a set of temporal frames,
and analyze the components in various frequency ranges from each frame. The
results from each interested frequency range (such as low frequency corresponding
to LSS, and high frequency corresponding to ESS) can be examined and compared
to arrive at an auditory similarity measurement.
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2.5 Application Example: Video Encryption Sys-
tem Design
In this section, we present a framework for a video encryption system that employs
the building blocks proposed in this chapter and from the literature. Using this
encryption system, several example configurations are presented and the encrypted
videos are compared in terms of the security against brute-force and approximation
attack, the friendliness to delegate processing, and the compression overhead.
Figure 2.11: Video encryption system description. The encryption system is di-
vided into two layers and for each layer candidate encryption components and
methods are listed.
2.5.1 System Setup
Designed with scalable video in mind, the video encryption system has two layers
as shown in Fig. 2.11. The base-layer video is coded with the MPEG-4 standard
and the enhancement layer with the MPEG-4 FGS standard. The size of the group
of pictures (GOP) is set to 15 and all predicted frames are set to P frames. For each
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layer, we provide candidate encryption methods and components to be encrypted.
Our experiments are conducted on a Dell workstation with 1.8GHz Pentium IV
CPU and 512MB RAM.
The two encryption operations proposed earlier in this chapter, namely, the
generalized index mapping with controlled overhead (GIMCO) and the intra bit-
plane shuffling (IBS), lend themselves naturally as building blocks for this system.
A third building block is the coded block shuffling discussed in Sec. 2.3.4. The
index mapping encryption can be applied to intra block DC/AC coefficients and
inter block motion vector (MV) residues, the intra bitplane shuffling encryption
can be applied to FGS bitplanes, and the coded block shuffling can be applied to
macroblock (MB) coding units. We use AES [26] with a 128-bit key to generate
the pseudo-random numbers for all encryptions.
2.5.2 Bitrate Overhead Study for Index-Mapping Encryp-
tion
As discussed in Section 2.2, the index-mapping based encryption introduces bitrate
overhead. The overhead can be controlled by carefully choosing the set of compo-
nents to encrypt and by using the set partitioning technique. In this part we study
the bitrate overhead under different encryption settings. A test video with 4000
frames in QCIF format is constructed by concatenating nine classic video clips, in-
cluding Carphone, Claire, Foreman, Grandma, Miss America, Mother-Daughter,
Salesman, Suzie, and Trevor. After an encryption range is chosen for each com-
ponent, the range can be further partitioned into two subsets. For example, the
encryption range [−63, 64] for DC residue can be partitioned into [−31, 32] and
([−63,−32]∪ [33, 64]). We also tested to encrypt the first two non-zero AC coeffi-
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cients along the zig-zag scanning order in each intra block. The encryption range
of motion vector residue is [−16, 15.5] with half pixel accuracy, which is also the
MPEG-4 standard coding range. The encryption ranges of AC coefficients and
MV residue can also be partitioned into subsets in a similar fashion as that of
DC encryption. Since the MV’s are predictively coded, the encryption of MV in
one frame is able to propagate the scrambling effect to future frames, suggesting
that encrypting MV of a subset of frames would be sufficient. For comparison, we
include one experiment in which MV’s from the first two P frames in a GOP are
encrypted, and another experiment in which all MV’s are encrypted. The latter
serves as an upper bound for the bitrate overhead by MV encryption.
The above mentioned components are encrypted individually and the com-
pressed file sizes are shown in Table 2.1. From Table 2.1, we can see that the
compression overhead incurred by encrypting DC prediction residue ranges from
3% to 7%, depending on the encryption range and whether set partitioning is used.
Encrypting AC and MV will generally incur an overhead larger than encrypting
DC, especially when the motion vectors from all P frames are encrypted. However,
limiting the encrypted MV’s to the first two P frames in each GOP can reduce this
overhead to around 5%. Also shown throughout Table 2.1 is that set partition-
ing is an effective way to control the overhead. These results provide a basis for
designing a video encryption system, which is presented in the next subsections.
2.5.3 Base-Layer Video Encryption
In this part, we present experimental results for base-layer video encryption and an-
alyze the security for different configurations. Four video clips, from fast-motion
to slow-motion, are used in our experiment. They are the Football, the Coast-
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Table 2.1: Index Mapping Encryption Overhead Comparison
Component Encryption Set File Size Relative
Encrypted Range Partition (MBytes) Overhead
None - - 1.88 -
DC [-127,128] no 2.01 6.9%
DC [-127,128] 2 sets 1.98 5.3%
DC [-63,64] no 1.98 5.3%
DC [-63,64] 2 sets 1.94 3.2%
AC [-64,64] no 2.12 12.8%
AC [-64,64] 2 sets 2.04 8.5%
AC [-32,32] no 2.04 8.5%
AC [-32,32] 2 sets 1.99 5.9%
MV [-16,15.5] no 2.36 25.5%
MV [-16,15.5] 2 sets 2.26 20.2%
MV of 2 P frames [-16,15.5] no 1.98 5.3%
MV of 2 P frames [-16,15.5] 2 sets 1.96 4.3%
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guard, the Foreman, and the Grandma, and each is 40 frames long. Encryption
is performed under the settings shown in the left column of Table 2.2, where the
encryption of DC, AC, and/or MV is based on the proposed generalized index
mapping. The DC and AC encryption ranges are chosen as [-63,64] and [-32,32]
with set partitioning, respectively; the motion vector encryption is applied to the
first two P frames in each GOP. Additionally, macro-block shuffling in the com-
pressed bitstream is applied to every frame. Each encrypted video complies with
the syntax prescribed in the MPEG-4 standard. We also consider approximation
attacks to these settings to emulate an adversary’s action, and list them in the
right column of Table 2.2. The security for these encryption configurations are
discussed below in details.
Security Against Exact Recovery by Exhaustive Search
To accurately recover an original I frame from the encrypted one, an attacker needs
to recover all the DC coefficients. For P frames, recovering the values of motion
vectors is also necessary. In the above configuration, each DC coefficient and
motion vector component has 6 bits encrypted. From the discussion in Section 2.4,
each I frame in QCIF format has 2376 equivalent DC bits encrypted and the
encrypted motion vectors in a P frame is equivalent to 1188 bits. Since a 128-bit
key is used, the security against exact recovery by exhaustive search is determined
by the cryptographic primitive with a 128-bit key.
Visual Security Against Approximation Recovery
To evaluate the visual security for our encryption system, we first encrypt the test
video and then apply approximation attacks to the encrypted video. After that
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Table 2.2: Encryption and attack settings for security analysis
Encryption System Settings Approximation Attack Settings
(E1) encrypting intra block DC
residue by index mapping;
(A1) set all intra block DC coefficients
to 0;
(E2) encrypting inter block MV
residue in the first two P frames of a
GOP, and all intra block DC residues;
(A2) set all intra block DC coefficients
to 0 and set the encrypted motion vec-
tor values to 0;
(E3) encrypting all the components in
E2, plus the first two (in the zig-zag
scan order) non-zero AC coefficients of
intra block;
(A3) including all the approximations
in A2, plus set the encrypted AC co-
efficients to 0;
(E4)–(E6) correspond to E1–E3 plus
macro-block shuffling in the com-
pressed bit-stream, respectively;
(A4)–(A6) the same as A1–A3, respec-
tively.
we obtain the ESS and LSS scores of the approximated video and compare them
with the thresholds, ESSth = 0.5 and LSSth = 0. An encryption is considered not
secure enough when either score is above the corresponding threshold.
Fig. 2.12 and Fig. 2.13 show the video encryption results under different settings
for the Football and CoastGuard clips. The results presented are for Y components
as they carry most of the information about the video. Visual examination sug-
gests that encrypting DC alone still leaks contour information after approximation
attacks, while extending encryption to MV and/or some ACs helps diffuse the
contour to reduce the information leakage. Furthermore, shuffling self-contained
coding unit such as macroblocks, coupled with the above value encryption, can
scramble the content to a completely unintelligible level. Table 2.3 lists the average
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ESS and LSS (averaged over the total 40 frames) of the videos after approxima-
tion recovery. From the average LSS and ESS scores we can see that, when coded
block shuffling is not used as an encryption tool, only the LSS score is below its
security threshold of 0, and the ESS score is around or above its threshold of 0.5.
This indicates that the encryption leaks out shape information and is not secure
enough, which we can also observe from Fig. 2.12 and Fig. 2.13. Once the coded
block shuffling is incorporated in the encryption, the ESS and LSS indicate that
the encryption is secure against approximations. These results concur with the
visual examination.
Figure 2.12: Encryption results for Football. Approximation attacks are performed
after encryption. The encryption-approximation settings are: (top left) unen-
crypted; (top right) E1-A1; (bottom left) E2-A2; (bottom right) E5-A5.
To examine the detailed ESS scores, we plot the frame-by-frame ESS score
of Coast-guard under different encryption-attack settings in Fig. 2.14. The top
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curve is from the attacked video with DC encrypted only, which confirms that
encrypting DC alone still leaves some contour information unprotected. The two
middle curves are the results involving MV encryption for inter-blocks and AC
encryption for intra-blocks, where the ESS scores are low at the beginning of a
GOP and increase substantially toward the end of the GOP. This is because as
it approaches the end of a GOP, motion compensation becomes less effective and
the compensation residue provides a significant amount of edge information. Such
observation suggests that if we can only afford the bitrate overhead to encrypt
two P frames in a GOP, the two encrypted P frames should be interleaved, such
as choosing the 1st and the 8th P frames in a GOP of 15 frames. On the other
hand, by incorporating the shuffling of macroblock coding units, the resulting ESS
measurements are consistently around 0.1 or lower.
Figure 2.13: Encryption results for Coast-guard. The encryption-approximation
settings are: (top row, left to right) unencrypted, E1, E1-A1, E2-A2; (bottom row,
left to right) E3-A3, E4-A4, E5-A5, E6-A6.
48
Table 2.3: Perception based security measures for video encryption
Football Grandma Coastguard Foreman
Settings ESS LSS ESS LSS ESS LSS ESS LSS
E1-A1 0.70 -0.78 0.64 -2.13 0.79 -1.18 0.71 -1.42
E2-A2 0.53 -0.85 0.46 -2.13 0.43 -1.19 0.43 -1.48
E3-A3 0.53 -0.86 0.30 -2.13 0.40 -1.20 0.40 -1.48
E4-A4 0.12 -0.93 0.05 -2.13 0.07 -1.20 0.07 -1.47
E5-A5 0.13 -0.92 0.05 -2.13 0.06 -1.21 0.06 -1.45
E6-A6 0.12 -0.92 0.04 -2.13 0.04 -1.20 0.05 -1.47
Relative Overhead
Table 2.4 lists the compression overhead for four videos under each encryption
settings. We can see that the overhead is low for high-complexity, fast-motion
video such as the Football and the Foreman, and relatively high for low-complexity,
slow-motion video such as the Grandma and the Coastguard. As we go from the
setting E1 to E3, more components are encrypted and thus the overhead increases.
We also see that the coded block shuffling approach does not introduce overhead, as
shown in setting E4 to E6. Overall, the overhead of 4–11% by the E1, E2, E4, and
E5 is comparable to that of a direct adaptation of generic encryption to multimedia
as discussed in Section 2.1.1. Considering both security and compression overhead,
we have found that the E5 setting provides a very good tradeoff. This setting is a
combination of block shuffling and selective value encryption via generalized index
mapping.
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Figure 2.14: Frame-by-frame ESS of Coastguard video sequence under different
settings. The corresponding settings are listed in Table 2.2.
2.5.4 Protecting FGS Enhancement Layer Video
We use 10 frames from the Foreman video sequence to demonstrate the protection
of the enhancement data while preserving the FGS characteristics from the source
coding. The proposed intra bitplane shuffling encryption is applied within each
8x8 block and the sign bit of each coefficient is encrypted using a stream cipher. To
allow for a better visual examination of the protection effects on the enhancement
data, we combine the encrypted FGS bitplanes with a clear-text base layer.
For most natural images, the coded DCT coefficients have decreasing dynamic
range versus the frequency. As such, we emulate an approximation attack, whereby
for each significant bitplane, all the “1”s of the bitplane is put to the lowest possible
frequency bins. A total of six encryption-attack settings are used, namely:
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Table 2.4: Relative Compression Overhead of the Encrypted Videos
Football Foreman Coastguard Grandma
E1 and E4 1.29% 1.75% 3.15% 6.96%
E2 and E5 3.88% 6.41% 8.74% 11.11%
E3 and E6 6.47% 9.62% 11.54% 24.61%
(a) to shuffle the first bitplane with clear-text base layer,
(b) to approximate the bitplane of (a) with the correct signs,
(c) to approximate the bitplane of (a) with random signs,
(d) to shuffle the first two bitplanes,
(e) to approximate the bitplanes of (d) with the correct signs,
(f) to approximate the bitplanes of (d) with random signs.
Fig. 2.15 shows the encrypted and attacked versions of the Foreman FGS video.
The first row shows the encryption and approximation results using MSB only (set-
tings (a), (b) and (c)), and the second row shows the results using the first two
bit-planes (settings (d), (e) and (f)). The blocky artifacts in the settings (d), (e)
and (f) are clearly more pronounced than in the settings (a), (b) and (c). This sug-
gests that using more encrypted bit-planes will worsen the approximation attack
results. Within each row, the visual difference is very subtle. This observation veri-
fies that without knowing the decryption key to the enhancement layer, an attacker
cannot obtain a more refined video than the base-layer video using approximations
from the encrypted enhancement layer.
Table 2.5 lists the corresponding average PSNR, LSS and ESS of the videos
under the six encryption-attack settings. From the table, we can see the approxi-
mation recovery can only reduce a little luminance error in terms of LSS and PSNR
in the approximated video compared to the encrypted video, and the edge similar-
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Base-Layer Setting (a) Setting (b) Setting (c)
Base + 2FGS BP Setting (d) Setting (e) Setting (f)
Figure 2.15: Encryption results for Foreman FGS video. Top row, left to right:
base layer picture; and the encryption-attack settings (a), (b), (c). Bottom row,
left to right: base layer plus 2 clear-text FGS bitplanes; and the encryption-attack
settings (d), (e), (f).
ity in terms of ESS remains imperfect and has little improvement after attack. This
demonstrates that the proposed method can protect the premium quality version
of the content in a FGS compatible way, with a separate key from base-layer video
encryption.
2.6 The Security in Media Authentication using
Image Hashing
In addition to media encryption, multimedia content authentication is equally
important in secure multimedia communications. In this section, we focus on
the security of image hashing schemes for content authentication. we first adapt
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Table 2.5: Intra Bitplane Shuffling and Approximation Attack
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
PSNR (dB) 28.59 28.76 28.74 27.39 27.87 27.50
LSS 0.28 0.34 0.34 0.28 0.34 0.29
ESS 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
the unicity distance concept to evaluate the security of image hashing. Using
the unicity distance framework, we analyze the security for two recently proposed
image hashing schemes [110][117]. Our analysis shows that the secret hashing key
can be disclosed with high accuracy when the key is re-used for several dozen of
times. This result determines the maximum number of key reuse in the investigated
hashing schemes. One way to mitigate such key disclosure is to generate a new
hashing key using a master key for each different image.
2.6.1 An Analysis of Image Hashing
Most image hashing schemes consists of two steps: randomized feature extraction
and postprocessing of image features. To achieve robustness and security, the
feature extraction stage is particularly important. If the image feature can be
generated without the secret key, an attacker can try to create a different image
that produces the same image feature. Since this feature will result in the same
image hash, the forged image becomes an artificial pre-image of the given hash.
Hence, randomization techniques must be incorporated into the feature extraction
stage to prevent hash forgery [37][110]. On the other hand, the robustness of image
hashing greatly relies on the robustness of image features. A robust image feature
extraction scheme must withstand minor distortions to the image, such as filtering,
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compression, noise corruption, and moderate geometric changes involving rotation,
scaling and translation.
The post-processing of image feature involves quantization and compression
of the feature. Further randomization, such as a permutation of the hash vector
values, can be introduced in this step. However, to fully preserve the robustness
obtained in image feature, the newly introduced randomness at this stage is usually
limited [109]. For example, if a cryptographic cipher is applied on the image
feature, the ultimate hash will dramatically change even if some feature values are
changed by one bit of information. Various image hashing schemes mainly differ in
the way randomized features are extracted. This is because usually similar post-
processing technique can be applied to almost all randomized feature extraction
schemes. For these reasons, we will concentrate on the feature extraction stage
and assume the randomized image feature can be observed as the hash output.
At the end of this paper, we will further discuss how to model and estimate the
randomization in the post-processing stage.
Let us denote an image hash function by h(·), the input image by I, the secret
key by K, and the resulting hash vector by v. When the same key K is used
to generate n image hashes, we observe pairs of (I1,v1), (I2,v2), · · ·, (In,vn).
The conditional entropy of the secret key K with respect to these observations is
H(K|{(Ij,vj)}nj=1). According to information theory, in general, such conditional
entropy will decrease with the increase of n. In our investigation of image hashing
security, we mainly focus on how the uncertainty in the secret key decreases in
robust image hashing schemes. Our exploration takes the following form. We
randomly choose a hashing key, and generate multiple hashes using some natural
images. The hash and image pairs are then provided to a key estimation algorithm.
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This algorithm outputs an estimated hashing key. This estimation is gradually
refined with the increased number of observed image-hash pairs. We expect to
observe the estimated key becoming closer and closer to the actual key, until finally
the two keys can be regarded functionally identical for hash generation purpose.
The “functional identicality” for two keys with only a few bit differences is a
unique property in perceptual hashing schemes with robustness constraint. The
secret key for most image hashing schemes can be considered as a random vari-
able/vector. Due to the robustness constraint in constructing the image hash,
for the same input image, adding a small perturbation vector to the key vector
usually results in a hash that is similar to the original hash. Such an observation
indicates that we can measure the distance dK between the estimated the hashing
key and the actual hashing key, and use dK to predict the distance dH between
the resulting hash vectors that use these two keys and the same image as input.
Conversely, we can also use dH to predict the distance dK . These two observations
form the basis of the key estimation algorithms that we will present later. In the
subsequent discussions, we use two kinds of vector norms to measure the distance
in key vector and hash vector, namely, the L1 norm and the L2 norm.
Next, we analyze the security for two image hashing schemes. The first scheme
was proposed by us in [110]. This scheme is one of the image hashing schemes
with the best performance in terms of robustness and security. We are also the
first to propose an analytical framework for quantitatively evaluating the hash
security based on a single input image and output hash [110]. The second scheme
we analyze was proposed by Venkatesan et al. in [117]. The authors of [117] are
among the first to propose a perceptual hashing algorithm and to recognize that
randomized feature generation is important to the robustness and security of image
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hashing. Analyzing these two representative hashing schemes can provide insight
towards the security and limitation of robust image hashing algorithms.
2.6.2 Unicity Distance for Polar Fourier Transform Hash
Our recently proposed robust and secure image hashing scheme [110] is based on
Fourier transform of image in polar coordinates. To obtain the hash, the FFT of an
image is first taken, and the Fourier coefficients are represented in polar coordinates
with zero frequency at the origin. Along the normalized magnitude coordinate ρ,
m equally-spaced magnitude ρ1, ρ2, · · ·, ρm are chosen ranging from 0 to 0.4.
Then for each chosen magnitude ρi, Fourier coefficients are circularly summed to
obtain one component in the feature vector, fi. The circularly summed Fourier
coefficients form a vector f = [f1, f2, ..., fm]
T . To randomize this feature vector,
a linear transformation is performed on the vector f to obtain the randomized
feature r
r = [r1, r2, · · ·, rm]T = Kf .
Here the matrix K is a m-by-m key matrix. Each matrix element in K is a
Gaussian distributed random variable with mean zero and variance one. We can
also decompose this key matrix into m row vectors. Each row kTi is a component
key with dimension 1-by-m. Thus we have
K = [k1,k2, · · ·,km]T , ri = kTi f .
When n image-hash pairs are observed, we have (f1, r1), (f2, r2), ···, (fn, rn). Define
F = [f1, f2, · · ·, fn], and R = [r1, r2, · · ·, rn]. We can obtain
Rm×n = Km×mFm×n. (2.11)
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There are two situations when trying to solve the above linear equation array.
When n ≥ m and m linearly independent columns of F exists, we can extract the
m columns of F as F and the corresponding m columns of R as R. Now that F





ignore the numerical inaccuracy in the solution, such a solution will give an exact
estimate of the secret key.
When n < m or the columns of F does not constitute an invertible matrix, the
problem in Eqn.(2.11) becomes solving an under-determined system and a number
of existing solutions can be applied. For example, we can use the least-square
method to obtain an estimate of the key matrix K̂. Each row k̂Ti in K̂ corresponds
to a hash component key. The L1 and L2 norm of the estimation error for the
component key is d1 = ||k̂i − ki||1, and d2 = ||k̂i − ki||2, respectively. We expect
both d1 and d2 to decrease with the increase of n. Since each column fi of in matrix
F is generated from a different image, we expect the matrix F to have full column
rank with high probability. Usually when n = m, the key should be uniquely
determined.
Experimental Validations
To verify our analysis, we conduct key estimation experiments using the method
discussed above. We set m = 64 as in [110]. According to the statistics gathered
from several hundred natural images, we generate the circular sum of Fourier
transform coefficients at different radii values f = [f(ρ1), f(ρ2), · · ·, f(ρm)]T . For
each randomly generated key vector k, we perform key estimation using different
numbers (1 ≤ n ≤ 64) of observed image-hash pairs. Then we compute the key
estimation error d1(n) and d2(n). We repeat the above experiment for 5000 times
and compute the average key estimation error as a function of n. In Fig. 2.16 we
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show that the key estimation error remains approximately constant when 1 ≤ n ≤
40. When n > 40 the error gradually decreases. When n = 64, the error becomes
zero and we are able to obtain the exact key. This experiment shows that the
unicity distance for polar Fourier transform hash is equal to m = 64.

































Figure 2.16: Average key estimation error for polar FFT hash. The results are
averaged over 5000 runs.
2.6.3 Unicity Distance for Hash using Randomized Spatial
Statistics
The second representative scheme on image hashing that we investigate was pro-
posed by Venkatesan et al. in [117]. This hashing scheme uses randomized spatial
statistics from input image as image feature. To generate one feature component,
the secret key is used to produce a four-tuple parameters p = (x, y, h, w) of a
rectangle. Here (x, y) is the coordinate of the upper left corner of the rectangle,
and h and w correspond to the height and width, respectively. With these pa-
rameters, a rectangular region in the input image is determined. The randomized
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spatial statistics can be either the mean or the variance of this region. To obtain
a feature vector, the parameters for multiple random rectangles are generated. In
this scheme, the equivalent secret key can be regarded as the four-tuple parameter
set (x, y, h, w). Next, we show how to formulate the problem of estimating these
parameters as a numerical optimization problem.
Suppose the mean (or variance) of luminance value of the selected image region
is used as the randomized image feature as in [117]. We denote the process of
computing the mean value as a function
v = h(p, I).
Here p indicates the secret key (rectangle parameters), I the input image, and v
the regional statistics. Our goal is to estimate the secret parameter set p based on
the observation of image-hash pairs. As the content of natural images are mostly
smoothly varying, the function h(p, I) varies smoothly with parameter p for any
given I. If an estimated parameter p̂ produces hash value v̂ = h(p̂, I), we can
use the distance between hash value v and v̂ as an indication of how accurate the
estimate p̂ is. For one image-hash pair, this may not be possible since many image
regions will produce very close regional statistics v. When multiple hashes are
generated using the same key but different images, we can observe (I1, v1), (I2, v2),
· · ·, (In, vn). Let v = [v1, v2, ..., vn]T . The hash value obtained using the estimated
key p̂ is v̂ = [v̂1, v̂2, ..., v̂n], where v̂i = h(p̂, Ii). We formulate the key estimation
problem as follows:
Given (I1, v1), (I2, v2), · · ·, (In, vn), find p̂ that minimizes the normalized cor-
relation η between v and v̂, where
η =
vT v̂
||v|| · ||v̂|| . (2.12)
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To efficiently solve the above problem, we devised an iterative search algorithm
that consists of two stages: the initialization stage and search refinement stage.
We consider all the input images are of the same size; otherwise, a preprocessing
step can be used to achieve this effect.
Table 2.6: Twelve sets of increments for parameter update
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
∆x −d −d 0 d d d 0 −d −d/2 d/2 0 0
∆y 0 −s −s −s 0 s s s 0 0 −s/2 s/2
∆w 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 d/2 −d/2 0 0
∆h 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 s/2 −s/2
Iterative Search Algorithm
Our proposed searching algorithm is similar in spirit to the hierarchical block
matching algorithm used in video compression [90]. Different spatial regions are
tested to find an initial rectangle that can approximate the actual rectangle area
used in hash generation. Then the initial rectangle is successively refined through
a hierarchical search to obtain the final rectangle estimation.
Initialization: The initialization stage is to obtain the approximate location
and size of the rectangle. We partition the entire image area in several ways.
The first partition is an non-overlapped partition into 4-by-4 equal size rectangles.
The second is an 8-by-8 non-overlapped uniform partition. The third partition
is a 4-by-4 overlapped partition, with the width and height of partition rectangle
being 2/5 of the image width and height, respectively. The horizontal and vertical
overlap between neighboring rectangles are 1/5 of the image width and height,
respectively. These partitions give a collection of 96 initial sets of parameters.
Next, for each set of initial parameters, we compute the regional statistics using
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all input images and the normalized correlation with the given image hashes as
in Eqn.(2.12). The parameter set t = (tx, ty, tw, th) that achieves the minimum
correlation among 96 partitions is chosen as the initial input to the next stage.
Iterations: In this stage, we update the rectangle parameter iteratively. Each
iteration tries to update the existing parameter to obtain a smaller normalized
correlation η. The parameters are updated by adding an increment or decrement
as
x′ = x + ∆x, y′ = y + ∆y, w′ = w + ∆w, h′ = h + ∆h.
We use twelve sets of parameter increments in our algorithm, as shown in Ta-
ble 2.6. These parameter increments correspond to translating the current rectan-
gle in eight directions to its neighbor areas, combined with horizontal (or vertical)
expansion (or shrinking) of the current rectangle. The incremental parameters d
and s are obtained from the current rectangle parameters as
d = θw/2 and s = θh/2.
Here θ is the step-size factor. We start with θ = 1. If none of the updated
parameters can result in a smaller normalized correlation η, we decrease θ by half
and recompute the updated parameters. This process is repeated until we can
find an updated parameter set that reduces η in (2.12). This iteration process is
illustrated in Fig. 2.17.
Termination conditions: The iteration stage will terminate when one of the
following three conditions are met. The first condition is that the normalized
correlation approaches 1 within a pre-determined margin ε. The second condition
is that when the incremental parameters d or s becomes smaller than 1, which
indicates that we cannot find a better parameter value within one pixel accuracy.
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The third condition is that the number of iterations reaches a pre-determined
maximum number.




We have collected 4000 images from 11 video sequences in QCIF format (frame
size 176×144) and apply the proposed key estimation test. In each experiment, we
randomly choose n images from this collection, generate hashes for these images
using a secret key, then perform key estimation. For each fixed n, we repeat the
experiment 400 times using different keys and calculate the average estimation
error in the rectangle parameters (ex, ey, ew, eh). Fig. 2.18 shows the absolute
value of the average estimation errors for different n values. As we can see, the
error reduces quickly as n increases. In Fig. 2.19 we also plot a histogram for
the width estimation error when n = 40. We can see that about half of the
estimation errors have absolute value smaller than 3. Within several pixels’ range,
the estimated rectangle will produce nearly identical hash values. Since most
perceptual hash verification relies on a soft hash distance metric by measuring the
normalized Hamming distance [79], the probability of forging a valid hash for any
new image becomes very high. Therefore the unicity distance for the hashing using
randomized spatial parameters is approximately around 40.






















Figure 2.18: Key estimation results for image hash using regional mean.
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Histogram of width estimation error, 400 runs, 40 image−hash pairs
Figure 2.19: Histogram of the width estimation error.
2.6.4 Discussions
Our investigation in the security for robust image hashing shows that the secret
hashing key, or its equivalent form, can be revealed with high accuracy when the
key is re-used for a few dozen of times. We believe such key disclosure problem
exists for all robust image hashing schemes, mainly due to the design limitation
that perceptually similar images should have similar hashes, which is a drastically
different criterion from cryptographic hash design. One way to mitigate such key
disclosure is to use a new hashing key for each different image, because usually
the unicity distance is more than 10 observed image-hash pairs. To reduce the
increase in key storage cost, the hashing key can be generated by a key derivation
function (a hash function) using a master key and a random number (the “salt”) as
input [52]. The salt value can be transmitted with the image content in clear-text.
We have demonstrated in this section how to employ the unicity distance con-
cept in analyzing the feature extraction stage of image hashing. For operations
in the post-processing stage of hash generation, such as the randomized quantiza-
tion [79] and hash vector permutation, the concept of unicity distance can also be
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applied. In an unified framework, the randomization parameters in both the fea-
ture generation stage and post-processing stage can be searched at the same time.
The exhaustive searching space may become very large. However, by exploiting
the robustness constraint, incorrect searching directions can be quickly pruned and
the effective search space will become much smaller. We believe through correct
mathematical modelling and by using signal processing techniques, the proposed
analytical framework based unicity distance concept can be extended to other ro-
bust perceptual hashing schemes.
2.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the unique security issues related to multimedia
encryption and content authentication. For media encryption, we proposed two
atomic encryption operations that can preserve standard compliance and are friendly
to delegate processing. We also provided quantitative analysis and demonstrated
that a good tradeoff can be made between the security and bitrate overhead. We
pointed out the need of quantifying the security against approximation attacks
that are unique to multimedia, and have proposed a set of multimedia-oriented se-
curity scores to complement the security metrics for generic data. Using video as
an example, we presented a systematic study on how to integrate different atomic
operations to build a video encryption system that can achieve a good tradeoff
among security, friendliness to delegate processing, and bitrate overhead.
For media authentication, we adapted the concept of unicity distance to eval-
uate the security of image hashing. Our explorations on two recent image hashing
schemes shows that the secret hashing key can be disclosed with high accuracy
when the key is re-used for a few dozen of times. One way to mitigate such key
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disclosure is to generate a new hashing key using a master key for each different
image.
2.8 Appendix: Derivations
2.8.1 Overhead Analysis for Generalized Index Mapping
In this appendix section, we present the derivations for the overhead analysis of
generalized index mapping as discussed in Section 2.2. We start with the a default
entropy codebook being used to encode encrypted data and prove Eq. (2.3).




Representing the constant in the denominator as c, we have li = − log ri − log c.
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In the above derivation, the second summation in (2.14) is zero; and the second





































Using the same technique, we can prove Eq. (2.4) for the overhead in the
adaptive entropy coding case. That is,
















2.8.2 Overhead Analysis for Intra-bitplane Shuffling
In this appendix section, we analyze the zero-run symbol distribution after intra-
bitplane shuffling as discussed in Section 2.3.
As we have seen in the main text, a macro-block in MPEG4 FGS coding consists
of four 8×8 luminance blocks, and zero-run symbols are formed within each block.
Intra bitplane shuffling can be done within a block or within a macroblock. For
generality, we refer to the block to which shuffling is applied as shuffling block and
denote its size as n; and similarly, the block to which run-length encoding is applied
as coding block and its size nB. In the case of shuffling within an 8× 8 block, the
two blocks are identical and n = nB = 64; while for the case of shuffling within a
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macroblock and run-length encoding within an 8× 8 block, we have nB = 64 and
n = 256. We assume that there are n1 “1”s in the shuffling block, hence the total
number of zero-run symbols is n1 both before and after shuffling. We derive the
zero-run symbol histogram conditioned on n1.
We use an indicator function I
(d)
k to denote the following event of the bitplane
of interests for coefficients in a coding block: when ones appear in both kth and
(k +d+1)th position and zeros in between (i.e. the bits from (k +1)th position to
(k +d)th position forms a zero-run symbol with run-length d), I
(d)
k = 1; otherwise,
I
(d)
k = 0. The range of k to be considered for I
(d)
k is between 0 and (nB−d−1), where
I
(d)
0 = 1 indicates the first zero-run symbol of the block has run d. The expected
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Tracing Malicious Relay in
Cooperative Wireless
Communications
Wireless communication systems have enjoyed a tremendous growth in the past
decade [96]. Recently, cooperative communications is proposed as an emerging
wireless communication paradigm that explores a new dimension of diversity to
combat the unfriendly wireless communication environment. Such a new com-
munication paradigm also introduces new information security issues, especially
in the area related to detecting and verifying signals simultaneously transmitted
from multiple cooperating nodes. In this chapter, we show that using signal pro-
cessing techniques and cryptographic tools, we are able to trace the adversarial
relay nodes who try to garble the relay signals in a cooperative communication
system. This shows the promising potential of signal processing in cooperative
wireless communication security.
Consider a wireless communication example where node A is transmitting to
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node B, and the direct link may be obstructed by large objects or hilly terrains.
In such a scenario, two other nodes C and D that are near to node A and B
can serve as relay nodes to improve the communication quality. In an cooperative
communication system, each node may simultaneously be an information source, a
destination, and a relay node. To achieve cooperation, the transmission of a node
can usually be divided into two phases. The first phase is to transmit information
generated from itself while listening to other source nodes. The second phase is
to transmit relay information [56][99][48]. Among the strategies employed by the
relay nodes, amplify-and-forward and decode-and-forward are two most common
strategies [56]. In amplify-and-forward, the relay nodes simply boost the energy
of the signal received from sender and re-transmit to the receiver. Such a strategy
may also amplify the noise in the received signal at the relay nodes. In decode-and-
forward, the relay nodes will perform physical layer decoding (demodulation plus
signal detection) and then forward the decoding result to the destination. When
multiple relays are available, more sophisticated relay strategy can be employed.
For example, multiple relay nodes can serve as multiple transmit antennas to em-
ploy a space-time code [2][113] in transmitting the relay signals [57][99][100][48].
Such schemes can improve the communication quality by exploiting the space and
time diversity.
While most of these prior arts focused on the communication aspects of such co-
operative system, there have also been serious concerns regarding the cooperation
motivation and security in such systems. The first concern is from autonomous
ad hoc network perspective, where a centralized control does not exist and each
node is an autonomous entity. In such a scenario, nodes may lack motivation to










Figure 3.1: Two nodes, C and D, try to forward the message from node A to B.
its own energy and prolong its lifetime [139]. We classify such “selfish” behavior
as passive non-cooperation. In the literature, passive non-cooperation have been
addressed by using credit system [142], or reputation propagation system [77]. The
second concern is from wireless communication perspective. Wireless communica-
tions use a shared medium and is susceptible to malicious denial-of-service attacks.
For example, a powerful attack against wireless communications is signal jamming,
where an adversary tries to corrupt communication by actively transmitting radio
signal and interfering with the receiver [134]. We classify such attacks as active
malicious attack, which is the focus of this paper.
In recent years, a number of works have addressed the problem of malicious
signal jamming in general wireless communications. Xu et al. proposed a scheme
to detect jamming attacks based on packet delivery ratio and signal strength [134],
and proposed to use channel surfing and spatial retreat to avoid jamming at-
tack [135]. Noubir et al. proposed to improve node connectivity and transmis-
sion reliability under jamming attack using directional antennas, node mobility,
and error correction code [61][83]. Another traditional anti-jamming techniques
is spread-spectrum, which spreads the energy of one bit information onto a wide
frequency spectrum. Most of these counter-jamming techniques have one common
attribute: they try to prevent the attacker from getting into the sender/receiver’s
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multiple access channel (MAC). In frequency division multiple access, the MAC
channel can be defended by frequency hopping; in code division multiple access, the
MAC channel is protected by each user’s spread-spectrum code; and node mobility
and the use of directional antennas provide a spatial multiple access channel that
is designated to the source/destination in a particular spatial region. The result
is that the jamming signal energy is significantly attenuated in the MAC channel,
thus an improved signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) can be obtained at the receiver.
The involvement of multiple relay nodes with sophisticated relay rules in coop-
erative communications poses a challenge to detecting and avoiding the malicious
attacks [73]. The complication brought by user cooperation is that most schemes
require nodes share their multiple access channels with other nodes [57][2][99][48].
This is because using an exclusive MAC channel between a sender and a receiver
would make it difficult to benefit from node cooperation. However, in an adver-
sarial environment, some relay nodes could be compromised. Using the captured
communication device, the compromised nodes can maliciously modify the relay
information, injecting falsified information, or choose not to relay. In such a situ-
ation, the counter attack techniques based on MAC channel exclusion will not be
effective, and the security enforcement for cooperative wireless system becomes a
challenging and delicate task.
In this paper, we are interested in the counter attack strategies against ma-
licious relay nodes in a cooperative wireless system. The goal of the malicious
relays is to corrupt the communications between the information source and the
receiver. These malicious relay nodes would exploit the weakness in user coopera-
tion rules, especially in the multi-node relay situation, and disguise themselves as
legitimate relays. We first study the attack behavior and investigate the impact of
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such attacks to the receiver. To defend against such malicious attacks, we propose
a cross-layer scheme for detecting and tracing adversarial nodes, which involves
both inserting pseudo-random tracing markers in the transmitted symbol stream
at the sender side, and an adaptive signal detection and processing at the receiver
side. Note that in addition to detecting the jamming, our scheme can also pinpoint
the adversarial relay node with very high probability. This allows further actions
to be taken to exclude the adversarial node from the network.
3.1 System Model and Proposed Framework
3.1.1 System Setting
Let us consider the simple decode-and-forward situation introduced in Fig. 3.1.
Sender node A transmit signals to both the receiving node B and relay nodes C
and D. The relay nodes obtain the signal yr = x + nr. Assuming the signal-to-
noise-ratio (SNR) at the relay nodes are high enough, they decode the received
signal symbol and normally should follow the forwarding rule. In this paper, we
mainly consider relay nodes using coded cooperation, such as the user cooperation
schemes described in [57][48] using space-time coding [2][113]. Nonetheless, the
analysis about attack and defense can also be applied to non-coded forwarding
strategy such as in [99][100], i.e., the relay nodes will directly transmit the received
signal without coding.
As an example, we consider two relay nodes employing an orthogonal space-
time code [2], described in Table 3.1, for message forwarding. After decoding,
the relay nodes obtain the message bits. Suppose the signal constellation set M
consists of M = 2k symbols. Each relay node takes two decoded symbols s0 and
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Table 3.1: Space-Time Code Used by Two Relay Nodes
relay node 0 relay node 1
t s0 s1
t + T −s∗1 s∗0
s1 from consecutive symbol durations, and transmit according to the cooperation
rule in Table 3.1. Denote the symbol duration by T . At the receiving side, the
received signals at two consecutive symbol durations t and t + T are
r0 = h0s0 + h1s1 + n0
r1 = −h0s∗1 + h1s∗0 + n1
(3.1)
Here h0 = α0e
jθ0 and h1 = α1e
jθ1 are complex channel gain, and n0 and n1
are complex Gaussian noise. Throughout this paper, we will use such base-band
equivalent expression for analysis. We assume the channel conditions h0 and h1
are known at the receiver side, but not at the relay node. This is achieved by using
proper channel estimation at the receiver side with pilot symbols that are inserted
frequent enough relative to the channel variations [2].
3.1.2 Attack Modelling
We now examine the attack strategies employed by an malicious relay node against
the cooperative communication system. The goal of the malicious relay node is
to corrupt the communication between the sender and receiver. In the meantime,
the attacker also tries to disguise his/her identity as a malicious adversary and to
corrupt communication for as long as possible [39]. This can be done by cleverly
choosing the attack technique and the portion of the relay signals to attack. Gen-
erally, we assume that the adversarial node uses the same transmission device as a
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normal relay node. The attacker will only corrupt communications when there is
relay message. This strategy is to preserve the energy of the attacker’s device as
well as to disguise attacker’s identity. When there is a relay message, the adver-
sarial relay nodes can do one of the following: (1) transmit nothing, which is the
passive non-cooperation; (2) transmit garbled signal, which is the active malicious
attack. We discuss the details of these two cases subsequently.
Transmit Nothing
When both relay nodes are adversarial and choose not to transmit, such an event
can be detected by comparing the received signal energy with ambient noise energy.
Thus we shall focus on the situation when only one relay node (say, the relay node
1) is adversarial and do not forward message. When the relay node 1 does not
transmit at all, the received signal from Eqn. (3.1) becomes
r0 = h0s0 + n0,
r1 = −h0s∗1 + n1.
This situation is also described in [2] as soft failure, i.e., one of the relay nodes
fails to function. In this situation, the receiver still can detect the received signals.
Here we describe the maximum likelihood detector, which is the optimal detector








c1 = −h0r∗1 = α20s1 + h0n∗1
It is clear that c0 only contains signal s0, and c1 only contains signal s1. Thus the
optimal detector for s0 only depends on c0
ŝ0 = argminxi∈M
{




Table 3.2: Forwarding Rules by Compromised Relay-1
relay node 0 relay node 1
t s0 s2 (instead of s1)
t + T −s∗1 s∗3 (instead of s∗0)
Here M is the entire signal constellation set and d(·, ·) denotes Euclidean distance.
The optimal detector for signal s1 takes the same form as (3.2), only c0 is replaced
by c1.
From the above discussion we can see that, the attacker’s strategy to transmit
nothing will not prevent communications because the transmitted signals can still
be detected. However, it will degrade the receiver’s performance because of the
loss of diversity.
Transmit Garbled Signal
Instead of transmitting the valid information, the adversarial relay node can ar-
bitrarily change some signal symbols and transmit such garbled signals. In order
not to be detected as an malicious attacker, the adversarial node will transmit
the valid symbols from signal constellations and according to the rule stipulated
by the space-time(ST) code. Without loss of generality, we analyze the damage
of such attacks for the situation where the relay node 1 is adversarial. Table 3.2
describe the strategy used the relay node 1. In this table, the adversarial relay
node randomly picks two signal symbols s2 and s
∗
3 to transmit, while the cooper-
ative relay (node 0) transmits the information according to the relay message and
the ST code. There are two difficulties at the receiver side. First, at the physi-
cal layer that uses the conventional signal detector, the receiver may not be able
to correctly perform signal detection. Second, even if the receiver can separately
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decode the signals transmitted from relay node 0 and 1, only by looking at the
physical layer symbols, it is very hard to tell which node is a friendly relay and
which is a malicious attacker. It is possible either relay node 0 or 1 is garbling the
transmitted signals, or even both.
Ambiguity in Conventional Signal Detector
To analyze the difficulty in signal detection using the conventional signal detector,
we first review the detection rule for the space-time code in Table 3.1. When both
relay nodes send signals according to the ST code, the conventional maximum






1 − 1)(|xi|2 + |xj|2) + d2(c0,xi) + d2(c1,xj)
}
. (3.3)





1, c1 = h
∗
1r0 − h0r∗1.
When the transmitted signal is garbled as in Table 3.2, the combined signals
using the conventional decoding rule produces the following result:
c0
(g) = h∗0(h0s0 + h1s2 + n0) + h1(−h0s∗1 + h1s∗3 + n1)∗
= α20s0 + h1h
∗
0s2 − h∗0h1s1 + α21s3 + (h∗0n0 + h1n∗1)
(3.4)








1), which is the combined sig-
nal without signal garbling, we can see that c0
(g) contains the same noise signal
(h∗0n0 + h1n
∗







0s2 − h∗0h1s1 + α21s3). Such garbling can easily lead to
a detection error, as is shown in the following example.
Example: Suppose the signalling scheme is QPSK, and the information symbols
are chosen as s0 = −s3 and s1 = −s2 . Furthermore, consider that identical
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channel coefficients h0 = h1 = αe
jθ. From (3.4) we obtain the combined signal as
c0
(g) = α2(s0 + s2 − s1 + s3) + (h∗0n0 + h1n∗1)






Under the maximum likelihood detection rule, the receiver outputs the signal
constellation that is closest to c0
(g) in Euclidean distance. Hence the detection
result will most probably be s2, while the actual signal sent is s0. This illustrates
the ambiguity in the conventional signal detector when encountering a adversarial
relay node.
3.1.3 Proposed Framework
There are two main challenges to distinguish the malicious relay from cooperative
nodes at the information receiver. First, traditional cryptography at the appli-
cation layer may be able to detect the attack, but cannot pinpoint the source of
the attack. This is because the received signals from possibly multiple relays are
superimposed with each other and corrupted by noise. At the physical layer, we
need to separately detect the signal symbols from each of the relay paths. Second,
we notice that such symbol-by-symbol detection is only feasible under certain con-
ditions, and the detected symbol may have low reliability. Therefore it is necessary
to aggregate the multiple symbol detection results for reliably distinguishing ad-
versary from cooperator. At the same time, the receiver needs to obtain some side
information about the “ground truth” of the relay signals. This side information
is used to compare with the received signals for identifying the malicious relay.
We propose a cross-layer framework for tracing malicious relay, as shown in
Fig. 3.2. The sender and receiver set up a secret key before sending messages.
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Figure 3.2: Schematic of the tracing scheme for malicious relay.
During communication, the information sender inserts a small number of pseudo-
random signalling symbols at random locations in the symbol stream. We refer to
the inserted symbols as the tracing symbols. Both the insertion location and the
inserted tracing symbols are generated using a cryptographically secure function
with the tracing key. Upon receiving the relay signals, the receiver uses the tracing
key to find out the location of the tracing symbols, extract them, and apply signal
detection. To process the detected tracing symbols, receiver also compute the
“ground truth” of the tracing symbols using the tracing key and compare them
with the detected tracing symbols from the relay path. Such a comparison can
tell whether a relay node is adversarial or cooperative. The details of the tracing
scheme consists of two parts: (1) how to detect the garbled tracing symbols, and
(2) how to aggregate the detection results from multiple tracing symbols to achieve
a reliable decision. These two components are presented in the next two sections.
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Figure 3.3: The pair-wise combined signal constellations. Notation (xi,xj) indi-
cates the signal point is formed by the combination h0xi + h1xj, where h0 = 1/2
and h1 = e
jπ/4.
3.2 Detecting Garbled Signals
3.2.1 Resolving Ambiguity Using One Receive Antenna
In this part, we discuss how the receiver with a single receive antenna can resolve
the ambiguity in the garbled signal and estimate the information sent respectively
by the two relay nodes. Consider the following example. The channel gain h0 =
1/2 and h1 = e
jπ/4. QPSK is chosen as the signalling scheme with constellations
M = {x0,x1,x2,x3}. The received signal, by combining the signals from two
relay nodes and the additive noise, takes the form r = h0s0 + h1s1 + n, where
s0, s1 ∈ M and n is the complex Gaussian noise. If we are only concerned with
the deterministic part of the signal, let y = h0s0 + h1s1 and we can see that y
can take 16 distinct constellations in the complex signalling plane, as shown in
Fig. 3.3. In this figure, the combined signal constellations are shown together with
the original QPSK constellations.
Rewrite the received signal as r = y+n. We can detect the signal y (corrupted
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in noise) as if the original signal contains a 16-point constellation. Under the
complex Gaussian noise assumption, the maximum likelihood detector is equivalent
to the minimum distance detector. Thus the detection result in the two dimensional
signal plane is the signal constellation closest to the received signal r.
Due to the smaller separation and geometrical irregularity in the combined
signal constellations (Fig. 3.3), the probability of error in signal detection would
naturally increase, and the closed form expression of the error probability cannot
be obtained in general. Here we outline a procedure for detecting combined signal
and computing the probability of error:
(a) Suppose the original signal constellation is M and the condition of the two
channels are known as h0 and h1. We first find the combined signal constellations
Y = {yk : yk = h0xi + h1xj, xi,xj ∈M}.
(b) In the two-dimensional signal plane, find the Voronoi diagram V associated
with the signal constellations Y . The Voronoi cell Vi delimits the areas that are
closer to a signal yi than any other signal constellations. If the received signal
r ∈ Vj, the detection output is yj.
(c) Estimate the error probability Pe for each received signal r. This procedure
is presented in details below.
Error Probability in Combined Signal Constellation
Denote the probability that a signal yi ∈ Y is sent while yj ∈ Y is detected by
Pr(yj|yi). According to Bayes rule, the probability that an error occurred when
yj is detected is







We first simplify the above equation by noticing that each constellation point
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yi ∈ Y is sent with equal prior in most practical applications, i.e., Pr(yi) = 1/|Y|
for all i. Second, if the Voronoi cells Vi and Vj are not neighbors, the probability
Pr(yj|yi) and Pr(yi|yj) are most likely to be small. Such terms can be ignored
in the estimation of (3.6). Third, if Vi and Vj are neighbors, then their shared
boundary line must be perpendicular to and dissect the line segment from yi
to yj. Without considering the interference from other constellation points and
under complex Gaussian noise, we can approximate Pr(yj|yi) ≈ Pr(yi|yj). Such
approximation is also true when the change in the probabilities Pr(yj|yi) and
Pr(yi|yj) introduced by the geometry of other constellation points are small. This





In the above equation, yj is the detected signal, and yi runs through all con-
stellation points. The conditional error probability in (3.7) can be computed using
Monte-Carlo method in two steps.
Step-1: Generate samples t = yj + e, where e is drawn from noise distribution
N with noise variance according to SNR. Use the detection algorithm proposed
above to obtain the detected symbol r and compare them with the ground truth
yj.
Step-2: Repeat Step-1 for N times and count the number of times with incorrect
detection Ne. When N is large, the probability of error due to receiver side noise
can be estimated by PNe ≈ Ne/N .
Error Probability in a Single Relay Stream
Suppose the transmitted symbols by the two relays are x0 and x1, respectively.
Denote the combined signal by y = h0x0 + h1x1. The detected combination sym-
82
Table 3.3: Channel Conditions with Two Receive Antennas
relay node 0 relay node 1
Rx 0 h0 h1
Rx 1 h2 h3
bol ŷ corresponds to a pair of detected symbols x̂0 and x̂1. A detection error in
ŷ can be due to one of the the two cases: (1) either x̂0 or x̂1 is incorrect, but
not both; (2) both x̂0 and x̂1 are incorrect. We observe that situation (1) occurs
with much higher probability than (2). In most cases, the two channel coefficients
h0 and h1 have different magnitudes. Usually the signal symbol associated with
the channel having a smaller-magnitude coefficient (or stronger attenuation) has
a much higher chance to be incorrectly detected. We assume the relay channels
are independent, and the probability for each relay channel to be attenuated more
than the other channel is 1/2. Thus for two relay channels, we can approximate




In the above detection algorithm, the detection complexity increases to O(M2),
where M is the number of signals in the original constellation. The detection
rule has removed the time diversity originally in the ST code scheme. The error
probability depends on the channel coefficients h0 and h1, which influence the
geometry of the combined signal constellations.
3.2.2 Resolving Ambiguity Using Two Receive Antennas
When the receiving side has more than one receive antenna, the signal detection
for garbled signals can take advantage of the additional antenna. We assume that
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Table 3.4: Received Signals at the Receive Antennas
Rx 0 Rx 1
t r0 r2
t + T r1 r3
the channel conditions between the two relay nodes and the two receive antennas
are known at the receiver, as shown in Table 3.3, and the channel variation is
negligible for adjacent symbol durations. The signals sent by the two relay nodes
are according to Table 3.2. The received signals at the two time slots are shown




r0 = h0s0 + h1s2 + n0,
r2 = h2s0 + h3s2 + n2.
(3.9)




r1 = −h0s∗1 + h1s∗3 + n1,
r3 = −h2s∗1 + h3s∗3 + n3.
(3.10)
We observe that only the signals s0 and s2 appear in (3.9), which corresponds
to the received signals at the first time slot. Similarly, equation array (3.10) has
the same structure as (3.9). From now on we will only focus on the signal detector
for s0 and s2 in (3.9). The detector for s1 and s3 can be obtained similarly. Let
us define
d1 = d(r0,h0xi + h1xj),
d2 = d(r2,h2xi + h3xj).
(3.11)
It can be shown that under uncorrelated Gaussian noise, the maximum likelihood
detector for s0 and s2 chooses signal constellations xi,xj ∈M that minimizes the
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2) using (3.9) and (3.11) leads to
(d21 + d
2
2) = |r0|2 + |r2|2 + d2(w0,xi) + d2(w1,xj)
− |w0|2 − |w1|2 − d2(v,x∗i xj) + |v|2 + |xi|2|xj|2
+ (α20 + α
2
2 − 1)|xi|2 + (α21 + α23 − 1)|xj|2.
(3.12)

















Thus minimizing (d21 + d
2
2) is equivalent to minimizing the following quantity
T = d2(w0,xi) + d
2(w1,xj)− d2(v,x∗i xj) + |xi|2|xj|2
+ (α20 + α
2
2 − 1)|xi|2 + (α21 + α23 − 1)|xj|2.
(3.14)
For PSK signals, the last three summation terms in (3.14) can be removed as their
values are fixed. This reduces (3.14) to
TPSK = d
2(w0,xi) + d
2(w1,xj)− d2(v,x∗i xj). (3.15)
The optimum detector has the following structure
(̂s0, ŝ2) = argmin(xi,xj)∈MT (xi,xj). (3.16)
The complexity in computing T in (3.14) is O(M2). This is because the signal
norms {|xi|} can be pre-computed. Computing d2(w0,xi) and d2(w1,xi) takes
linear time (w.r.t. M). Only computing d2(v,x∗i xj) takes O(M2) time, which is
the dominating factor in the detector complexity.
Similar to the case of one receive antenna, the symbol error probability in the
case of two receive antennas can be obtained using Monte-Carlo method. Generally
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speaking, the symbol error probability of using two receive antennas is lower than
that of using only one receive antenna. To see this, let us consider the combined
signal constellation sets
Y1 = {h0xi + h1xj | xi,xj ∈M} and
Y2 = {h2xi + h3xj | xi,xj ∈M}
from the two combining channels in (3.9). With one receive antenna, the detection
errors are usually caused by a constellation point u1 that is close to t1 in Y1 with a
small Euclidean distance d(u1, t1). Thus noise may drag the received signal closer
to u1. Recall that u1 is a mapping from a pair of sent signals (xi,xj) ∈ M by
channel coefficients h0 and h1. At the second receive antenna, the same (xi,xj)
pair is mapped by uncorrelated channel coefficients h2 and h3 to a signal u2 in Y2.
The probability that the distance from u2 to t2 (d(u2, t2)) is also small will be
low. Therefore when we have two receive antennas, the signal detection accuracy
would naturally increase.
We have shown that with two receive antennas, the receiver is able to detect the
potentially garbled signalling symbols from each relay node, with higher accuracy
than using one receive antenna. The only “luck” required by such a signal detection








Otherwise, it would be easy to see that the situation described in (3.9) reduces to
the situation of only having one receive antenna as discussed in Section 3.2.1.
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3.2.3 Generalization
In this part, we generalize the proposed signal detection approach to the scenario
of having R relay nodes and K receive antennas. Denote the channel coefficient
between the i-th receive antenna and j-th relay node by hij. At any given symbol
duration, the transmitted signal symbol from the j-th relay node is denoted by
sj. Since each relay node can potentially be adversarial, we do not impose any
constraint on the signal that can be transmitted by a relay node. The receive




hijsj + ni (1 ≤ i ≤ K). (3.17)
The maximum likelihood detector for the signal (s1, s2, ..., sR) is























it (1 ≤ j ≤ R, 1 ≤ t ≤ R).



















The formulation of the minimization objective function (3.19) has the advan-
tage that it reduces the computation complexity in searching the detection output.
Because zj takes values only from the signal constellation set M, there for a R-by-
M table can be pre-computed for d(wi, zj), (1 ≤ i ≤ R, 1 ≤ j ≤ M , zj ∈M). The
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magnitude |zj|2|zt|2 (1 ≤ j ≤ M, 1 ≤ t ≤ M , zj, zt ∈M) can be pre-computed to
obtain a M -by-M table. The term d(vjt,x
∗
1x2) can be pre-computed for every pos-
sible combinations of vjt (1 ≤ j ≤ R− 1, j + 1 ≤ t ≤ R) and x∗1x2 (x1,x2 ∈M).
Thus obtaining a table of size R(R−1)
2
×M ×M . Since computing each vjt (or wi)
term takes K multiplications, the total number of multiplications needed is about
(R2M2K/2). To search for the optimal (z1, z2, ..., zR) ∈ MR, a total of MR pos-
sible combinations need to be computed. With the help of pre-computed tables,
the rest of the computation cost would only be the cost for performing additions.
If we directly compute the general formulation using (3.18), the total number of
multiplications is about (MRRK), which is significantly larger than (R2M2K/2)
when R is large. Therefore the efficiency of our proposed algorithm is superior
than the brute-force computation of (3.18).
3.3 Cross-Layer Scheme for Tracing Adversarial
Relay
The physical layer signal detection scheme, working on a symbol-by-symbol basis,
has inevitably low reliability and detection accuracy. In this section, we present the
adversary-tracing scheme outlined in Sec. 3.1.3 from a system perspective, which
aggregates the detection results of a stream of tracing symbols, and significantly
improves the accuracy of tracing the malicious relay.
3.3.1 The Tracing Algorithm
In a secure cooperative communication system, it is expected that the sender
applies application-layer encryption and message authentication to protect data
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confidentiality and integrity. In our proposed scheme, the sender also insert pseudo-
random tracing symbols into the data symbol stream. The inserted symbol values
and locations can be computed using a cryptographic one-way function with the
secret key as input. Such a scheme enables the receiver to recompute the ground
truth of the tracing symbols and their locations.
At the receiver side, the receiver extracts the tracing symbols according to the
signal detection algorithm presented in the previous section. Since there may be
multiple relay nodes transmitting according to a cooperative relay scheme (either
coded or non-coded), the detected tracing symbols and the ground truth for each
relay stream should be treated separately. Next, we present the tracing scheme
using aggregated information from multiple tracing symbols for one relay stream,
and this scheme can be repeatedly applied to all the relay streams.
Denote the detected tracing symbols from one relay node at the physical layer
by [s1, s2, ...., sn], and the ground truth by [t1, t2, ..., tn]. Additionally, a confidence
value pi for each detected tracing symbol si, indicating the probability of correct
detection for each tracing symbol is also provided. The algorithm for determining
whether the relay node is cooperative or adversarial consists of the following steps:
(1) Pre-processing: Remove the detected tracing symbols si (and the corre-
sponding ground truth ti) whose confidence value pi is below a pre-determined
threshold τ . Hence the two sequence may be shortened in this step.
(2) Symbol mapping: Assign binary Gray code to the two-dimensional signal
constellations. After the mapping, use antipodal signal to represent the results,
i.e., represent binary bit one by “1” and binary bit zero by “-1”. Thus the mapping
results are two sequences [s1, s2, ..., sm] and [t1, t2, ..., tm], whose elements take value
in {−1, +1}.
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cooperative if ρ ≥ η;
adversarial if ρ < η.
(3.21)
In the above algorithm, the pre-processing is to ensure that each tracing sym-
bol involved in the final decision is reliable enough, i.e., with probability of correct
detection Pc ≥ τ . The mapping from signal constellations to binary data is con-
ventional in digital communication system [92]. Gray coding will ensure that the
constellations that are close in Euclidean distance will be mapped to binary strings
with small Hamming distance.
The above algorithm can be implemented sequentially, i.e., with each received
tracing symbol, the correlation value ρ can be updated with a relatively low com-
putation overhead. Suppose k reliable tracing symbols have been received and











i . When the (k + 1)-th tracing symbol arrives, the
receiver updates Ck+1 = Ck + sk+1tk+1, Sk+1 = Sk + s
2
k+1, Tk+1 = Tk + t
2
k+1, and
computes the updated ρ = Ck+1/
√
Sk+1Tk+1. Thus as more tracing symbols ar-
rive, the receiver can gradually improve the accuracy of the tracing scheme. Such
a property will be discussed in the next subsection in details.
The main costs for such a tracing scheme include: (1) the computation at the
receiver side; (2) the bandwidth cost by inserting the tracing symbols into the data
stream, which incurs about 1-3 % overhead; (3) the cost of setting up the secret
key for the tracing scheme, which can be done at the same time when setting up
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the application layer secret keys for using cryptographic tools. The mechanism for
tracing the adversarial relay is only activated when the receiver detects abnormal
behavior from the relay signals. For example, when application layer cryptographic
authentication frequently would not pass or decryption results in meaningless data.
3.3.2 Analysis of the Correlation Statistics ρ
In this part, we analyze the statistical property of the correlation statics ρ. Con-
sider N tracing symbols have been received, each with probability of correct de-
tection pc = 1 − pe, where pe is the single stream error probability in Eqn.(3.8).
The result of symbol detection is independent for each symbol. This is because
each tracing symbol is randomly chosen, and the time slot for transmitting each
tracing symbol is sparsely and pseudo-randomly spaced. We assume that if an
error happens during symbol detection, it is equi-probable to choose each of the
(2m − 1) erroneous detection results, i.e., each with probability 1/(2m − 1). We
















Here {S(k)i }mi=1 is the binary expansion of the k-th tracing symbol, represented by
antipodal signals ±1, and {T (k)i }mi=1 is the corresponding ground truth generated
using cryptographic tools with the secret tracing key. Since {Ck}Nk=1 are i.i.d.
independently distributed, we denote their common mean and variance by µc and
σ2c . Thus we have
E(ρ) = µc and Var(ρ) = σ
2
c/N. (3.23)
Although ρ only takes discrete values, when N approaches infinity, the distribution
of ρ will converge to a normal distribution according to central limit theorem. As
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the mean and variance would suffice to describe such distributions, we derive µc
and σ2c under two different hypothesis, i.e., whether the relay node is cooperative
(H0) or adversarial (H1). To make the presentation concise, we will drop the index
k in Ck, S
(k)
i , and T
(k)
i .
Mean and Variance Analysis
Hypothesis H0 (Relay node is cooperative): When the relay node is cooper-
ative, the received Si will only differ from ground truth Ti due to noise corruption.
When a detection error occurs, the bit sequence {Si}mi=1 can differ from {Ti}mi=1 by
flipping j bits, where j ∈ {1, 2, ..., m}. Since each of the (2m − 1) detection error
occurs with equal probability, the probability that exact j bits are flipped from




















2m − 1(1− pc).
(3.24)
The variance of C can be obtained as
Var(C) = E(C2)− [E(C)]2 (3.25)















= (1− pc) 2
m −m
(2m − 1)m + pc
(3.26)
Hypothesis H1 (Relay node is adversarial): When the relay node is adversar-
ial, the transmitted tracing symbol takes value from each of the 2m constellations
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(m− 2j) = 0. (3.27)










(m− 2j)2 = 1
m
(3.28)




Since the variance of the correlation statistics ρ decreases with more received
tracing symbols,the two hypothesis can be gradually separated, resulting in im-
proved tracing accuracy. The threshold value η in (3.21) can be dynamically
adjusted according to the number of tracing symbols N and the probability pc.
Distribution Analysis
The close-form probability mass function of the tracing statistics ρ can be derived
for some scenarios. We note that such a distribution can be expressed in a unified
framework for both H0 and H1. Here we give an example when m = 2, i.e., the
signal plane contains four constellation points. When m = 2, Ck in (3.22) can take
three values −1, 0, and 1. Denote the probability that Ck takes value 1 by p1, and
that it takes value 0 by p0. When N symbols are reliably detected, ρ can take
discrete values from the set {−1,−1+ 1
N
, ..., 0, ..., 1− 1
N
, 1}. Denote the number of
Ck’s with value 1 by N1 and that with value −1 by N−1, and that with value 0 by
1Here we have made another simplifying assumption. The adversarial relay can certainly
choose to transmit the correct tracing symbol from time to time to avoid being identified. How-
ever, in order to interrupt communications, the adversary need to transmit at least a fair portion
of garbled signals. The simplified analysis here can be utilized in subsequent discussions when
we consider more sophisticated attacks and involving system issues such as channel coding.
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N0. When ρ =
k
N
, this means N1 −N−1 = k. We thus can obtain the probability
























0 (1− p1 − p0)t.(3.29)



















When applying this unified distribution to two hypothesis H0 and H1, the
probability p1 and p0 can be adjusted. For example, under hypothesis H0, p1 = pc
and p0 = 2(1− pc)/3. Under hypothesis H1, p1 = 0.25 and p0 = 0.5.
Validations and Discussions
In this part ,we experimentally validate the mean, variance, and distribution of ρ
under hypothesis H0 and H1.
When the relay node is adversarial (hypothesis H1), we experimentally compute
the mean and variance of ρ using QPSK signalling. The results about mean and
variance are shown in Fig. 3.4(b) and Fig. 3.5, respectively. From Fig. 3.4(b)
we can see that the experimental mean approaches the analytical value 0; and in
Fig. 3.5 we can see that the variance of rho decreases with the increase in the
number of tracing symbols.
Approximating the mean and variance for ρ under hypothesis H0 is a more
intricate task. Our analytical mean and variance are obtained for any fixed value
of pc. In practice, ρ is computed from a large number of tracing symbols, each
with different pc values. Nonetheless, we observe that the analytical expression of
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Mean of ρ under H
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, two Rx, QPSK (m=2)
Experimental
Analytical
(a) Relay node is cooperative (H0)




















Mean of ρ under H
1
, two Rx, 200 tracing symbols
experimental
analytical
(b) Relay node is adversarial (H1)
Figure 3.4: The mean of ρ under hypothesis H0 and H1.
E(ρ|H0) in Eqn. (3.24) is a linear function of pc. This allows us to average the
estimated pc over a large number of tracing symbols to obtain the analytical value
for E(ρ|H0). We compare the analytical estimation obtained using Eqn. (3.24) and
the experimental results in Fig. 3.4(a). Fig. 3.4 shows that, for SNR from 12 dB
to 17 dB, our analytical approximations closely fit the experimental results, with
an error margin on the order of 10−3.
We plot the analytical distribution of ρ in Fig. 3.6 for N = 100. To validate our
analysis that the distribution of ρ approaches Gaussian as N becomes large enough,
we also performed χ2 test to quantitatively measure how close the distribution of
ρ is with respect to a Gaussian distribution. The results in Table 3.5 indicates
that with the probability of miss equal 0.1, we can classify ρ as a Gaussian random
variable. Such distributions of the tracing statistics ρ under two hypotheses clearly
indicate that we are able to distinguish the cooperative relay from malicious ones
with high accuracy.
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Variance of ρ under hypotheis H
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Figure 3.5: The variance of tracing statistics ρ under 10 dB SNR.






















Figure 3.6: The distribution of tracing statistics ρ.
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Table 3.5: χ2 fitting statistics of ρ under H1
N 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
One Rx 3.9847 3.2885 3.3828 4.1831 1.7825 1.2650 4.3765 3.4841
Two Rx 4.2556 6.0017 5.2737 0.4385 1.6241 1.3392 1.7076 0.5940
Note: χ2 < χ2α indicates the experimental data fits the analytical Gaussian distribution with miss probability α.
Degree of freedom = 5; χ20.05 = 11.07; χ
2
0.1 = 9.236.
3.3.3 A Randomized Attack Strategy
Since adversarial relays have every incentive to avoid being caught, a more sophis-
ticated strategy is to “comply” with the transmission rule for part of the symbol
stream and randomly jam the rest of the symbols, as long as the goal of corrupting
communications can be achieved. Such a strategy results in a correlation statistics














/(N1 + N2) (3.31)
Here N1 is the number of symbols that complies with the ground truth and N2 is
the number of garbled symbols. Superscript (c) and (g) indicate whether a symbol
is compliant or garbled. Let N = N1 + N2 and it is straightforward to decompose





























We can see that ρ(c) follows the distribution in Hypothesis H0 and ρ
(g) that
in H1. It can be seen that the mean (resp. variance) of the overall correlation
statistics ρ are weighted combinations from the means (resp. variances) of ρ(c) and
ρ(g). Therefore, in general, the mean of such an attacked ρ would increase and
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the variance would decrease. The increase in the mean results in a smaller “gap”
between the attacked statistics and the complied statistics. However, the gap
cannot be indefinitely small in practice. This is because the adversary’s primary
goal is to corrupt communications. When channel coding are applied before symbol
formation, if the attacker only garbles a very small portion of the symbol stream,
the garbled information would be recovered by the FEC at the receiver side. The
minimum portion of the symbol stream that the attacker needs to garble in order to
corrupt communications is thus determined by the channel coding rate. Suppose
the channel code can correct 1/4 of the symbol errors on average, the attacker
needs to corrupt at least 1/4 of the symbol stream, i.e., N2/N = 1/4 in (3.32).
Using QPSK signalling m = 2 and with pc = 0.9, we can estimate the mean and
variance of tracing statistics as
E(ρ) = 0.65 and Var(ρ) = 0.261/N.
3.3.4 Effects of Channel Estimation Error
In the previous discussions, we have assumed that the exact channel information
can be obtained at the receiver side through channel estimation. In practice, the
channel estimation will deviate from the actual channel information. This require
that the tracing scheme should be adapted according to such deviations. In this
part, we examine the effect of channel estimation error on the tracing statistics ρ.
The existing literatures on wireless channel estimation [32][59][98] indicate that
with training symbols, the normalized mean square error (NMSE) of the channel
estimation can approach the Cramer-Rao Bound (CRB) at high receiver SNR, or
when the number of training symbols is large enough. With a moderate number
of training symbols and high enough receiver SNR, we assume that the NMSE of
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channel estimation is equal to the negation of the receiver SNR. We note that such
a result can be obtained using various channel estimation methods, such as the
Minimum Mean Square Error (MMSE) method [59], the least square (LS) method
[32], or the Maximum Likelihood (ML) method [98]. For example, if the receiver
side has a SNR of 14 dB, the NMSE of channel estimation will be about -14 dB.
The deviation in channel estimation will result in a deviation in estimating
the combined signal constellations, which is used to perform symbol detection.
Since the energy of the error is relatively small compared to the energy of channel
coefficients, the estimated signal constellations YE can be seen as a slightly shifted
and rotated version of the true signal constellations Y . This effect is illustrated in
Fig. 3.7, where the actual signal constellations is drawn by ×, and the deviated
one by ◦. To see how a deviated signal constellation will affect symbol detection,
we consider two received signal points, C and D, shown in the figure. Point C is
generated by sending signal point A1 with additive noise. Using minimum distance
detection, C is detected as point B1 in the estimated constellations. Since B1 ∈ YE
and A1 ∈ Y correspond to the same set pair of transmitted symbols inM×M, such
a result is a correct detection. However, for received signal point D generated by
A2 and detected as B1, the detection result is incorrect, because the constellation
point in YE corresponding to A2 ∈ Y is B2.
When the channel estimation error is considered, the received signal model can
be written as
r = (H + nH)s + nT = Hs + nT + nHs, (3.33)
where nH is the uncertainty in channel estimation and nT represents receiver ther-
mal noise. It can be seen that the second noise term nHs is proportional to the
signal power |s|. Thus we refer to the noise introduced by channel estimation error
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Figure 3.7: Illustration of channel estimation error and symbol detection in com-
bined signal constellation plane. QPSK signalling, M = {1, ,−1,−}. The
true signal constellations (indicated by ×) Y = {y : y = h0xi + h1xj}, where
h0 = 0.82 + 0.15, h1 = −0.36 − 0.19, xi,xj ∈ M. Because of the error in
channel estimation, the estimated ĥ0 = 0.84− 0.12 and ĥ1 = −0.24− 0.22. The
estimated signal constellations (indicated by ◦) YE = {y : y = ĥ0xi + ĥ1xj}.
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as “self-noise” 2.
We now quantitatively analyze the effect of inaccurate channel information to
the tracing statistics ρ under hypothesis H0 and H1. The analysis under hypothesis
H1 is straightforward. Since the adversary randomly choose one symbol in M to
transmit, at the correlation phase (Eqn.(3.22)), even if the transmitted symbol is
incorrectly detected, the effect is still the same as receiving a randomly chosen
symbol in M. Thus the mean, variance, and distribution of ρ under H1 will not
change with inaccurate channel information.
Under hypothesis H0, if we know the mean square error (MSE) of channel esti-
mation, we can then estimate the energy of the self-noise term in (3.33). Assuming
the self-noise and thermal noise are independent, we can obtain the aggregated
noise energy and the equivalent SNR. This SNR will lead to an equivalent error
probability Pe for symbol estimation in the combined signal plane. From here on
the rest of previous analysis for tracing statistics ρ can be applied. In practical
implementations, the total noise energy including the self-noise can be measured.
3.4 Simulation Results
In this section we present a number of simulation results using the tracing statis-
tics ρ for detecting malicious realy under different Signal-to-Noise-Ratio (SNR). We
consider three simulation scenarios. In the first scenario, the malicious relay uses
the basic attack strategy and we assume the receiver obtains perfect channel infor-
mation. In the second scenario, the malicious relay employs the advanced attack
strategy, and the receiver has perfect channel information. In the third scenario,
2The term “self-noise” was introduced by Dr. Rajiv Laroia during his talk at University of
Maryland on Jan. 13, 2006.
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the malicious relay uses the advanced attack strategy, and the receiver’s channel
information is inaccurate, where the inaccuracy is quantified by the normalized
MSE of the channel estimation.
In our simulations, The channel conditions are generated using the modified
Jakes model in [27]. Each channel follows time-correlated slow Rayleigh fading.
Different channels are uncorrelated. QPSK is chosen as the signalling scheme. Ev-
ery second, a total of physical layer 20K symbols are transmitted. Since the fading
is slow, the channel coefficient for each symbol duration is considered constant.
Every 64 symbols are grouped as a frame. In each frame the sender will send one,
two, or three tracing symbols with equal probability. The time slot to send the
tracing symbols are generated uniformly within each frame from 1 to 64.
We consider two types of decision threshold η. The first is a simple average of
the analytical expected values under two hypotheses as follows
η = (E(ρ|H0) + E(ρ|H1))/2. (3.34)
The second decision threshold setting we consider is the Neyman-Pearson setup,
where we require the probability of miss is smaller than α and minimize the proba-
bility of false alarm. The decision threshold can be computed using the distribution
analysis results in Section 3.3.2. Here we demonstrate that even a simple thresh-
old setting as in (3.34) will be very effective in detecting malicious relay. We note
that these threshold settings are inherently adaptive. Because the mean and dis-
tribution of ρ under two hypothesis are based on the receiver SNR, the attacker’s
strategy, and the channel estimation error.
Another important system parameter is the threshold probability of correct
detection for each tracing symbol, τ (ref. Section 3.3.1). Generally speaking, when
τ is large, each tracing symbol will have higher accuracy, thus we will need fewer
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tracing symbols to obtain a converged tracing statistics ρ. However, the fact that
τ is high will reduce the chance that a received tracing symbol can be admitted
to compute the final tracing statistics. Since ρ converges with more admitted
tracing symbols, a higher τ will take a longer time for the tracing statistics to
converge. This is especially a problem at very low SNR because most received
tracing symbols have lower probability of correct detection. In our simulations,
we set τ = 0.9 when channel estimation is considered perfect, and set τ = 0.75
otherwise.
3.4.1 Basic Attack with Perfect Channel Information
In this experiment, we simulate the tracing scheme with one adversarial relay node
randomly transmit signalling symbols, and the other relay node transmit cooper-
atively. The simulations are performed for SNR in the range of 12 – 17 dB. In
Fig. 3.8 we present one realization of the tracing statistics ρ with respect to the
number of received tracing symbols, under 13 dB SNR. The adversarial relay ran-
domly chooses one symbol to send and the simulation runs in a 200-frame duration.
We can see that using one receive antenna (left figure), only 40% of the tracing
symbols are considered reliable, because the threshold probability τ is set rather
high at 0.9. However, using two receive antennas (right figure) significantly im-
proves symbol detection probability. All the received tracing symbols are reliable.
We can also observe that the tracing statistics from adversarial relay converges to
its mean 0; and that from the cooperative relay converges to its mean close to 1.
In both cases the convergence rate is fast, requiring only 50-100 reliable tracing
symbols. We note that the simulation time duration is about 0.6 second, which
indicates that the proposed tracing scheme can obtain a highly confident result
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One Rx, SNR = 13 dB, symbol Pc ≥ 0.9, T = 200 frames
ρ




rate = 40 %









Two Rx, SNR =13 dB, symbol Pc ≥ 0.9, T = 100 frames
ρ





Figure 3.8: Tracing statistics ρ under 13 dB SNR. Left: one receive antenna. Right:
two receive antennas.
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(a) histogram of ρ under 14 dB SNR
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decision threshold η
(b) min and max of ρ under different SNR
Figure 3.9: Statistics of ρ under basic attack with perfect channel information.
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within half a second.
For SNR value ranging from 12dB to 17dB, we perform the simulation 200 times
for each integer SNR value. Each simulation run contains one random node that is
adversarial and the other that is cooperative. We use the proposed tracing scheme
to identify the adversarial and cooperative node. The number of received tracing
symbols ranges from 100 to 300 in our simulations. Through all of our simulations,
we achieve 100% correctness in detecting both malicious and cooperative nodes.
We note that a tracing error can happen by either classifying a cooperative node
as adversarial (false alarm), or classifying a malicious node as cooperative (miss).
In Fig. 3.9(a) we plot the histogram of ρ under 14 dB SNR. We can see that the
decision threshold η computed according to Eqn.(3.34) clearly separates the two
classes of ρ values. We note that although the values of η over the 200 experiments
are not exactly the same, they are very close as can be seen in the histogram. In
Fig. 3.9(b) we show and minimum and maximum values of ρ from 12 dB SNR
to 17 dB. We also show the average value of decision threshold η. Again, these
decision thresholds perfectly separate the cooperative nodes from malicious ones.
3.4.2 Randomized Attack with Perfect Channel Informa-
tion
In this subsection we present the tracing scheme under the advanced attack strat-
egy discussed in Section 3.3.3. Similar to [61], we consider that the information
sender employs a RS code to protect the transmitted information. Suppose the RS
code has parameters (40, 20, 21). This forces the malicious relay to jam at least
1/4 of the symbol stream on average in order to successfully corrupt the commu-
nication link. In Fig. 3.10 we plot one realization of the tracing statistics under
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Avanced Attack, One Rx, SNR = 10 dB, symbol Pc ≥ 0.9, T = 400 frames





rate = 18 %










Advanced Attack, One Rx, SNR = 10 dB, symbol Pc ≥ 0.9, T = 200 frames





rate = 85 %
Figure 3.10: Tracing statistics ρ under advanced attack strategy, 10 dB SNR. Left:
one receive antenna. Right: two receive antennas.
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(a) histogram of ρ under advanced attack, SNR = 12 dB

















) under advanced attack, 300 runs
min( ρ ) under H
0
max( ρ ) under H
1
decision threshold η
(b) min and max of ρ under advanced attack
Figure 3.11: Statistics of ρ under advanced attack with perfect channel informa-
tion.
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such a situation. The receiver SNR is 10 dB. For each signalling symbol, the mali-
cious relay randomly choose to transmit a garbled signal with probability 1/4, or
to transmit the correct signal symbol with probability 3/4. We can see from the
figure that the separation of tracing statistics ρ between the adversarial relay and
the cooperative relay becomes smaller, but is still separable. The convergence rate
of tracing statistics ρ is slower than in the basic attack.
Under advanced attack, the decision threshold η is adaptively calculated ac-
cording to Eqn.(3.32). For example, when adversarial relay garble 1/4 or more
signalling symbols, the expected value E(ρ|H1) = 3E(ρ|H0)/4. A threshold by
simple averaging E(ρ|H0) and E(ρ|H1) would give η = 7E(ρ|H0)/8. We plot the
histogram of ρ under advanced attack in Fig. 3.11(a) with that from a cooperative
relay. The histogram for decision threshold η is also shown in the figure. Together
these histograms indicate that the tracing statistics ρ under two hypotheses are
well separated by the adaptive threshold η. In Fig. 3.11(b) we present the min-
imum of ρ under hypothesis H0 and maximum of ρ under H1. Each data point
(min or max) in the figure is obtained from 300 experiments. In all the experi-
ments under all SNR values, we obtained perfect classification, i.e., no false alarm
or miss event appeared.
3.4.3 Randomized Attack with Channel Estimation Error
In Eqn.(3.33), we modelled channel estimation error as an additional noise term
in the received signal. In our simulation, we intentionally add noise to the actual
channel coefficient, and provide the inaccurate channel coefficients to the trac-
ing algorithm. We assume the channel estimation mean square error is a known
parameter. In this setting, we explore the Neyman-Pearson threshold setting by
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Table 3.6: Experimental occurring frequency of miss and false alarm
SNR (dB) 12 13 14 15 16 17
number of miss 0 0 0 0 0 0
number of false alarm 0 0 0 0 0 0
Advanced attack with channel estimation error, Neyman-Pearson setting Pm ≤ 10−5, 300 runs.
analytically computing the distribution of ρ under H0. The threshold η ensures
that the miss probability Pf ≤ 10−5. As in the previous simulation setting, the
malicious relay randomly garble 25% of relayed signals.
In Fig. 3.12 we the histogram of ρ from 300 experiments. Two methods to com-
pute the Neyman-Pearson threshold are tested. The first method is to compute the
threshold based on the estimated symbol error probability from each experiment
run, as shown in Fig. 3.12(a). The second method is to use the average symbol
error probability from all experiments, as shown in Fig. 3.12(b). In both cases the
miss or false alarm occurred. In addition, we plot the analytical distribution for ρ
under hypothesis H0 in Fig. 3.12(b), which is the basis for computing the thresh-
old η. Due to the inaccuracy in estimating symbol detection error, the analytical
histogram slightly deviate from the actual one by a mean shift of about 3× 10−3.
In spite of the slight deviation in estimated distribution, the tracing algorithm
performs very well as it achieves perfect detection accuracy. If the tracing scheme
can allow a training stage, even such deviation in analysis can be corrected by
using the results from training.
3.4.4 Discussions
The cost of the tracing scheme is the extra bandwidth for transmitting the tracing
symbols, the computing resource used to detect garbled symbols and aggregate the
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(a) Threshold η computed for each experiment run






















(b) Threshold η computed using collective information from
300 experiments.
Figure 3.12: Statistics of ρ under advanced attack with channel estimation error.
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tracing symbols. The performance of the proposed tracing scheme is quantified by
detection probability. Generally speaking, improving the receiver SNR can improve
the efficiency and performance of the tracing scheme. This can be achieved in
several ways, such as increase transmit power, using multiple receive antennas.
With improved SNR, the receiver can achieve a better detection probability using
a smaller number of tracing symbols, thus improving efficiency and performance
of tracing simultaneously. Another way to improve the detection probability of
tracing scheme is to use stronger channel coding at the sender side. Thus the
malicious relay has to garble more signals in order to corrupt communications.
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that the pilot symbols for channel es-
timation are not manipulated by the malicious relay node. In reality, the malicious
node can also garble these pilot symbols. However, in cooperative communications,
a relay node is chosen only when the channel condition between itself and the re-
ceiving node is good enough. As such, in order to be chosen as relays and have the
potential to corrupt communications, the malicious nodes cannot choose to signif-
icantly manipulate the pilot symbols. Otherwise the channel estimation result will
indicate high fluctuation in the channel condition and the malicious node will not
be chosen as a relay.
3.5 Chapter Summary
In this paper, we identify the threat of signal garbling by malicious relay nodes in
cooperative wireless communication systems. To counter such malicious attack, we
proposed a cross-layer tracing scheme that can pinpoint the malicious relay with
high accuracy. The proposed tracing scheme employs an adaptive signal detection
algorithm, coupled with an statistical tracing symbol aggregation scheme. Our
112
analysis and simulation results show that the proposed tracing scheme can identify
the malicious relay with probability of miss and false alarm as low as 10−5, requiring
only 1 − 3% of the bandwidth when activated, and obtain the tracing result in a




for Security and Sensing
Performance
Wireless sensor network is an emerging area that integrates sensing, wireless com-
munication, internetworking, distributed signal processing, embedded system and
information security all through a set of tiny sensor nodes that are deployed in a
designated area. It has a great potential to be widely used in environmental moni-
toring, building surveillance, industrial manufacturing, and military combat [1, 50].
To achieve security and other functionality using sensor nodes, the protocols for
sensor networks must take into consideration the computation, memory, and power
constraints of the sensor nodes. In addition, one aspect in sensor network design
is often intricately involved with a number of other aspects. Since sensor network
systems have inherent complex criteria and objectives, optimizing a single objec-
tive may impair the system performance on other aspects. One such example is the
the sensor node deployment. The main jobs for most sensor nodes include sensing
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and communications. In sensor deployment literature, there are works concerning
the efficient sensing coverage issue [74, 145, 120], or the secure communication
problem [30, 64], but not yet both. As a first step toward developing the the-
ory and algorithms of more coordinated sensor deployment, this chapter focuses
on jointly considering two important aspects, namely, the sensing coverage and
communication security.
A sensor network usually performs its task in the following way. Depending
on applications, appropriate type of environmental information in the field are
first gathered by the individual sensor nodes and processed; and the necessary
information is then relayed to and/or collected by other nodes [35, 46]. The physical
characteristics of the sensing and communication devices on board of a sensor
impose limits on both the sensing range and the communication range. Therefore,
the placement of sensor nodes will have a substantial impact on both the sensing
coverage [74] and the communication connectivity [60].
Recently, the security of sensor networks has been brought to the attention of
the research community [18][15][39]. As the sensor nodes rely on wireless trans-
mission for communications, malicious adversaries could intercept the communica-
tions, modify the data packets, or inject falsified packets. To ensure secure sensor
communications, cryptographic mechanisms can be employed to encrypt the data
and produce message authentication code (MAC). As symmetric-key cryptogra-
phy that employ the same cryptographic key in the sending and receiving ends
generally have substantially lower computational complexity than the public-key
ones, symmetric-key cryptographic tools is generally preferred in practice because
of limited computational resources at each sensor node. Furthermore, resource-
constrained sensor networks impose stringent constraints on the key establishment
115
scheme. Conventional key management schemes are either centralized by employ-
ing a key distribution server, or contributory by using public-key cryptography,
and both often require a non-trivial amount of communications. These conven-
tional schemes are not suitable in the sensor network scenarios [34]. To meet the
challenge in designing secure sensor networks, key pre-distribution schemes have
been introduced to address the special needs in sensor networks [34, 16].
There are two main scenarios that sensor deployment are modelled and studied,
depending on whether the locations of sensor nodes can be adjusted after the ini-
tial deployment. The first scenario is static deployment, where the location of the
sensors will not change once deployed. When efficient sensing coverage is the sole
concern, the existing literature suggests that different deployment topologies lead
to substantially different efficiency in sensing coverage [20, 53]. In the mean time,
researchers focusing on secure sensor communications have recently shown that, if
the key pre-distribution can be adapted according to the sensors’ locations, we can
substantially improve the probability for establishing secure communication links
between sensors as well as the security against compromised nodes [30, 64, 143].
However, there is a very limited amount of analysis on how the topology of sensor
locations affects both security and coverage issues [71]. In Section 4.2 of this chap-
ter, we present analytic model and experimental validations on several practical
topologies in terms of both sensing coverage and ability to establish secure commu-
nication links. We shall consider both the case when each sensor can be accurately
placed at any desired location, and the case when the actual deployment deviates
from the desired location. This investigation will provide important guidelines to
sensor deployment for a variety of applications.
The second scenario of sensor deployment considers more advanced sensing
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devices, where the sensors have the capability of adjusting their locations after
being deployed in the field. This is particularly useful when the actual deployment
deviates from the desired location. The current literature primarily concerns the
development of adjustment algorithms to optimize the sensing coverage. As we
shall show in Section 4.3, such adjustment may negatively affect the probability
for sensors to establish secure communication links. In [91] and [22], the authors
have proposed general frameworks for constrained sensor location adjustment by
jointly considering sensing coverage and other performance aspects, such as sensor
communications. For communication connectivity, the distance between nodes is
a primary factor. However, more complicated factors than distance also play im-
portant roles in determining the secure connectivity between nodes. As such, the
extension of prior work to incorporate secure communication is not straightfor-
ward. The nature of secure sensor communication requires comprehension of the
key establish schemes, investigation into deployment topology, and special formu-
lation of the key sharing constraint as part of the location adjustment algorithm.
This motivates us to develop new location adjustment algorithms that can jointly
optimize the sensing coverage and communication security. We further relate to
the first scenario by examining how different topologies for the desired deployment
locations affect the overall performance under these security-aware adjustment al-
gorithms.
4.1 Background and Related Works
In this section, we review the background on sensing coverage and secure communi-
cations in sensor networks, and briefly survey the related prior works. Throughout
the discussion we adopt a simplified mathematical model for sensing coverage. A
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1 if d(x0,x) ≤ Rs;
0 if d(x0,x) > Rs.
(4.1)
where Rs is referred to as the sensing radius, and the distance metric d(·, ·) is
usually the Euclidean distance. S = 1 indicates the sensor has the capability to
sense and S = 0 otherwise. Analogous to the sensing capability, we can simplify
the existence of a communication link between two sensor nodes n0 (located at x0)





1 if d(x0,x1) ≤ Rc;
0 if d(x0,x1) > Rc.
(4.2)
where Rc is referred to as the communication radius. T = 1 indicates the link
exists and T = 0 otherwise.
4.1.1 The Sensing Coverage Problem
Efficient Sensing in Static Deployment
Suppose the sensor nodes with sensing radius Rs can be hand placed in the field
to the exact location of our choice. We are interested in the optimal way to place
the sensors so that: (1) any location in the field can be covered by at least one
sensor; and (2) the nodes can perform sensing in an efficient way. To quantify the
efficiency of sensing coverage, we define the sensing efficiency ratio ρ, which is the





Here Acol is the actual covered area by all the sensor nodes, and Asep is the sum
of the area covered by each individual sensor. Apparently, we have Asep ≥ Acol as
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(a) The square lattice.












(b) The hexagon lattice.
Figure 4.1: Two possible lattice deployment. Under full coverage requirement, the
hexagon lattice has the lowest node density.
the coverage between sensors may overlap, thus ρ ≥ 1. The closer the efficiency
ratio gets to 1, the higher the efficiency. So the problem of optimizing coverage
efficiency can be formulated as to minimize the efficiency coefficient ρ subject to
the whole area can be fully covered. This problem is traditionally known as the
circle covering problem [128], where a number of equivalent circles (i.e. circles with
the same radius) are placed into a field to completely cover the field area. A sensor
node is located at the center of a circle, and the radius of the circle corresponds
to the sensing radius.
If the circles are placed in repeated regular patterns, the circle centers form a
lattice and the dissecting lines among the centers form a cell pattern. In Fig. 4.1 we
show two possible covering layout using the square lattice and the hexagon lattice,
respectively. Each layout leads to a specific efficiency ratio ρ, which is also known
as the covering density or covering thickness in the mathematics literatures [20].
For the simplified sensing model of Eqn. (4.1), Asep = n · πR2s, where n is the total




1.21, which is achieved when the center of the circles (i.e. the sensor nodes) form
a hexagon lattice. In this case, the distance between any two neighboring nodes is
D =
√
3Rs. Fig. 4.1(b) illustrates the geometry of such a placement. Compared to
the square lattice placement, which has efficiency ratio ρ = π/2, the hexagon lattice
placement gives much more efficient coverage. Further, sensor placement can be
viewed as spatial sampling from signal processing perspective. The literature there
also suggests the superiority of hexagonal sampling lattice over the square lattice
when the spatial spectrum of a 2-D signal being measured (such as a temperature
field) is bandlimited with a circular support.
For the convenience of discussion, we define the following notations. In the
square lattice deployment, we denote the distance from a node to its horizon-
tal/vertical neighbor by D1, and the distance to its diagonal neighbor by D2.
Thus we have D2 =
√
2D1 ≈ 1.41D1, and the covering density ρ = πR2s/D21. In
the hexagon lattice, we denote the distance from a node to its six neighbors by





3D1 ≈ 1.07D1. Throughout this chapter, we use the normalized
distance with respect to D1 as the distance metric, and study the impact of deploy-
ment topology on the performance of sensing coverage and secure communications.
Sensor Location Adjustment Algorithms
In recent years, the advances in micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) have
made it possible for tiny sensor devices to walk as microrobots [89]. The locomotion
capabilities of sensor nodes have made it possible to improve the sensing coverage
after the initial sensor deployment. Consequently, a number of prior works have
studied how to adjust the location of sensor nodes to maximize the total coverage in
120
a given area [75, 44, 74, 120, 145]. The total sensing coverage, η, is the percentage
of the area covered within the sensing range with respect to the total field area.
We can see that η ≤ 1 and a larger η represent a better coverage. Most existing
algorithms for sensor location adjustment uses an iterative framework. In each
iteration, sensors (or a cluster head) obtain their current locations and the relative
locations to their neighbors. Based on these information, each node will compute
a new location using the location updating algorithm. The general strategy is to
spread out the sensor nodes as evenly as possible. For example, the virtual force
algorithm (VFA) proposed in [145] compares the distance between a sensor and its
neighbor nodes with a threshold distance. An attractive (resp. repulsive) virtual
force is applied to the sensor node if the distance is greater (resp. smaller) than
the threshold. The Minmax algorithm proposed in [120] employs the Voronoi cell
concept and move the sensors to the center of the minimum-radius circum-circle
of its Voronoi. Further, for calculating the sensing coverage, the authors of [74]
and [75] have proposed polynomial-time algorithms to calculate the worst case and
average case coverage.
From secure communication point of view, however, the location adjustment
intended only to maximize sensing coverage may reduce the secure communication
connectivity. This is because the secure links established before location adjust-
ment may no longer exist after location adjustment and some sensor nodes can be
moved to un-preferred locations in terms of establishing secure communications
using pre-distributed key. In Section 4.3, we will present a detailed example to
illustrate the limitation of the existing adjustment methods and discuss how to
balance the tradeoff between the sensing coverage and the node connectivity using
secure links.
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4.1.2 Key Pre-distribution for Sensor Networks
As reviewed earlier, one of the critical issues for secure sensor communication is
to establish a cryptographic key between two sensors. To accommodate stringent
resource constraints in sensor network systems, an increasingly popular approach
is to preload each sensor with a set of keys from a large collection of keys. This
entire collection of keys is referred to as the key pool and the set of the keys loaded
by each sensor is referred to as the key ring. Once the sensors are deployed in
the field, neighboring sensors will follow certain protocol to discover whether they
share some secret keys. If so, they will use these shared secret keys to establish a
secure communication link. There are two requirements for establishing a secure
communication link between two sensor nodes: (1) two nodes should be within
communication range; and (2) two nodes should share at least one secret key. The
first work on random key pre-distribution [34] was proposed by considering the
sensor nodes are randomly deployed into the field. Later, Du et al. and Liu et al.
proposed to incorporate sensor location knowledge into key pre-distribution [30]
[64]. The deployment model in these works considers the sensors being deployed at
the center of evenly partitioned square cells. Each cell will have its own key pool,
and only neighboring cells will have overlap between their key pools. The sensors
in each cell will randomly pre-load keys from the key pool of its own cell. Since the
key pool of each cell is much smaller compared to the key pool for the entire sensor
node collection, neighboring sensors will have a higher chance to share keys. Most
recently, Zhou et al. identify the improved circular symmetry of the hexagon cell
than the square one to reflect the common shape of sensors’ communication range,
and propose to use hexagon lattice in location-based key pre-distribution [143].
In location-based key pre-distribution, each sensor has a designed deployment
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location for establishing secure communication link. In practice, these designed
locations may not be the same as the locations determined according to the sensing
performance. This motivates us to study the impact of practical sensor deployment
on establishing secure communications.
4.1.3 Adversary Model and Link Compromise Probability
In addition to the ability to establish secure links between nodes, resilience against
node compromise is another important security aspect to be examined. As sensor
nodes may be deployed in adversarial environment, a deployed node could be cap-
tured by adversaries. We assume the adversaries will try to capture the deployed
sensor nodes and use the pre-loaded keys in the captured nodes to eavesdrop secure
links among sensor nodes that are not compromised. In measuring such a potential
threat, the probability of link compromise due to node compromise is an important
security metric considered by previous key pre-distribution works [34, 16, 63, 30].
To allow fair comparison on different deployment topologies, we should require each
topology to have the same link compromise probability when the same number of
nodes are compromised, and then compare the connectivity of secure communica-
tion. We have constructed a probabilistic model to compute and approximate the
link compromise probability in the location-based key pre-distribution scheme [30]
using lattice deployment. It can be shown that if the compromised nodes are sta-
tistically uniformly distributed among all nodes and each node carries the same
number of keys, then the link compromise probability is approximately the same
for the location-based scheme using the square lattice, the hexagon lattice, and the
basic scheme using random deployment, up to the first-order Taylor expansion [34].
The detailed derivation can be found in the Appendix. With this finding, we can
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construct a fair comparison between deployment topologies. Our study shows that,
for fixed-size key ring, the group-based scheme using structured/lattice deployment
usually can achieve a better connectivity than the random deployment.
4.2 Lattice-Structured Deployment
In this section, we jointly examine the sensing coverage and communication se-
curity under the static sensor deployment scenario. Given that a very limited
amount of study has been done in the literature on how the sensor topology affects
both security and coverage issues, we focus on analyzing the impact of deploy-
ment topology on the performance of sensing coverage and efficiency as well as
to the ability of establishing secure communications. We will consider two main
deployment topologies, namely, the square lattice and the hexagon lattice.
4.2.1 Fundamental Relations Between Deployment Lattices
As the first example to illustrate the impact of sensor deployment topology on
the establishment of secure communications links, we consider the simple case of
sensors being placed exactly at the desired location. We deploy sensors under
a square lattice and a hexagon lattice, respectively, and employ the basic key
pre-distribution scheme [34], where each node has the same probability to share
a secret key with any other node. We denote the key sharing probability by
Pshare, and use the same node densities in the two lattice deployment, which is
the number of nodes per unit area. As the communication radius Rc increases
from 0 to 1.6D1, each sensor can gradually have more reachable neighbors, and
this in turn will affect the number of secure links per node. Because the distance
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expected number of secure links versus communication radius
square lattice
hexagon lattice
Figure 4.2: Expected number of secure links versus communication radius using
the basic key pre-distribution scheme.
between a node and its eight neighboring nodes in a square lattice is not circularly
symmetric [143], the number of neighbor nodes that can be reached is a two-
step function of the communication range. That is, as the communication range
increases, four vertical and horizontal neighbors of the center nodes (also known
as the 4-way connection [47]) will be reached first, before the other four neighbors
on the diagonal directions being reached. This can be seen from Fig. 4.2, where we
show the relation of the expected number of secure links per node, normalized by
the key sharing probability, with respect to the normalized communication radius.
The result for a hexagonal lattice, on the other hand, is a one-step function, owing
to the circular symmetry between a center node and its six neighbors. Under the
same node density, Fig. 4.2 shows that hexagon lattice achieves a better topology
when the communication radius Rc is between 1.07 and 1.41 times of D1; and
outside this range, square lattice achieves a better connectivity. Later in this
chapter, we shall see several more examples reflecting this fundamental relations
between the square and hexagon deployment lattice.
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4.2.2 Secure Connectivity Under Perturbed Deployment
Lattice
While Fig. 4.2 depicts the trend for the secure communication connectivity using
square and hexagon lattices in the ideal situation, sensors may not be deployed
with high accuracy at the designed lattice locations in practice. Such inaccuracy
may be caused by measurement error (if sensors are deployed by human), or by
wind speed (if sensors are deployed by vehicle or airborne methods). Suppose a
sensor node is designed to be deployed at location (x0, y0) in the field. The actual
deployment location (x, y) can be modelled as
x = x0 + rx; y = y0 + ry.
Here the deviation terms rx and ry are zero-mean random variables. One can model
these deviation terms as Gaussian distributed [30] or uniformly distributed [63]
random variables with variance σ2 as the deviation parameter.
Taking the deployment deviation into consideration, we investigate the im-
pact of deployment topology on the connectivity of secure communication. Here
we choose the location-based key pre-distribution in [30] and the Gaussian deploy-
ment deviation model and compare the square lattice deployment used in [30] with
the hexagon lattice deployment. In the hexagon lattice deployment, each node is
surrounded by six neighbor nodes. By using location-based key pre-distribution,
the key pool for any given node, referred to as the center node, has 1/6 overlap
with each of its six neighbors’ key pools. Thus the the center node will have equal
probability to share keys with each neighbor node. We denote the probability that
the center node can still be a neighbor with one of its neighbor node under Gaus-
sian deployment deviation by Pr(neighbor), and the probability that the two nodes
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can share a key by Pr(share). As the deployment deviation is independent of key
distribution, the probability that a designed neighbor in the hexagon lattice can es-
tablish a secure link with the center node is Pr(hexlink) = Pr(neighbor) Pr(share).
Because of the geometrical symmetry, the expected number of secure links for the
center node is
E(Nhexsec ) = 6 Pr(hexlink).
Similarly, we can compute expected number of secure links per node in the square
lattice deployment. In the square lattice, we refer to the horizontal/vertical neigh-
bors of a node as type-A neighbors and the diagonal neighbors as type-B neighbors.
Denote the probability that a node can establish a secure link with one of its type-
A neighbors as Pr(sqlinkA), and that with type-B neighbors as Pr(sqlinkB). The
expected number of secure links per node is
E(N sqsec) = 4 Pr(sqlinkA) + 4 Pr(sqlinkB).
In Fig. 4.3 we show the expected number of secure links per node under Gaus-
sian deployment deviation. Each node carries 100 keys and each key pool contains
1200 keys. The neighbor probability and key sharing probability can be computed
using the model in [31]. In Fig. 4.3, in both square and hexagon lattice deployment,
the expected number of secure links increases with the normalized communication
radius Rc/D1. The hexagon lattice achieves a slightly higher connectivity over
the range of 0.9 and 1.7 in the normalized communication radius, exhibiting a
similar trend as in Fig. 4.2. This suggests that the communication radius, deploy-
ment topology, deviation parameter, and the number of pre-loaded keys per sensor
all play a role in establishing secure links. It is also worth noticing that while
the numerical gain in connectivity by hexagon lattice over the above mentioned
communication range is small, its practical impact is non-trivial. Within this com-
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Figure 4.3: Expected number of secure links per node versus communication radius.
Shown here are the analytical values under Gaussian deployment deviations.
munication range, the average node degree increases from 0.5 to around 4, and the
sensors gradually change from isolated nodes to connected components, where the
boundary value for the average links per node is around 2. This phenomenon will
be illustrated later in Section 4.3. To achieve the same connectivity, the square
lattice would require a larger communication range. As the power consumption
of wireless communications is related to the communication range by a power law
(from the 2nd to the 4-th power, depending on the propagation environment [97]),
a lower requirement on communication range with lower power consumption while
maintaining communication connectivity is more desirable in many sensor net-
work designs. This makes hexagon deployment lattice attractive for power-limited
applications.
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4.3 Security-Aware Sensor Location Adjustment
The static deployment strategy described in the previous section considers the
sensor deployment as a one-time task. Once the sensors are deployed in the field,
their locations are fixed and cannot be further adjusted. In recent years, a num-
ber of works on practical sensor deployment have considered movement-adjusted
sensor deployment for improving sensing coverage [120, 145, 44]. In this section,
we investigate the impact of location adjustment in sensor deployment on secure
communications. We propose two new location updating algorithms for sensor
deployment that jointly consider sensing coverage and secure communications.
4.3.1 Improving Secure Connectivity Using the Virtual Force
Framework
Effect on Secure Connectivity by the Existing Approach
When secure communications is required for sensor nodes, the existing location
adjustment algorithms may negatively affect the establishment of secure commu-
nication links. As an example, we examine the establishment of secure communica-
tion links when the sensors are moved by the Virtual Force [145] location updating
algorithm. The Virtual Force algorithm adjusts the sensor locations based on
the relative distance from a sensor to its neighbors compared to a pre-determined
threshold dth. Suppose a node ni has a neighbor node nj and their distance is dij.






wA(dij − dth) · −→v ij if dij ≥ dth;
(wR/dij) · −→v ji dij < dth.
(4.3)
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Coverage ratio ρ = 0.7; Average secure links per node N
sec
 = 2.5
(a) Initial deployment locations








Coverage ratio ρ = 0.85; Average secure links per node N
sec
 = 1.6
(b) Locations after 4 VFA iterations
Figure 4.4: Impact of location adjustment to the establishment of secure links
using VFA
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Here −→v ij is the unit-length pointing from the location of ni to that of nj. The
total virtual force
−→








After computing the virtual force for each node, the node ni is moved to the
direction specified by the aggregated virtual force
−→
F i with a step size equal to its
magnitude |−→F i|.
Fig. 4.4 shows an example of location updating using the VFA and its impact
on secure communications. Initially, 49 sensors are deployed into a 60 × 60 area
with a hexagon lattice pattern. A uniform distributed deployment deviation is
applied to the initial locations, with the deployment variance σ2 = 4/3. This
initial deployment is shown in Fig. 4.4(a) with the established secure links marked
as lines connecting the sensor nodes. In this example, the sensing radius is 5
and the communication radius is 9. The sensing coverage achieved by the initial
deployment is η = 0.7 and the average number of secure links per node is Nsec =
2.5. Next, we apply the VFA to update the sensor locations. After four iterations,
the sensing coverage has been improved to η = 0.85, while Nsec has been reduced
significantly to Nsec = 1.6, implying most of the nodes are no longer connected.
This is illustrated in Fig. 4.4(b). At the initial deployment, most nodes form a
connected component using the secure links; after four iterations, about half of the
nodes are no longer connected with the largest connected group, which reduces the
capability of secure communications between the sensor nodes. Our study shows
that such a phenomenon is common in sensor location update using virtual force
type of schemes. To maintain a comparable sensing coverage while improving
secure connectivity, we propose a modified sensor location updating algorithm
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based on the virtual force framework. We call the modified algorithm VFSec,
indicating that secure communications is one of the main factors in updating the
sensor locations.
VFSec Algorithm
As we have seen, there is a tradeoff between the sensing coverage and secure
connectivity. For balancing this tradeoff, we define an additional performance
metric as
Γ = w1η + w2Nsec. (4.5)
The weights w1 and w2 are chosen such that w1η and w2Nsec are approximately
in the same value range, so as to achieve a desired tradeoff. Since the sensing
coverage is always within [0, 1], and the average number of secure links per node
is around 3 in most of our experiments, we choose w1 = 1 and w2 = 1/3 in our
experiments.
Our algorithm uses the combined performance metric Γ to measure the opti-
mality of sensor locations, which balances the tradeoff between coverage and secure
communications. During each iteration of location adjustment, the algorithm tries
to keep the distance between those nodes that can establish secure links closer. To
achieve this, we add a new term of virtual force,
−→
F sec, to the total virtual force.
The virtual force
−→






ws(dij −Dsec) · −→v ij if Dsec < dij < Rc





F secij , Dsec is a threshold distance smaller than the communication
radius Rc, dij is the distance between node ni and nj, ws is the weight assigned
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to the added virtual force, and −→v ij is the unit-length vector pointing from the







F secij . This force is added to distance-based forces
−→
F ij in Eqn.(4.4)
to compute the total virtual force
−→
F i. To update the sensor location, the sensor
node ni is moved along the direction of
−→
F i by a distance equal to the magnitude
of vector |−→F i|. The complete algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
Simulation Results and Discussions
To study the performance of VFSec, we have performed three experiments and
compared the VFA and VFSec in terms of sensing coverage and secure link estab-
lishment. Throughout these experiments, we set the communication radius Rc as
twice the sensing radius Rs. This is to ensure that even when the sensing range
is very small and two neighboring sensors are barely disjointly placed (i.e. the
distance between two neighboring sensor nodes is 2Rs), it is still possible to es-
tablish a communication link between the two sensors. In all the experiments, we
choose ws = 0.2 and Dsec = 0.6Rc based on heuristics. Both the VFA and VFSec
algorithms are run for seven iterations.
In the first experiment, we place 36 sensors nodes uniformly in a 50× 50 area.
Using VFA and VFSec, the locations of the sensors are adjusted. The sensing
coverage and the number of secure links per node are recorded. We repeat such
experiment 400 times and computed the average coverage and the number of secure
links per node under different sensing and communication radius. From the results
shown in Fig. 4.5 we can see that, the proposed VFSec algorithm can improve the
average number of secure links by approximately 15-20%, with a small reduction in
the sensing coverage by approximately 2-5%. In addition, the VFSec consistently
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Algorithm 1 VFSec algorithm
Input: sensor locations {(xi, yi)}ni=1 and key index set {Ki}ni=1
Output: new locations (xopt1 , y
opt






Compute Γopt using Eqn.(4.5) with ({(xi, yi)}ni=1, {Ki}ni=1)
(xopti , y
opt
i ) ←− (xi, yi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
/* Iteration */
for i = 1 to MAX-ITERATION do
for each sensor node ni do
Calculate
−→
F ij using the formulation in [145]
Calculate
−→











1) ←− (xi + Fix, yi + Fiy) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Compute Γ using Eqn.(4.5) with ({(x′i, y′i)}ni=1, {Ki}ni=1)
if Γ > Γopt then
(xopti , y
opt




achieves a better performance in terms of the overall performance metric Γ in
Eqn.(4.5).
In the second experiment, we compare the VFSec and VFA using square lattice
deployment under Gaussian deployment deviation. We fix the node density and the
deviation parameter σ = 0.4D1. From Fig. 4.7, we can see that VFSec improves the
average number of secure links per node, with a small compromise in the sensing
coverage. In this experiment, we have excluded the boundary nodes of the square
deployment area in computing the sensing coverage and number of secure links.
Thus the results can be viewed as if the performance is evaluated in an infinitely
large area. In spite of the difference in accounting the performance, the results in
Fig. 4.7 shows the same trend as in Fig. 4.5.
In the third experiment, we compare the square and hexagon lattice deploy-
ment using the corresponding location-based key pre-distribution. We use the
proposed VFSec algorithm for location updating and the results are obtained
for different communication and sensing radius under small deployment deviation
(σ/D1 = 0.2). Fig. 4.6 shows that the hexagon and square lattices achieve compa-
rable sensing coverage. In terms of the average number of secure links per node,
the hexagon lattice achieves a better performance when the normalized communi-
cation radius Rc/D1 is in the approximate range of [1, 1.5]; outside this range, the
square lattice performs better. Such a result again shows that there is no all-time
winner in terms of deployment lattice, as is shown in the step function connectivity
graph in Fig. 4.2 for the ideal hexagon and square lattices. When designing secure
sensor networks, the deployment lattice as well as system parameters, such as the
communication radius, should be taken into consideration.
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Implementation Issues
Similar to the VFA algorithm, the VFSec can be performed by the cluster head of
the sensor nodes. As indicated in Algorithm 1, the cluster head needs to collect
the sensors’ key index sets and their current locations. The key indices are ID’s
assigned to secret keys, which is used in the shared key discovery phase in key
pre-distribution schemes [34][16]. The iterations for updating sensor locations are
performed by the cluster head and only the final results obtained are sent back to
the sensor nodes. The actual location adjustment is performed only once by each
sensor.
When the cluster head is not available, the algorithm can be performed by
the individual sensors only based on its neighborhood information. In this case,
Algorithm 1 must be adjusted to suit the distributed implementation. The sensors
need to perform movement adjustment after each iteration. At the same time,
computing and comparing the global performance metric Γopt as in Algorithm 1
would not be feasible; and the number of iterations must be limited to reduce the
power consumption in sensor movement.
4.3.2 Sensor Location Adjustment Based on Vector Quan-
tization
One limitation of the VFSec algorithm is that in order to achieve a better secure
connectivity, the sensing coverage is somewhat sacrificed. The reason is that the
virtual force based approach simplifies the problem in a two-dimensional area to
a set of vectors. In this part, we propose a new approach for updating sensor
locations that can explore more freedom in the two-dimensional space to jointly
optimize sensing coverage and secure communications.
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of VFA and VFSec with uniform random initial deploy-
ment.
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of deployment lattice using VFSec under Gaussian de-
ployment deviation.
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The problem of covering a region using distributed sensor nodes is analogous to
the vector quantization problem in signal compression [38]. In the sensing coverage
problem, each node can sense its nearby region with certain accuracy. The goal is to
maximize the total coverage given a limited number of sensors. In the quantization
problem, each point in the k-dimensional space is associated with a representative
point in the codebook. The goal is to use a limited number of points to represent
all points in the region with minimum error. In two-dimensional space, if the
input signal is statistically uniformly distributed, the minimum-error quantization
lattice and the most efficient covering lattice are the same hexagon lattice [20] as
we have seen in Fig. 4.1(b). This has motivated us to employ insights in the vector
quantization literature to explore solutions for sensor deployment.
The Weighted Centroid Algorithm
Several prior works have proposed location updating algorithms that are similar
to the two-dimensional vector quantization solution [74][120]. In particular, the
MinMax algorithm proposed in [120] computes the Voronoi cell V for each sensor
node n, and move the sensor to the minmax location xminmax so that the maximum
distance from the new location to any point in the cell V is minimized, i.e.,





It has been shown in [120] that the minmax location is the center of the minimum-
radius circum-circle of the Voronoi cell associated with each node.
Inspired by these works, we propose a new approach for updating sensor loca-
tions based on the Lloyd-Max quantization algorithm [38]. We consider that the
sensor has a communication range Rc and can know the locations of its neigh-
bors and its own location [74]. Furthermore, the proposed approach will allow the
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of VFA and VFSec using square deployment lattice under
Gaussian deployment deviation.
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Fig. 9. Comparison of the weighted centroid and minmax algorithm,
small Gaussian deployment deviation.
of location adjustment is to maximize the coverage, the
same weight can be assigned to all
for all points. In this situation, the algorithm will try to
Figure 4.8: Illustration of the weight assignment in the weighted centroid algo-
rithm.
sensors to take secure communication as a factor in updating locations.
Our proposed algorithm aims at minimizing the weighted average distance of a
sensor node to the points in its Voronoi cell. We choose a weighted square distance
as the distance metric. Suppose in the two-dimensional space, there are N points
uniformly distributed at locations {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 inside the Voronoi cell formed of a
sensor node located at (x0, y0) and its neighbors. Each point is associated with a






wi[(x0 − xi)2 + (y0 − yi)2]. (4.7)
From the classic vector quantization results [38], we know that given the set of
points {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 and the weight {wi}Ni=1, the optimal value for (x0, y0) that











For the dual problem, we know directly from the definition of Voronoi cell that, for
any point p located inside a voronoi cell Vi of sensor ni, the node ni is closer to the
point p than any other node outside the Voronoi cell Vi. Thus we have naturally
obtained an iterative algorithm for location updating.
The proposed algorithm works as follows. In each iteration, each sensor ni
discovers its neighbors and generates its Voronoi cell Vi according to the neighbor
locations. Next, the sensor node generates a set of uniformly distributed grid
points {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 inside Vi and assign weight to each point. Then the node will
compute its new location (x′0, y
′
0) that can minimize the weighted square distance
Dw according to Eqn.(4.8). The simplest weight assignment is to assign equal
weight of one to all points. When different weights are assigned to the sampling
grid points, the solution (xopt0 , y
opt
0 ) is the centroid of the Voronoi cell with respect
to weight assignment {wi}. Therefore we refer to the algorithm as the weighted
centroid (WTC) algorithm and describe it in Algorithm 2.
To jointly consider secure communication and sensing coverage, we propose
the following weight assignment procedure. For each sensor node ni, after the
Voronoi cell has been formed and the grid points are generated, the base weight
for each grid point inside the cell is 1. If the node ni already has a secure link
with a neighbor node nj, each grid point that falls into the ring area centered
at nj, and between the radius 0.7Rc and 0.95Rc will be assigned an extra weight
of wsec = 0.5. An algorithmic description of the weight assignment procedure is
presented in Algorithm 3. In Algorithm 3, Nb refers to the number of neighbors of a
center node nc; and the function Sec(ni, nj) is an indicator function, which returns
true if node ni and nj has a secure communication link and false otherwise.
In Fig. 4.8 we illustrate the weight assignment procedure. In this figure, the
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Algorithm 2 The Weighted Centroid Algorithm
Input: sensor location (x0, y0), neighbor locations {(xi, yi)}Nbi=1
Output: movement vector ~v
Compute Voronoi cell V
Generate uniform grid points {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 ∈ V
Assign weight {wi}Ni=1 using Alg. 3
Compute updated location (x′0, y
′
0) using (4.8)
Compute the movement vector ~v ←− [(x′0, y′0)− (x0, y0)]
/* adjustment for stability */
if |~v| > Rs/2 then
~v ←− Rs~v/(2|~v|)
end if
Algorithm 3 The Weight Assignment Procedure
Input: neighbor locations {xi}Nbi=1, sampling points {pi}Ni=1, Rc, and wsec
Output: weight vector {wi}Ni=1
wi ←− 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ N
for i = 1 to Nb do
for j = 1 to N do
if Sec(ni, nc) and 0.7Rc ≤ d(xi,pj) ≤ 0.95Rc then





center node is shown as a square, its neighbor nodes are shown as circles, and
the node that already has a secure link with the center node is shown as a plus
sign. The Voronoi cell is shown as the shaded area. The grid points are shown
either as cross or as dots, where a dot indicates that grid point is inside the ring
area between radius 0.7Rc and 0.95Rc of its secure communication neighbor. The
weighted centroid is shown as a diamond in Fig. 4.8. We can see that the updated
location is within the center of the ring area, at the same time tends to cover more
areas in the Voronoi cell.
The choice of the ring area to be within [0.7Rc, 0.95Rc] is due to the joint
consideration of sensing and communications. When the center node is far away
from its neighbor, the ring-based weighting tend to pull the center node towards
its neighbor. When the center node is too close to its neighbor, the ring-based
weighting tend to push the center node away from its neighbor. Thus this weight
assignment maintains the communication connectivity between the center node
and its neighbors, at the same time avoids too much wasteful overlaps between
their sensing regions.
Simulation Results and Discussions
We study the performance of the weighted centroid (WTC) algorithm using sev-
eral experiments. We compare it with the performance of the MinMax algorithm
proposed in [120], which is known as one of the best schemes in sensor location
updating for improving sensing coverage.
In Fig. 4.9 and Fig. 4.10 we compare the sensing coverage ratio and the av-
erage number of secure links per node achieved by the proposed WTC algorithm
and by MinMax, with respect to the normalized sensing/communication radius.
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We set communication radius Rc = 2Rs. The initial deployment uses hexagon
lattice and the key pre-distribution uses location-based scheme. Each node has
preloaded 100 keys. Both algorithms are run locally by each sensor for four itera-
tions. In these experiments we have excluded all boundary nodes, which allows the
results to be interpreted as the expected performance in an infinitely large deploy-
ment field. The comparison results can be summarized as follows: (1) when the
sensing/communication radius is small, MinMax out perform WTC in both sensing
coverage and the average number of secure links; (2) as the sensing/communication
radius becomes moderately large, WTC outperforms MinMax in both performance
categories; (3) when the sensing/communication radius becomes large enough, the
performances of the two schemes will converge.
These results can be interpreted from resource allocation and optimization
perspectives [103]. The minmax criterion employed by the MinMax algorithm em-
phasizes fairness, i.e., even when a point in Voronoi cell is very far away from
the current sensor location, the location adjusting algorithm tries to cover that
point. In contrast, the criterion employed by WTC emphasizes efficiency. It tries
to minimize the weighted square distance from the sensor node to all points in
its Voronoi cell, which is a more greedy philosophy compared to the minmax cri-
terion. In sensor networks, the sensing and communication range are valuable
resources to be allocated to the deployment field. The results shown in Fig. 4.9
and Fig. 4.10 indicate that, with a resources-scarce situation (relative to the re-
source needed for a full coverage/connectivity), the MinMax is a better criterion,
with a moderate enough amount of resources, WTC outperforms MinMax. To
quantify the demarcation for resource-scarce and resource-abundant situations, we
note that in the ideal hexagon lattice, the normalized sensing radius needs to be
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Figure 4.9: Comparison of the weighted centroid and minmax algorithm, small
Gaussian deployment deviation, hexagon lattice deployment and location-based
key pre-distribution.
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27 ≈ 0.62 to achieve full coverage, and the normalized




3 ≈ 1.07 to achieve full
connectivity with the neighbors, which is a pre-requisite for establishing secure
links. As shown in Fig. 4.9 and Fig. 4.10, usually the proposed WTC outperforms
the MinMax algorithm when the normalized sensing and communication radius are
beyond their respective thresholds of 0.62 and 1.07. In practical situations, since
the resource budgets are known prior to the design of sensor networks, dynamically
determining which criterion to use will best serve the purpose of improving sensing
coverage and establishing secure links.
In a separate experiment, we simulated the WTC and MinMax algorithms
under random deployment with uniform distribution over the entire field. We place
a total of 49 sensors into a 60×60 area and use the basic key pre-distribution scheme
for establishing secure links. In this experiment, as it is not possible to exclude
the boundary nodes in calculating the average node degree, the average number
of secure links drops significantly when compared to the previous lattice-based
experiments. In spite of the change in accounting the performance, the simulation
results presented in Fig. 4.11 shows the same trend as Fig. 4.9 and Fig. 4.10 in that,
the WTC algorithm achieves better performances in both performance categories
in the resource-abundant situations, and performs worse than the MinMax in the
resource-scarce situations.
Implementation Issues
In the WTC algorithm, the grid points are chosen to discretize the computation
of the centroid instead of using a continuous integration over the Voronoi cell.
As power consumption is a major concern in sensor networks, the grid points
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Figure 4.10: Comparison of the weighted centroid and minmax algorithm, large
Gaussian deployment deviation, hexagon lattice deployment and location-based
key pre-distribution.
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coverage ratio under uniform random deployment
WTC, basic key pre−distribution
MinMax, basic key pre−distribution















average number of secure links, uniform random deployment
WTC, basic key pre−distribution
MinMax, basic key pre−distribution
Figure 4.11: Comparison of the weighted centroid and minmax algorithm, uniform
random deployment with basic key pre-distribution.
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can be chosen as sparse or dense according to the power budget, thus trading off
computation accuracy with energy. If the only goal of location adjustment is to
maximize the coverage, the same weight can be assigned to all wi’s, i.e., wi = 1
for all points.
Unlike the VFSec algorithm, the WTC is more suitable to be performed by in-
dividual sensors. This is because computing both the Voronoi cell and the weighted
centroid can be done locally. The simulation results have shown that the locally
computed location updates using WTC and MinMax can outperform the location
updates run by a cluster head using the VFA and VFSec. However, using the
grid-based method in computing the weighted centroid, performing WTC gener-
ally requires more computation than performing schemes based on virtual force.
One way to reduce the computation is to decompose the weighted centroid in Al-
gorithm 2 into a weighted summation of several uniform-weight centroid problem,
and compute the centroid of uniform-weighted polygon (or ring area) using the
close-form solution provided in [22] and other related work. We plan to further
look into this aspect in our future work.
4.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have investigated the impact of sensor deployment on the perfor-
mance of sensing coverage and secure connectivity. For static sensor deployment,
we have investigated the hexagon and square lattice topology and compared them
with the random deployment. We show that the two lattice topology exhibits
range-dependent performance and there is no all-time winner in the context of
secure connectivity. For designing secure sensor networks, the system parameters,
such as sensing and communication range, should be jointly considered with the
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deployment topology.
When sensor locations can be adjusted after the initial deployment, we have
proposed two sensor location updating algorithms, the VFSec and the WTC algo-
rithm, to jointly optimize sensing covering and secure connectivity. The simulation
results show that the WTC algorithm outperforms the existing algorithms in both
secure connectivity and sensing coverage under moderate to abundant node den-
sity, while VFSec achieves a superior tradeoff in both performance categories than
the existing virtual force based algorithms.
4.5 Appendix: A Model for Link Compromise
Probability
In this appendix, we analyze the link compromise probability in the location-
based key pre-distribution scheme in [30] and compare it with that of the basic
scheme [34].
Let us denote the size of the key pool in the basic scheme by P , and there are
x nodes compromised. For a given link e in the basic scheme, it has been shown
in [34] that the probability that the link e is compromised is
Pbasic = Pr(e|x) = 1− (1− m
P
)x.
Next, we consider in the group-based scheme [30], the size of the group key pool
is S and the number of sensor groups is N . We require the total number of distinct
keys in the group based scheme to be the same as in the basic scheme. As each
distinct key appears in exactly two group key pools, we have P = (NS)/2. In the
group-based scheme, suppose the given link e uses key Ke. This key Ke is in the
key pools of exactly two groups, denoted by G1 and G2. Only when a compromised
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node n(c) is from one of the two groups, the link e can potentially be compromised
by n(c). When the compromised nodes are i.i.d. uniformly distributed among all
groups, denoting the probability that a compromised node n(c) falls into group G1
or G2 by p, we have
p = Pr(n(c) ∈ {G1 ∪G2}) = 2/N.
In the group-based scheme, the probability that link e is compromised given x





Pr(e|(k out of x) ∈ {G1 ∪G2}) ·












For function f(ε) = (1− ε)a with ε ≈ 0, the first-order approximation at ε = 0
using Taylor expansion is f(ε) ≈ 1 − aε. As the key pool size P and the group





to zero, we can apply first-order approximation to both (1 − m
S





)x ≈ 1− m
P
x. Thus we arrive at
Pbasic ≈ 1− (1− x · m
P















Since we have S = 2P/N and p = 2/N , substituting these into Eqn. (4.9), we
obtain




This shows that the link compromise probability of the basic scheme and the
group-based scheme are approximately the same with the fixed key ring size m.
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Chapter 5
Optimizing Time Efficiency in
Contributory Group Key
Management
The complexity of communication security protocols is often determined by mul-
tiple factors such as the type of cryptographic primitive used, the connectivity
and reliability of the communication links, the number of user who intend to com-
municate, etc. Among these factors, the scalability of communication security
protocol with regard to the user group size is especially important. Such scalabil-
ity will greatly influence the system efficiency and user satisfaction, and emerging
communication applications may involve user groups ranging from thousands to
millions [42][69][88][129]. In this chapter, we introduce scheduling and optimization
techniques into the design phase of a special class of communication security proto-
col, group key management protocols. We demonstrate that with these techniques,
we can significantly improve the scalability of contributory group key management,
hence improve system efficiency and satisfy users’ demands.
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An important aspect of communication security is content confidentiality and
access control [82], which becomes a necessity in a wide range of applications,
including bank transactions, teleconferencing, and data collection in sensor net-
works [87][34]. For secure group-oriented applications, access control is a chal-
lenging task due to the potentially large group size and dynamic membership. To
achieve confidentiality in group communications, usually a key known to all group
members is used to encrypt the communication content [13][51]. This key is usually
referred to as the group key [42, 88, 129]. In a group with dynamic membership,
the group key needs to be updated upon each user’s join to prevent the new user
from accessing the past communications. Similarly, upon each user’s departure,
the group key needs to be updated to prevent the leaving user from accessing the
future communications. Thus group members need to agree upon the same key
management protocol for key establishment and update. Sometimes the group key
management protocol is also referred to as the group key agreement.
In Chapter 4, we have seen the probabilistic key pre-distribution in sensor net-
works, which does not guarantee that two nodes who try to communicate share a
secret key. In deterministic key management, a group key management scheme fol-
lows either a centralized or a contributory approach and can maintain a shared key
between information sender and recipient. The centralized approach uses a cen-
tral key server to generate and distribute keys for all group members [17][119][129],
whereas in the contributory approach, each group member contributes his/her own
share to the group key [105, 54, 29]. Since contributory schemes do not rely on
a central key server, they become necessary in situations where: (a) a central key
server cannot be established, such as in Ad Hoc networks, (b) group members do
not trust another entity to manage their private keys, or (c) members and server do
155
not share any common knowledge about each other’s secret keys beforehand. Con-
tributory schemes remove the need of the key server at the expense of performing
computationally expensive cryptographic primitives, such as modular multiplica-
tion and exponentiation [51][33]. This poses a challenge to the design of efficient
key agreements.
In the literature, many group key management protocols have been proposed [129,
88, 42, 119, 17, 105, 54, 29, 107, 81, 80, 6, 118, 114, 106, 144, 68]. The early de-
signs of contributory key agreements mostly consider the efficiency of key establish-
ment [45][104][8]. Among them, Ingemarsson et al. first introduced a conference
key distribution system (CKDS) based on a ring topology [45]. Later, Burmester
and Desmedt proposed a key distribution system (BD) that takes only three rounds
to generate a group key [11]. Steiner et al. extended the two-party Diffie-Hellman
(DH) protocol and proposed group Diffie-Hellman protocols GDH.1/2/3 [104].
Becker and Willie studied the minimum communication complexity of contribu-
tory key agreements and proposed the octopus and 2d-octopus protocols [8], which
have proven optimality for key establishment. While achieving efficiency in key
establishment, most of these early schemes encounter high rekeying complexity in
either member join or departure. Recent research on key management became
more aware of the scalability issue. As a means to improve scalability, tree-based
approach for group rekeying was first presented in the centralized scenario by
Wallner et al. in [119] and Wong et al. in [129], independently. Later, tree-based
schemes were also proposed for the contributory setting by Kim et al. in their
TGDH scheme [54], and by Dondeti et al. in their DISEC scheme [29]. The tree-
based schemes use a logical key tree to organize the keys belonging to the group
members and achieve a rekeying complexity of O(log n) [129][54][29][114], where
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n is the group size. In addition, [54] and [29] also pointed out that the rekeying
cost is related to both the key tree structure and the location of member join or
departure in the key tree, and suggested a balanced key tree to reduce the rekeying
cost based on heuristics. In [144], Zhu et al. proposed two schemes to optimize
the rekeying cost in centralized key management. The key tree structure is re-
organized according to the temporal patterns of the group members, or the packet
loss probability along the route from the key server to each member.
In this chapter, we investigate the time efficiency of contributory key agreement.
The time efficiency is measured by the processing time in group key establishment
and update. In order to participate in the group communications, a joining user
has to wait until the group keys are updated. Since computing cryptographic prim-
itives and exchanging rekeying messages are time-consuming, such waiting time is
not negligible. Similarly, the amount of time needed to recompute a new group
key reflects the latency in user revocation. Thus from a quality of service (QoS)
perspective, the rekeying time cost is directly related to users’ satisfaction and a
system’s performance. Traditionally, the rekeying time complexity is analyzed only
for one join or departure event. The design rationale of our scheme is to look into
the combination of multiple events, and optimize the time cost over the dynamics
of group membership. To improve the time efficiency, we design a new key tree
topology with join and exit subtrees, which are small subtrees located close to the
root of the key tree. With this key tree topology, we propose a set of algorithms
to handle the key update for join and leave events. In particular, we show through
analysis that the sizes of join and exit trees should be at the log scale of the group
size. The resulting scheme is called Join-Exit Tree (JET) Group Key Agreement.
Analytical results show that the proposed scheme achieves an average asymptotic
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time cost of O(log (log n)) for a join event, and also O(log (log n)) for a departure
event when group dynamics are known a priori. In addition to the improved time
efficiency, our scheme also has low communication and computation complexity.
5.1 Efficiency Aspects in Contributory Key
Agreement
5.1.1 Background on Tree-based Contributory Key
Management
We briefly review rekeying operations for join and leave events in tree-based con-
tributory key agreements [29][54], which use the two-party DH protocol [28] as a
basic module.
In a tree-based key agreement, three types of keys are organized in a logical
key tree, as illustrated in Fig. 5.1(a). The leaf nodes in a key tree represent the
private keys held by individual group members. The root of the tree corresponds
to the group key. All other inner nodes represent subgroup keys, each of which is
held by the group members that are descendants of the corresponding inner node.
We denote the i-th group member by Mi, and the key associated with the j-th
node in the key tree by Kj. In addition, g and p are the exponentiation base and
the modular base for the DH protocol, respectively.
To establish a group key, the keys in the key tree are computed in a bottom-up
fashion. Users are first grouped into pairs and each pair performs a two-party
DH to form a sub-group. These sub-groups will again pair up and perform the
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Figure 5.1: Notations for a key tree.
key can be obtained. An example is shown in Fig.5.1(a) with four group members,
and member Mi has private key ri. The group key K1 corresponding to node 1 is
computed in two rounds as
K1 = g
(gr1r2 mod p)(gr3r4 mod p) mod p.
In a user join event, the new user will first pair up with an insertion node,
which could be either a leaf node or an inner node, to perform a two-party DH.
Then all the keys on the path from the insertion node to the tree root are updated
recursively. An example is shown in Fig.5.1. When member M5 joins the group,
node 7 in Fig.5.1(a) is chosen as the insertion node. Then M4 (node 7) and M5
(node 9) perform a DH key exchange to generate a new inner node 8 in Fig. 5.1(b),
followed by the key updates on the path node 8 → node 3 → node 1.
Upon a user’s departure, the leaving user’s node and its parent node will be
deleted from the key tree. Its sibling node will assume the position of its parent
node. Then all the keys on the path from the leaving user’s grandparent node to
the tree root are updated from the bottom to the top.
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5.1.2 Time-Efficiency Issues in Contributory Key
Agreements
The time efficiency of DH-based contributory group key agreement is usually eval-
uated by the number of rounds needed to perform the protocol during a key up-
date [45, 104, 54, 29]. However, in some schemes, the number of operations may
be different in distinct rounds. For example, in GDH.2 [104], i modular exponen-
tiations are performed in the i-th round. To address this problem, the notion of
“simple round” was introduced in [8], where every party can send and receive at
most one message in each round. In our work, we apply the notion of simple round
in the tree-based contributory schemes. In each round, each user can perform at
most one two-party DH operation. With the new definition of round, we propose
performance metrics for time efficiency below.
Average Join/Leave Time We define the user join time as the number of rounds
to process key updates for a user join event. The average user join time, denoted





where Rjoin is the total number of DH rounds performed for Njoin join events.
Similarly, the user leave time is defined as the number of rounds to process key






where Rleave is the total number of DH rounds performed for Nleave leave events.
Let N = Njoin + Nleave and R = Rjoin + Rleave. The overall average processing
160












5.1.3 Communication and Computation Efficiency
The communication efficiency of a contributory key agreement refers to the number
of messages sent for a key update during a join or leave event. The underlying as-
sumption is that sending each message incurs about the same communication cost.
In practice, the size of each message could be different. However, the main cost in
sending a rekeying message is the cost in software and hardware to go through the
protocol stack and form a packet, along with the cost in networks while routing
and transmitting the packet. Similar to the case of time efficiency, we choose the
average number of messages per user join or departure as the performance metric
for communication efficiency.
In a DH-based contributory group key agreement, the computation of modular
exponentiation dominates the total computation cost. Therefore we use the average
number of exponentiations per join or departure event as the performance metric
for the computation efficiency.
5.2 Join-Exit Tree (JET) Algorithms
In this section, we present a new logical key tree topology and the associated
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Figure 5.2: Topology for the proposed join-exit tree.
shown in Fig. 5.2(a), the proposed logical key tree consists of three parts: the join
tree, the exit tree, and the main tree. The proposed key tree is a binary tree built
upon the two-party DH protocol. We refer to the key tree in Fig. 5.2(a) as a join-
exit tree and a key tree without special structures as a simple key tree. The prior
works have shown that, if a user joins the group at a location closer to the tree
root, fewer number of keys need to be updated, thus the join time will be shorter.
Similar reasoning applies to user departures. So the join tree and exit trees should
be much smaller than the main tree. We define the join tree capacity and the exit
tree capacity, denoted by CJ and CE, as the maximum number of users that can
be accommodated in the join and exit tree, respectively. The number of users in
the join tree and the main tree are denoted by NJ and NM , respectively.
In the proposed scheme, a joining user will first be added to the join tree.
Later on, when the join tree reaches its capacity, all users in the join tree will be
relocated together into the main tree. In addition, when users’ departure time is
known, users who are most likely to leave in the near future will be moved in batch
from the main tree to the exit tree. The design rationale of the join and exit trees
resembles that of memory hierarchy in computer design [43]. Furthermore, the
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capacities of the join and exit trees can change over time, resulting in a dynamic
key tree structure. For example, when there is no user in the exit tree, the key
tree reduces to a main tree and join tree topology, as shown in Fig. 5.2(b).
5.2.1 The Join Tree Algorithm
The join tree algorithm consists of four parts: the join tree activation, the insertion
strategy, the relocation strategy, and the join tree capacity update. When the
group has only a few members, the join tree is not activated. As the group size
increases and exceeds a threshold we activate the join tree and choose an initial join
tree capacity. Such a threshold condition is referred to as the activation condition
for the join tree. After the activation, any user joining the group is first inserted
to a node in the join tree. The insertion node is chosen according to the insertion
strategy. When the join tree is full, the members in the join tree are merged into
the leaf nodes of the main tree. Such a process is called the batch relocation. Since
the number of users in the main tree is changed after the batch relocation, the join
tree capacity is updated according to a rule that relates the join tree capacity to
the main tree user number. According to this rule, the optimal join tree capacity
in the sense of time efficiency can be computed. We explain these four parts in
details below.
User Insertion in the Join Tree
When the join tree is empty and a new user wants to join, the root of the current
key tree is chosen as the insertion node. The insertion is done by treating the
entire existing group as one logical user, and performing a two-party DH between
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Figure 5.3: User join at the join tree root. Note that the new user M5 becomes
the root of the join tree.
the new user M5 becomes node 9, the root of the join tree. Member M5 is paired
up with the original root of the key tree (node 1) to perform a DH key exchange
and the new group key is established as node 8. When the join tree is not empty,
the insertion node is determined by Algorithm 4, where usernumber(x) returns
the number of users under a given node x in the key tree. After the insertion node
is found, the new member node performs a two-party DH key exchange with the
insertion node. Then the keys on the path from the insertion node to the tree root
are updated through a series of DH key exchange. Fig.5.4 illustrates the growth
of the join tree from one user to eight users using the insertion strategy.
Algorithm 4 Finding the insertion node
x ← join-tree-root
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Figure 5.4: Sequential user join strategy (only the join tree is shown).
The Batch Relocation
We present two relocation methods that differ in whether the subgroup keys in the
join tree are preserved. In the first method, all users in the join tree are viewed as
a logical user during relocation, and this logical user is inserted into the shortest-
depth leaf node of the main tree. Thus, the subgroup keys among the users in the
join tree are preserved. This process is shown in Fig.5.5(a). Then all keys along
the path from the insertion node to the tree root are updated, which is indicated
by the dash line in Fig. 5.5(a). The reason to choose the shortest branch leaf node
in the main tree as the insertion node is to guarantee that the relocation time is
at most the log of the main tree size (dlog NMe), because the shortest branch must
be smaller or equal to the average length of the branches, which is dlog NMe 1.
The only exception comes when the main tree is a complete balanced tree, the
relocation time is log NM + 1, because one more level of the key tree must be
created to accommodate the new logical user.
In the second relocation method, we find the NJ shortest-depth leaf nodes
in the main tree as the insertion nodes for NJ join tree user. These insertion
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Figure 5.5: Relocation methods for the join tree.
nodes are found so that the unbalance-ness of the key tree can be alleviated by
the relocation process. Then we relocate the join tree users simultaneously to
the insertion nodes. The keys on the branches from all original join tree users
to the tree root are updated in parallel and finally a new group key is obtained.
This process is illustrated in Fig.5.5(b). To analyze the time complexity, we note
that this relocation may fill up the empty nodes at the shortest-depth leaf nodes
of the main tree. The maximum depth of any relocation path would not exceed
dlog(NM + NJ)e. Since the join tree is much smaller than the main tree, the
relocation time is upper bounded by dlog NMe+ 1.
Although the two relocation methods have similar time complexity, the first
method will generally produce a skewed main tree. Since users may leave from a
branch longer than the average depth of the key tree, an unbalanced key tree may
cause the user departure time to be longer than the case when a balanced key tree
is used. The second relocation method helps maintain the balance of the key tree,
which reduces the expected cost of leave events [54]. We shall choose the second
relocation method in this work because it takes into consideration both the join
and leave time cost.
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Table 5.1: Latency of Sequential User Join
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ...
r(k) 1 2 2 3 2 3 3 4 2 3 ...
The Optimal Join Tree Capacity
Using the proposed insertion strategy, the user join latency for the k-th user in
the join tree is measured as r(k) rounds, which is listed in Table 5.1. We observe
a special property of the sequence r(k), namely,
r(2p + q) = 1 + r(q), p ≥ 0, 0 < q ≤ 2p, (5.4)
where p is a non-negative integer, and q a positive integer. For the user join latency
r(k) in (5.4), the following inequality holds for any positive integer n, and equality







log n + 1. (5.5)
The proof is presented in Appendix 5.7.1.
Consider the average join time for x users joining the group starting form an
empty join tree. These x users are inserted into the join tree one by one, then they
are relocated together into the main tree. From previous analysis we can see that,
when the main tree has NM users, the average join tree relocation time is log NM ,
where we relax the integer value of the tree height to a continuous value to simplify








r(k) + log NM). (5.6)
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log NM + 1. (5.7)
Since it is not easy to minimize Tjoin directly, we try to minimize its upper bound
over x. The optimal join tree capacity CJ that minimizes the upper bound is given
by






log NM + 1}
= 2 ln NM (5.8)
The above analysis shows that, for a given number of main tree users NM and
the insertion rule specified by Algorithm 4, the optimal join tree capacity CJ is
2 ln NM . Since between two consecutive join tree relocations, the main tree size
is fixed at NM , the join tree capacity should also be fixed during this time at
CJ ≈ 2 ln NM and the average join time is upper bounded by
Tjoin ≤ 1
2








log log e. (5.9)
This upper bound indicates that on average, a user needs to spend only O(log(log n))
rounds for a rekeying operation in user join, where n is the group size. We note
that this asymptotic performance is not affected by the variation of the relocation
time, because the relocation time of around log NM rounds is averaged over log NM
join events, contributing approximately only one round to the average join cost.
This validates the use of the approximate average relocation time log NM in the
above analysis.
For the joining users, since they can start to communicate once they are inserted
into the join tree, their waiting time do not include the relocation time of log NM
rounds. We refer to the waiting time for the joining users as user join latency. We
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The Join Tree Activation
To decide whether to activate the join tree, we compare the average join time with
and without employing the join tree. For a key tree structure with join tree, adding
each user in the join tree incurs at most a time cost of log CJ rounds. Consider
the average user join time for CJ users when the join tree changes from empty to
full, followed by a batch relocation of log NM rounds. The average join time for
these CJ users satisfies
Tjoin ≤ log CJ + (log NM)/CJ . (5.10)
If a simple key tree with only a main tree is used, the average join time would be
at least log NM . Consequently, a reduction in time cost can be obtained by using
the join tree when the following inequality holds,
log CJ + (log NM)/CJ ≤ log NM ,
or equivalently,
log NM ≥ CJ
CJ − 1 log CJ . (5.11)
We can see that when the number of users in the group is large enough, a join tree
should be activated to reduce the average join time. In Appendix 5.7.2, we show
that when CJ = 2 ln NM , the inequality (5.11) is satisfied for any NM > 8. Thus
we have found a threshold group size THjoin = 8. When the group size is smaller
than or equal to 8, a simple key tree is used. Otherwise, the join tree is activated.
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5.2.2 The Exit Tree Algorithm
In some group applications, users can estimate the duration of their staying time
according to their own schedule. Such information can help reduce the time cost
of rekeying operations in user departure. In the following analysis, we assume that
we can obtain accurate information about users’ duration of stay. In later sections,
the cases of inaccurate or unavailable staying time will be discussed.
Similar to the join tree algorithm, the exit tree algorithm consists of four parts,
namely, the activation condition, the batch movement, the user insertion in the
exit tree, and the optimization of the exit tree capacity.
The Batch Movement
The batch movement refers to the operations to move the users that are likely to
leave in the near future from the main tree to the exit tree. The group communi-
cations is not interrupted since the old group key can still be used before the batch
movement is completed.
A batch movement takes place when there is a user leaving from the exit tree
and a batch movement condition is satisfied. Denoting the number of users in the
exit tree after the last batch movement as Up, and the current number of users in
the exit tree as Uc, we propose a batch movement condition as
Uc ≤ ρUp, (5.12)
where ρ ∈ [0, 1) is the exit tree residual rate (residual rate for short), a pre-
determined parameter to control the timing of batch movement. In a batch move-
ment, the first B users who are most likely to leave soon are moved to the exit tree,
where B is referred to as the batch movement size. Starting from an empty exit
tree (Up = 0), the number of users in the exit tree after the k-th batch movement
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will be upper bounded by
∑k−1
i=0 ρ
iB. As k goes to infinity, the number of users
in the exit tree converges to the upper bound B/(1 − ρ). Therefore the exit tree
capacity CE is related to the batch movement size by
CE = B/(1− ρ). (5.13)
We propose to use a priority queue [21] to keep the departure time of all the
users in the main tree. This queue is referred to as the leaving queue. The users’
departure time is obtained from their arrival time and their estimated staying time.
The leaving queue will be update under two circumstances. First, after a batch
relocation of the join tree, the departure information of the join tree users are
added to the leaving queue. Second, after the batch movement of the exit tree, the
departure information of the moved users are removed from the leaving queue.
User Insertion in the Exit Tree
The insertion locations for the users being moved into the exit tree are chosen to
maintain the balance of the exit tree. For each user insertion, the leaf node with
the minimum depth in the exit tree is chosen as the insertion node.
Optimal Exit Tree Capacity
Here we derive the optimal exit tree capacity that minimizes an upper bound of
the average leaving time. Suppose that b users are moved together into the exit
tree. A batch movement of these b users will incur a time cost of (log NM + 2),
where log NM is the average height of the main tree, and the addition of 2 refers
to the additional two levels above the main tree due to the use of the join tree and
the exit tree (refer to Fig. 5.2(a)). If the exit tree capacity is x, each user leaving
from the exit tree will incur at most a time cost of (log x + 2). Thus the average
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user leave time for these b users is bounded by
Tleave ≤ 1
b
(log NM + 2) + (log x + 2). (5.14)
Using (5.13), b = x(1− ρ), and minimizing the right hand side of (5.14) we obtain
CE = arg minx
{
1
(1− ρ)x(log NM + 2) + (log x + 2)
}
=
ln NM + 2 ln 2
(1− ρ) . (5.15)
When the capacity of the exit tree is computed as in (5.15), the average leave time
is bounded by
Tleave ≤ log(log NM + 2) + δ, (5.16)
where δ = 2− log(1− ρ) + log e− log log e. Combining (5.15) and (5.13), we have
B = ln NM + 2 ln 2. (5.17)
A few comments should be made to provide more insights from the above
analysis. First, the batch movement size B is only determined by the number of
users in the main tree, and independent of the residue rate ρ. Second, there are
actually only two parameters, B and ρ, in our system, since the exit tree capacity is
a function of B and ρ as in (5.13). Third, with perfect departure information, the
average leave time is bounded by O(log log n), where n is the group size, and the
residue rate ρ should be set to 0 to minimize the upper bound in (5.16). However,
in practice, the choice of ρ is a tradeoff. When ρ is 0, a batch movement cannot
be performed unless the exit tree is completely vacant. If some users inaccurately
estimate their departure time and stay in the exit tree for a long period of time,
no other users can utilize the exit tree during that period. When ρ is close to 1,
batch movements are frequently performed, resulting in a large overhead. Based
on experimental heuristics, we suggest setting ρ to around 0.5.
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The Activation of Exit Tree
The average leave time using a simple key tree with NM users is log NM . Comparing
this result with the upper bound in (5.14), a reduction in the average leave time
can be obtained if
1
(1− ρ)CE (log NM + 2) + (log CE + 2) ≤ log NM . (5.18)
Using (5.15), we simplify the above condition as
log NM ≥ log CE + log e + 2. (5.19)
Similar to the case of the join tree activation, we can prove that when the
exit tree capacity is chosen as in (5.15), the inequality (5.19) is satisfied for any
NM > 256. Thus we have found a threshold group size THleave = 256. When
the group size is larger than this threshold, activating the exit tree can reduce the
average leave time.
5.3 Group Key Agreement Based on Join-Exit
Tree
In this section we present a protocol suite of the Join-Exit Tree (JET) Group Key
Agreement, which consists of a key establishment protocol, a user join protocol, and
a user leave protocol. These protocols are based on the algorithms we discussed in
the previous section.
5.3.1 Group Key Establishment
Many prior works [114][45] assume that all group members are available before
starting the group communications, thus parallel computation can take place to
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establish a group key. We refer to this situation as concurrent user join. In reality,
there are situations when members join the group sequentially, and we refer to them
as sequential user join. The proposed JET scheme treats the key establishment
in these two types of situations differently. For concurrent user join, subgroup
keys in the key tree are computed in a bottom-up fashion in parallel to obtain the
final group key, as in [114]. For sequential user join, we use the join protocol (as
discussed below) to handle the sequential key updates. The join tree is activated
when the group size exceeds the activation threshold THjoin = 8, but the exit tree
will not be activated during the key establishment stage.
5.3.2 Join Protocol
The key update for a user join event follows the next few steps:
1. Choose an insertion node in the key tree.
(a) Before the join tree is activated, Algorithm 4 is used in the simple key tree to
choose the insertion node.
(b) After the join tree is activated, when inserting the new user according to Algo-
rithm 4 will not make the join tree height more than dlog CJe, the insertion
strategy in Algorithm 4 is followed. Otherwise, the insertion node will be
chosen as the leaf node with the minimum depth in the join tree. (When
there are user departures from the join tree, this helps keep the join tree
balanced.)
2. The insertion node and the new member perform a two-party DH key
exchange. Then all the keys on the path from the insertion node to the root are
updated subsequently.
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3. Adjust the key tree topology and parameters according to the rules specified
as follows:
(a) When the group size is larger than THjoin = 8, the join tree is activated.
When the group size is larger than THleave = 256, the exit tree is activated.
(b) When the join tree becomes full after a join event, users in the join tree are
relocated into the main tree using the relocation strategy in Section 5.2.
Additionally, the departure information of those users who can report their
staying time is stored in the leaving queue.
(c) Update the join and exit tree capacities according to Eqn. (5.8) and Eqn. (5.15),
respectively.
5.3.3 Leave Protocol
The exit tree residual rate is set to ρ = 0.5. The key update for a user leave event
follows the next few steps:
1. Delete the leaving user node and its parent node. Promote the leaving user’s
sibling node to their parent node’s position. Mark the keys on the path from the
leaving user’s grandparent node to the tree root as to be updated later.
2. When the user is leaving from the main tree and there are also users in
the join tree, perform a join tree relocation. Mark the keys to be updated for
relocation.
3. Update all the keys marked in step 1 and 2 from the bottom to the top of
the key tree.
4. When the user is leaving from the exit tree and the batch movement condi-
tion is satisfied, perform a batch movement as specified in Section 5.2.
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5. Perform the updates for key tree management as follows:
(a) Remove the leaving user’s departure information if it is in the leaving queue.
(b) Compute the new join and exit tree capacities according to Eqn. (5.8) and
Eqn. (5.15), respectively. If the newly-computed join/exit tree capacity be-
comes larger than the current number of users in the join/exit tree, the
join/exit tree capacity is updated immediately. Otherwise, no update is
done.
(c) When the main tree user number NM falls below the threshold for join/exit tree
activation and the join/exit tree is empty, the join/exit tree is deactivated.
5.4 Experiments and Performance Analysis
In this section, we present three simulations. The first simulation focuses on group
key establishment, in which we consider sequential user join. The second and
third simulation have both join and departure activities. In each simulation, the
performance of our proposed scheme is compared with that of TGDH scheme [54],
a typical tree-based contributory key agreement.
5.4.1 Key Establishment for Sequential User Join
For sequential user join, the proposed JET protocol uses a simple key tree for
small group size, and activates the join tree when the group size is larger than
8. The exit tree will not be activated. We compare the average join time for
sequential user join using the proposed JET and TGDH [54] in Fig. 5.6. It can be
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Figure 5.6: Average time cost for sequential user join.
small, and outperforms TGDH when the group size becomes large. Regarding the
asymptotic performance, TGDH achieves an average time cost of O(log n), while
the proposed JET scheme achieves O(log (log n)). The dashed line in Fig. 5.6
shows the theoretical upper bound for the average time cost from (5.9).
5.4.2 Experiment Using MBone User Activity Data
In this simulation, we choose three user activity log files from three Multicast
Backbone (MBone) multicast sessions [116] as user activity for our simulation.
Two of these three sessions are NASA space shuttle coverage and the other one is
CBC News World online test 2.
2The sources of these MBone sessions are: (1) NASA-space shuttle STS-80 coverage, video,
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Figure 5.7: Average join and leave time for simulations using MBone data.
Fig. 5.7 shows the experimental results using JET and TGDH scheme, where we
can see that JET has about 50% improvement over TGDH in user join, and about
20% improvement in user departure. It is worth noting that the improvement in
user departure is not resulted from the use of the exit tree, since all the three
sessions have maximum group size below 100 and the exit tree is not activated.
From the study of the MBone multicast sessions, Ammeroth et al. observed that
the MBone multicast group size is usually small (typically 100-200), and users
either stay in the group for a short period of time or a very long time [4][3]. Using
the proposed JET scheme, the exit tree will not be activated for a small group
size. However, when a user stays in the group for only a short period of time, it
is highly likely that this user joins and leaves the group in the join tree without
time 12/4/1996, 10:54:49; (3) CBC Newsworld on-line test, audio, starting time 10/29/1996,
12:35:15.
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Table 5.2: Statistical Parameters for User Behavior
Duration 0-199 200-499 500-4499 4500-5000
λi 7 5 2 1
mi 2500 500 500 500
Characteristic long stay short stay
getting to the main tree. Thus the use of the join tree reduces both the user join
time and the user leave time.
5.4.3 Experiments Using Simulated User Activity Data
In this experiment, we generate user activities according to the probabilistic model
suggested in [4]. The duration of simulation is 5000 time units and is divided into
four non-overlapping segments, T1 to T4. In each time segment Ti, users’ arrival
time is modelled as a Poisson process with mean arrival rate λi and users’ staying
time follows an exponential distribution with mean value mi. The values of λi and
mi are listed in Table 5.2. The initial group size is 0. The simulated user activities
consist of about 12000 join and 10900 leave events. The maximum group size is
approximately 2800 and the group size at the end of simulation is about 1100.
In practice, users’ accurate staying time will not always be available. To model
the inaccuracy in users’ estimated staying time (EST), we consider three classes
of users. The first class of users do not report EST, the second class of users
reports accurate EST, and the third class of users reports inaccurate EST. In the
third class, the EST for user i is modelled as a random variable with Gaussian
distribution N(µi, σ
2
i ), and the mean value µi is the actual staying time
3. We also
3Because of the Gaussian distribution, a user could report a negative staying time. Such a
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Simulated Data Experiment: P1 = 1 − P0
Average Join Time
Average Leave Time
Average Overall Operation Time
TGDH performance    
Average join time   
Average overall time
Average leave time  
JET performance 
JET with      
join tree only
Figure 5.8: Average join, leave and overall time costs for the first experiment using
simulated data. A user either do not report EST with probability P0, or reports
accurate EST with probability P1 = 1− P0.
assume that in the third class, the ratio of the standard deviation σi to the mean
µi of the EST is constant across the users, and is denoted by R = σi/µi. The
probability that a user is in the first, second, and third classes is denoted by P0,
P1, and (1− P0 − P1), respectively.
In the first experiment, we consider that a user either does not report EST
or reports an accurate EST, i.e., P1 = 1 − P0. By varying the value of P0, the
average join and leave time costs are shown in Fig. 5.8, where the average leave
time increases with P0 almost linearly. The only exception is the data point at
P0 = 1, i.e., when no user reports EST. When P0 = 1, the average join, leave,
and overall time costs are: Tjoin = 1.87, Tleave = 10.97, and T = 6.22. This is the
case is treated as EST unavailable.
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Leave from exit tree
Leave from main tree
Leave from join tree
Figure 5.9: A breakdown of the contributions to the user leave time in Fig. 5.8.
Shown in the figure is the contribution to the user leave time by users leaving from
the exit tree, the main tree, and the join tree. These contributions (in rounds) is
plotted against P0, with P1 = 1− P0.
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situation when the exit tree is not activated during the group lifetime. From these
data, we can see that when the exit tree is not used, the average overall time cost is
equal to or lower than the costs when P0 ≥ 0.8. This is because activating the exit
tree increases the depth of the key tree by one. When P0 is large, a large portion
of users without departure information cannot take advantage of the exit tree, and
the overhead of the exit tree structure outweighs its benefit. The benefit of the
exit tree is substantial as long as more than 30% (corresponding to P0 = 0.7) or
more users report accurate EST. We have also compared the performance of JET
with that of TGDH in Fig. 5.8, where the performances of TGDH are shown as
horizontal lines because they do not vary with probability P0. We can see that
JET always outperform TGDH in terms of the overall time cost and the join time
cost. For user leave time cost, JET will outperform TGDH as long as more than
35% of the users report accurate EST.
The average leave time presented in Fig. 5.8 consists of three parts, namely, the
cost of users leaving from the exit tree, from the main tree, and from the join tree,
respectively. We illustrate these three parts in Fig. 5.9. In particular, to obtain
the first part, we obtain the average leave time for users leaving from the exit tree;
then we multiply it with the percentage of user departures from the exit tree with
respect to the total number of user departure events. The other two parts can
be computed similarly and the average leave cost is the summation of these three
parts. We can see that when P0 is small, the user leave time is dominated by the
time cost of the users leaving from the exit tree. As P0 increases, the user leave
time is gradually dominated by the time cost of users leaving from the main tree.
In this experiment, most users will stay in the group for a non-trivial period of
time, therefore the percentage of users leaving from the join tree is very small.
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Simulated Data Experiment: P0 = 0; R = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3

























Figure 5.10: Average join, leave and overall time costs for the second experiment
using simulated data. A user either reports accurate EST with probability P1, or
reports inaccurate EST with probability 1−P1. For inaccurate EST, the deviation
parameter R ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}.
In the second experiment, we consider that all users will report EST (P0 = 0).
The degree of deviation is at R ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}, and P1 varies in the range of [0,1].
The average join and leave time under different P1 values are plotted in Fig. 5.10.
We can see that when the proportion of inaccurate estimates (1 − P1) is small,
the proposed JET scheme can achieve good time efficiency in both join and leave
events. However, the average leave time is sensitive to the change in R value,
especially in the range where (1 − P1) is small, where the gain obtained by using
the exit tree diminishes quickly with the increase of R.
In the third experiment, all users report inaccurate EST, which corresponds to



















Simulated Data Experiment: P0 = P1 = 0, 















Average Overall Operation Time
Figure 5.11: Average join, leave and overall time costs for the third experiment
using simulated data. All users report inaccurate EST. The deviation parameter
R ∈ [10−4, 1].
of R is in the range of [0,1]. Fig. 5.11 shows that, when the standard deviation
is two orders of magnitude smaller than the true staying time (R ≤ 0.01), the
proposed JET scheme can efficiently manage both user join and leave events. We
also note from Fig. 5.10 and Fig. 5.11 that, when a large portion of users do not
report accurate estimation, the advantage of the exit tree diminishes.
Table 5.3 lists the average and the worst case time costs for JET with both
join and exit tree (when P0 = 0, P1 = 0.1 and R = 0.1), JET using only the join
tree, and TGDH. All the worst case time costs do not change with the simulation
parameters (P0, P1, and R). Comparing the performance of JET using only the
join tree, which does not depend on users’ reported EST, with that of JET using
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Table 5.3: Simulated Data Experiment: P0 = 0, P1 = 0.1, R = 0.1
average worst case
join leave overall join leave
JET (join tree only) 1.87 10.97 6.22 13 13
JET (join-exit tree) 3.25 6.34 4.73 14 14
TGDH 10.83 9.96 10.41 12 12
both join and exit tree, we can see that the exit tree indeed provides a reduction
in terms of the average overall time cost, even when around 10% of users report
inaccurate EST. Comparing these time costs with those of TGDH, we can see that
the proposed JET scheme can improve time efficiency in terms of the average time
costs, while tolerating a small amount of inaccuracy in EST. However, for a group
of size n, the worst case operation time of JET using only the join tree is dlog ne+1,
and that of JET using both join and exit tree is dlog ne+2. These worst case time
costs are one and two more rounds than that of TGDH, respectively. This is due
to the increased depth by the join and exit tree structure, which we refer to as the
structural overhead of the JET scheme.
Two observations can be made from the above experiments. First, regardless
of the accuracy in EST, the join tree scheme can improve the time efficiency for
join events. Second, although the inaccuracy in EST comes in different forms (no
EST or inaccurate EST), the overall operation time is not very sensitive to the
change of experiment parameters P0, P1, and R. This is because inaccurate EST
leads to user departures from the main tree. When users leave from the main tree,
we simultaneously relocate the users from the join tree to the main tree (refer to
Section 5.3.3). As such, part of the join tree relocation cost can be amortized by
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the leave cost. Such an amortized cost can be counted either toward the join time
or toward the leave time. In this chapter, we have counted it toward the leave
time. Therefore when we see a cost increase in user leave events, we will often
see a cost reduction in user join events, which will partially offset the overall cost
increase in the overall efficiency.
5.5 Discussions
5.5.1 Extension to Multi-Level Join Tree
The idea of caching the joining and leaving users, as in the design of memory
hierarchy, can be extended to multiple levels. Here we illustrate an extension of
the one-level join tree to a two-level join tree. We consider a new join tree topology,
where a smaller join tree is attached directly to the tree root, a larger join tree
is attached one level lower from the tree root with the main tree as its sibling
sub-tree. We refer to the smaller join tree as Level-1 join tree and the larger one as
Level-2 join tree, respectively. Such a topology can be visualized as in Fig. 5.2(a),
where the exit tree is replaced by the Level-2 join tree. We note that the exit tree
does not exist in this topology.
We compare the average join time using a two-level join tree with that using
a one-level join tree, and try to find the condition under which the two-level join
tree has advantage over the one-level join tree. From our analysis, the smallest
group size that can benefit from a two-level join tree is around or greater than 180.
Compared to the activation group size of 8 for the one-level join tree, the result
shows that the two-level join tree would improve the rekeying time efficiency when
the group grows larger.
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5.5.2 The Implementation of Key Agreement
In this subsection, we discuss two implementation methods for the proposed JET
protocol with and without a group coordinator. We show that these two imple-
mentations will give the same time cost.
In the first case we consider using a group controller in the implementation
of JET. In [105], group controller was suggested to be one of the group members
who knows all group membership information and facilitates adding and excluding
members. However, the group controller does not have the knowledge of the secret
keys of other members and therefore would not violate the security requirements
of the contributory key management. The joining/leaving user will send a request
to the group controller. Then the group controller sends a broadcast message
specifying the change in the logical key tree, including the insertion node ID,
adjustment of the key tree structure, etc. For each join tree relocation or batch
movement to the exit tree, the group controller will also send a broadcast message
to specify where each user will be relocated to. The group controller would have a
storage overhead proportional to the group size as it needs to store the topology
of the key tree. In addition, the group controller has a communication overhead
of one broadcast message per join or leave event and one broadcast message for
each batch relocation, which takes place infrequently. When the current group
controller leaves the group, another member in the group is chosen as the new
group controller and the related information is passed from the leaving group
controller to the new one. The group controller can also be a non-member entity.
The second implementation does not require a group controller. Instead, each
group member stores the topology of the key tree and follows the JET protocol.
Thus all users can achieve consistent action for key update. During a join event,
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the joining user will broadcast a request to the whole group. All members will
find the same insertion node according to the insertion strategy, then a sponsor is
chosen as the rightmost leaf node in the subtree rooted at the insertion node [54].
Since the sponsor knows all the subgroup keys along the path from the insertion
node to the root, the sponsor will perform a two-party DH key exchange with
the new user, compute the keys on the path from the insertion node to the tree
root, and then broadcast the blinded keys on this path. The blinded keys are
the results of exponentiation base g raised to the power of the secret keys, which
can be public known. Such a procedure is detailed in [54]. When a leave event
occurs, the sponsor is chosen as the rightmost leaf node of the subtree rooted at
the leaving user’s sibling node, and a key update procedure similar to that of a
join event takes place. Since all users have the same view of the key tree structure,
they can also cooperate in the update operations of the key tree, such as the batch
relocation/movement.
An important factor in the rekeying cost is the depth of the joining/leaving
node, d. In the first implementation, d rounds of DH key exchange will be per-
formed in key update, which has 2d exponentiations and d message transmissions
in total. in the second implementation, the sponsor needs to compute d un-blinded
keys, d blinded keys, and send d messages. Therefore, the two implementations
have the same total computation and communication cost, as well as the same time
complexity. But in the second implementation, half of the computation load and
almost all communication load are on the sponsor. As for the storage overhead,
in the first implementation, only the group controller needs to store the structure
of the key tree, whose size is proportional to the group size. In the second imple-
mentation, each user needs to store a copy of the key tree structure and the total
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Table 5.4: A Comparison of Rekeying Protocol Complexity (group size n)
Key update time Rekeying message overhead
in group lifetime (# of messages)
for one user for entire system with multicast without multicast
JET O(n) O(n log(log n)) O(log n) O(n)
TGDH O(n log n) O(n log n) O(log n) O(n)
GDH.2 O(n2) O(n2) O(n2) O(n2)
Computation overhead
(# of exponentiations)
for one user for all users
JET O(log(log n)) O(n)
TGDH O(log n) O(n)
GDH.2 O(n) O(n2)
storage overhead grows proportional to the square of the group size.
5.5.3 Protocol Complexity
In this subsection, we provide a more comprehensive comparison of the protocol
complexity between JET and TGDH. The complexity aspects we consider are
the rekeying time cost during a group lifetime, the messaging overhead, and the
computation overhead. These results are summarized in Table 5.4.
Time Complexity from Other Perspectives
Our previous discussions have been focused on the time cost from individual user’s
perspective and on a per event basis. Two additional aspects can help evaluate
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the overall efficiency of key management from a system perspective. One is the
amount of time a user spends on key update during his/her lifetime in the group,
and the other is the amount of time the whole group spends on key update during
the lifetime of the group.
Consider a sequence of n join events followed by n leave events. We assume
that the first user joining the group is also the last one to leave the group. In JET,
such a user will spend most of the life time in the main tree for key management
purpose. On average, this user will spend 2-round time for key update with each
user join event and 3-round time with each user leave event, assuming all users
report their staying time accurately. Therefore this user has spent Θ(n) rounds in
total on key update during the life time. Since this user has the longest life time
among all users, O(n) is the upper bound for any user’s total key update time. For
tree-based key agreement using a simple key tree, this first-come-last-leave user
will spend O(n log n) rounds in total on key update.
If we consider a group of n users as a whole, for the same sequence of events
described above, the group will spend O(n log(log n)) rounds in key update using
JET. If a key agreement using a simple key tree is employed, the time cost will
be O(n log n). Compared to TGDH, we note that the improvement from a system
perspective is not as significant as that from a user’s perspective.
Communication Complexity
During member join and leave, a joining/leaving member should send a join/leave
request. Afterwards, in the rekeying process, at least two messages will be sent for
each DH key exchange. This messaging overhead is the communication cost of the
rekeying protocol.
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We now discuss the average number of messages for user join and leave events
in JET protocol. In the first scenario, we consider that multicast is available. In
particular, if a message needs to be sent to m users, sending one multicast message
would suffice. In this case, the average number of messages is O(log n) for both
join and leave events. In the second scenario, we consider that multicast is not
available. If a message needs to be sent to m users, m duplicate copies of the
same message must be sent. In this case the average number of messages is O(n)
for both user join and leave event. From Table 5.4 we can see that, the rekeying
message overhead in JET is comparable to those in TGDH.
Computation Complexity
In the proposed JET protocol, the total number of exponentiations performed by all
users is O(n) during the key update for a join or leave event. Such a measurement
captures the overall computation load of the entire group.
During each join or leave event, the number of exponentiations performed by
any individual member is less than or equal to two times the number of DH
rounds. Therefore for any single user, the average number of exponentiations
is also O(log(log n)) per join/departure event.
5.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have presented a new contributory key agreement, known as
the Join-Exit-Tree Group Key Agreement, for secure group communications. Built
upon tree-based group key management, the proposed scheme employs a main tree
as well as join and exit subtrees that serve as temporary buffers for joining and
leaving users. To achieve time efficiency, we have shown that the optimal subtree
191
capacity is at the log scale of the group size and designed an adaptive algorithm to
activate and update join and exit subtrees. As a result, the proposed JET scheme
can achieve an average time cost of O(log(log n)) for user join and leave events in
a group of n users, and reduces the total time cost of key update over a system’s
life time from O(n log n) by prior works to O(n log(log n)). In the meantime, the
proposed scheme also achieves low communication and computation overhead. Our
experimental results on both simulated user activities and the real MBone data
have shown that the proposed scheme outperforms the existing tree-based schemes
by a large margin in the events of group key establishment, user join, and user
departure for large and dynamic groups, without sacrificing the time efficiency for
small groups.
5.7 Appendix: Derivations
5.7.1 Derivation for Inequality (5.5)







log A + 1, (5.20)
where r(1) = 1, r(2p + q) = 1 + r(q), p is a non-negative integer, and q ∈ [1, 2p] is
a positive integer. The equality holds when A is a power of 2.
We first use induction to show that when A = 2p, p = 0, 1, 2, ..., the equality
holds.
When A = 1, LHS = RHS = 1.








log 2p + 1. (5.21)
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log 2p+1 + 1 = RHS,
where (5.22) is obtained using the induction assumption (5.21).
We now prove the inequality for any positive integer A. It is obvious to see
that inequality is true for A = 1, 2. By induction, suppose that the inequality is
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+ 1, (5.24)
where (5.23) is obtained using the induction assumption.
To prove that (5.24) ≤ 1
2






log(4q) ≤ log A. (5.25)




dx, (5.25) can be written











































We denote B = 2p and fix p (hence B is fixed). Thus A = B + q. It is
straightforward to see that (5.26) holds when B + q ≥ 4q, or 1 ≤ q ≤ B
3
.













dx ≥ 0. (5.27)
Since q is the only variable in (5.27), let f(q) be the LHS of (5.27), and consider















where q ∈ [B/3, B]. Taking the derivative of f(q), we get
d
dq






dx < 0. (5.28)
In previous proof we showed that the equality of (5.20) holds when A is power of
2, i.e. f(B) = 0. We also showed that f(q) > 0 for 1 ≤ q ≤ B
3
. Since f(B/3) > 0,
f(B) = 0, f(q) is continuous on [B/3, B] and f ′(q) < 0, we must have f(q) > 0 on
[B/3, B]. Thus (5.26) also holds for B/3 ≤ q ≤ B. This completes the proof.
5.7.2 Derivation for Inequality (5.11)
In this appendix, we prove the inequality (5.11) holds for any x > 8,
log x >
2 ln x
2 ln x− 1 log(2 ln x). (5.29)
Let y = ln x. We consider the case when the group size is larger than 1, so
x ∈ (1, +∞), and y ∈ (0, +∞). Under such a condition, (5.29) becomes
2y − 1 > 2 ln 2(1 + log y). (5.30)
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Let g(y) = (2y − 1) − 2 ln 2(1 + log y). Function g(y) havs two zeros at y0 = 1/2
and y1 ≈ 1.7564. In addition, g(y) > 0 for any y > y1. Therefore (5.29) holds
for any x > ey1 ≈ 5.7917. In our proposed protocol, we choose a larger threshold





In this dissertation, we have investigated the potential, the mechanism, and the
performance of incorporating signal processing techniques, as well as beneficial
knowledge from other related fields of study, into different layers of a secure com-
munication system. The fusion of different technical disciplines can take place
at physical layer communications for tracing the adversary, at application layer
for confidentiality protection and content authentication for multimedia, at sys-
tem deployment phase of sensor networks for jointly optimizing sensing coverage
and secure communication, and at protocol design phase for improving key man-
agement efficiency and user satisfaction. Such an interdisciplinary and cross-layer
approach for application security is important in meeting the demands of emerging
communication paradigms and multimedia applications.
In Chapter 2, we have looked into the unique issues related to multimedia en-
cryption and content authentication in the multimedia communication scenario.
We have proposed atomic encryption operations for multimedia that can preserve
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standard compliance and are friendly to delegate processing, provided quantita-
tive analysis on the security and bit-rate overhead, and presented a systematical
study on how to strategically integrate different encryption operations to build a
video encryption system. For media authentication, we have adapted the concept
of unicity distance to evaluate the security of image hashing, discovered the po-
tential key disclosure problem for popular image hashing schemes, and proposed
mitigation solutions.
In chapter 3, we focus on the security issues in cooperative wireless commu-
nication systems. We have discovered the threat of signal garbling attack from
compromised relay nodes, and propose a countermeasure to trace and pinpoint
the adversarial relay. The proposed tracing scheme employs an adaptive signal de-
tection algorithm, coupled with an statistical tracing symbol aggregation scheme,
and can pinpoint the malicious relay with very high accuracy and low bandwidth
overhead.
In Chapter 4, we have investigated the impact of sensor deployment on the per-
formance of sensing coverage and secure connectivity in sensor networks. We have
provided analysis for static sensor deployment scenario, and proposed two sen-
sor location adjustment algorithms for mobility-assisted sensor deployment. Our
results show that by jointly optimizing sensing coverage and secure communica-
tion connectivity, we can achieve a better and more balanced performance in both
performance categories.
In Chapter 5, we have studied the scalability of contributory key management
and proposed a new scheme, the Join-Exit Tree (JET) key management scheme,
for time-efficient key management. To improve time efficiency, optimization and
scheduling techniques, together with cryptographic primitives, are integrated into
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the proposed key management protocol. The time efficiency for user join and
departure event is significantly improved from O(log n) to O(log(log n)), while
achieving high communication and computation efficiency.
Throughout this dissertation, we have shown that the various security issues
in a multi-layer communication system can be better solved by instilling signal
processing concept into the design of application security. Such a design paradigm
can have a broad impact and wide applications, including in other related areas
such as confidentiality preserving search and retrieval for multimedia content, dig-
ital forensics for communication and multimedia, as well as high performance and
trusted computing. The possible future extensions of this dissertation include the
following aspects.
In the multimedia security area, the content encryption and authentication
techniques introduced in this paper can be jointly employed, and combined with
feature domain obfuscation techniques to build a privacy-preserving search and
retrieval engine for multimedia data. To ensure the scalability of such system, the
system can employ database techniques such as hashing and indexing to achieve
efficiency and scalability. Such an media search and retrieval will have the fol-
lowing benefits. Since the data stored in the database are encrypted, when the
database is compromised, the attacker cannot observe the clear-text content stored
in the database. The search and retrieval can be performed by comparing the
hash distance without the decryption of content, which is computation-efficient
and time-efficient. With obfuscation and randomization techniques on the hash
vector, the content owner can share the searching capability with some authorized
users, without revealing the content of the media to unauthorized users.
In the wireless communication security area, our adversary-tracing scheme in
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cooperative wireless communications focuses on one-hop relay situation. It will
be fruitful to extend such a framework to multi-hop relay, and combine network-
layer routing information into the adversary tracing scheme. One security problem
similar to the adversary-tracing scenario is the security of channel estimation.
Usually channel estimation is achieved through the sender sending pre-determined
pilot symbols to the receiver. When the sender node is compromised and sends
garbled pilot symbols to confuse the receiver, the receiver should be able to detect
such malicious behavior. In our preliminary study, we have seen that the statistical
behavior of the estimated channel condition from garbled pilot symbols deviates
from that of the normal estimation result. Therefore the receiver can use multiple
garbled pilot symbols as a “self-reference” to detect channel estimation attack in
a probabilistic manner. We envision such an approach to be especially effective
under slow-fading channel condition.
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